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1COMMENTARY BY  
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
In September, UNODC published its Afghan Opium Survey 
2009 with detailed estimates of cultivation, production, 
labour force, revenues and domestic prices.
This Report is a sort of a sequel: it presents a perspective 
that is both deeper in scope and broader in geographical 
coverage. It looks at the multiple consequences of Afghan 
drugs as they move through neighbouring states, along the 
Balkan and Eurasian routes, ending up in Europe, the Rus-
sian Federation, even China and India. This analysis is 
proposed to help the international community appreciate 
the fact that we all are part of the Afghan drug problem: 
hence, we all must work for its solution, addressing all links 
of the drug chain: (i.) assistance to farmers to reduce supply, 
(ii.) drug prevention and treatment to curb demand, and 
(iii.) law enforcement against intermediaries.
These intermediaries are not only shady characters linked 
to international mafias. They are also (i.) white collar 
Afghan officials, who take a cut by protecting the drug 
trade, as well (ii.) the religious fanatics and political insur-
gents who do the same to finance their cause. 
By looking, with unprecedented detail, at the Health, Secu-
rity and Stability dimensions of the Afghan drug problem, 
this report shows what more needs to be done at a time 
when, within the country, market forces have reduced 
domestic cultivation by 1/3 in the past 24 months. Let us 
begin with the health question.
AddictionA. 
The catalogue of casualties caused by Afghan narcotics is 
gruesome. We need to go back to the dramatic opium addic-
tion in China a century ago to find comparable statistics.
Every year, s  more people die from Afghan opium 
than any other drug in the world: perhaps 100,000 
globally.
The number of people who die of heroin overdoses in s 
NATO countries per year (above 10,000) is ﬁve times 
higher than the total number of NATO troops killed 
in Afghanistan in the past 8 years, namely since the  
beginning of military operations there in 2001.
The number of addicts in the Russian Federation has s 
multiplied by 10 during the past 10 years, and they 
now consume a staggering 75-80 tons/year of Afghan 
heroin. More Russian people die from drugs per  
year (at present 30,000-40,000, according to govern-
ment estimates) than the total number of Red Army 
soldiers killed during the Soviet invasion and the  
ensuing 7-year Afghan campaign.
Despite major eﬀorts to cope with drug traﬃcking, s 
the Islamic Republic of Iran is swamped by Afghan 
opium: with its estimated 1 million opiate users, Iran 
faces one of the world’s most serious opiates addiction 
problem.
Central Asia, once only a conduit for Afghan heroin, s 
is now a major consumer – a habit that is resulting in 
an HIV epidemic caused by injecting drug use. 
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These numbers show that Afghan opium is not a home-
made Marshall Plan, to replace (inadequate) foreign devel-
opment assistance with (illegal) domestic revenues. Nor is 
it the result of a country short on controls and long on cor-
ruption. Rather, these numbers suggest that the Afghan 
opium trade is a well-funded threat to the health of nations. 
And what about security?
CrimeB. 
While in recent years opium has generated up to $1 billion 
per year to Afghan farmers, the global heroin market is 
worth many times that much ($65 billion). Not idly, Presi-
dent Karzai pointed out to me that: “we take 3% of the 
revenue and 100% of the blame”. This report documents the 
extent to which benign neglect, incompetence and corrup-
tion enable narcotics to move from one of the poorest 
(landlocked) countries in the world, to the main streets of 
the richest nations in Europe and (growingly) Asia. Here 
are the hard facts to document this systemic failure.
While 90% of the world’s opium comes from  s 
Afghanistan, less than 2% is seized there. This is a 
major law enforcement defeat, as it is incomparably 
cheaper and easier to detect and interdict an illicit  
activity at the source, rather than at destination  
(Colombia, the other major drug-producing country, 
seizes 10 times more of its dope than Afghanistan: as  
a consequence, on the high street, purity has decreased 
and prices increased)
Most of the s  Afghan borders with Pakistan are wide 
open, enabling low-risk smuggling back and forth 
across the Durand Line, especially in Balochistan. 
Almost no drugs are seized in the Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas (FATA) although thousands of tons 
transit the region. Abuse of the Afghan Trade Transit 
Agreement (ATTA) as well as exploitation of centu-
ries-old kinship ties, have turned the Afghanistan/
Pakistan border – already known for the unimpeded 
movements of insurgents-- into a massive illicit free 
trade zone of drugs, chemicals precursor, money,  
people and weapons.
The rates of interception of the opiate ﬂows in the s 
Islamic Republic of Iran (20%) and in Pakistan (17%) 
are more signiﬁcant, but are not matched in other 
countries or regions (except China). 
Countries of Central Asia are s  only seizing around 5% 
of the 90 tons of heroin that cross their territory, on 
the move to the Russian Federation.
The Russian Federation, the foremost (national) s 
heroin market, consumes 20% of the Afghan heroin 
production, but seizes a meagre 4% of the ﬂow reach-
ing its territory.
Even worse, countries of South-Eastern Europe,  s 
including EU members like Greece, Bulgaria and 
Romania, are intercepting less than 2% of the heroin 
ﬂow.
There is something basically wrong with global counter-
narcotics. Why are global seizures of cocaine (from Andean 
countries) twice as high, in absolute and relative terms, than 
for opiates (from Afghanistan)? To understand the menace 
resulting from this law enforcement failure, let us look at 
the threat Afghan drugs pose to stability.
InsurgencyC. 
The Taliban’s relationship with opium has gone through 
stages, each a manifestation of an opportunistic response to 
the situation on the ground – within, but especially beyond, 
Afghanistan.
When in power (in the second half of the 1990s), the s 
Taliban tolerated opium cultivation and facilitated its 
export. In the process, through a direct taxation on 
farmers (ushr) they generated about $75-100 million 
per year to fund a regime without alternative sources 
of foreign exchange.
In the summer of 2000, as a Security Council embar-s 
go loomed, Mullah Omar banned opium cultivation 
(but not its export). Thanks to the regime’s near total 
control of the territory, farmers had no option but to 
respect the decree (fatwa). In the fall of 2000, they 
refrained from planting; the spring 2001 harvest was 
close to zero. 
Ever since their return as insurgents into southern s 
Afghanistan (in 2005) the Taliban – and other anti-
government forces – have derived enormous sums of 
money from the drug trade. Although the amounts 
are subject to debate, some order of magnitude esti-
mates are possible. 
In 2006-2007, the drug-related funds accruing to insur-
gents and warlords were estimated by UNODC at $200-
400 million a year. This estimate included incomes from 
four sources: levies on opium farmers; protection fees on 
lab processing; transit fees on drug convoys; and taxation 
on imports of chemical precursors. The proposed sum, a 
surprise to many observers, was in line with the high opium 
prices at that time and the unprecedented levels of cultiva-
tion (never repeated). 
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Ever since, the opium economy of Afghanistan has changed 
its shape and nature: crops, prices and revenues have 
declined; additional sources of revenue have materialized 
for the Taliban; also insurgents outside Afghanistan have 
started to benefit in their own right. In total, there have 
been pluses and minuses.
During the past four years (2005-2008) the Taliban s 
have made $450-600 million in total from taxing 
opium cultivation and trade in Afghanistan. Year over 
year the amounts have changed as both cultivation 
(hectares) and prices ($/kg) in the middle of the pe-
riod were much higher than in earlier and later years. 
At the same time, Afghanistan’s opiate exports have s 
shifter towards a greater share of reﬁned products  
(at present 2/3 of the raw opium output is turned into 
heroin and morphine compared to 3/4 a few years 
back). This has allowed the Taliban to tax higher val-
ue-added commodities (reﬁned products) and other 
drug-related activities: lab processing, traﬃcking and 
the import of precursors – a business worth around  
$3 billion in 2007 in Afghanistan alone.
Furthermore, the Taliban and other al-Qaeda linked s 
groups have been taking a share of the $1 billion  
opiate market in Pakistan. 
As a consequence, the estimation of the revenue derived by 
insurgents in Afghanistan has become more complex, as the 
taxes imposed on licit economic activity have to be taken 
into account and added: a source of money that did not 
 
 
 
exist in 2006-2007 when the anti-government groups did 
not control the territory in southern Afghanistan as widely 
and permanently as they do now. Furthermore, the lines 
between the ideologically-driven Taliban, the criminal 
groups in the business for profit, and the government offi-
cials taking a cut for greed, have become blurry. Pinning all 
the blame on anti-government forces diverts attention from 
the broad range of profiteers, at home and abroad. In short, 
the Afghan drug economy generates several hundred mil-
lion dollars per year into evil hands – some with black 
turbans, others with white collars. 
A perfect storm spiralling into Central Asia 
The most sinister development yet is taking shape outside 
Afghanistan. Drugs are funding insurgency in Central Asia 
where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic 
Party of Turkmenistan, the East Turkistan Liberation 
Organization and other extremist groups are also profiting 
from the trade. The Silk Route, turned into a heroin route, 
is carving out a path of death and violence through one of 
the world’s most strategic, yet volatile regions. The perfect 
storm of drugs, crime and insurgency that has swirled 
around the Afghanistan/Pakistan border for years, is head-
ing for Central Asia. If quick preventive measures are not 
put into place, a big chunk of Eurasia could be lost – 
together with its massive energy reserves. 
This report provides a diagnosis of the transnational threat 
posed by Afghanistan’s opium that only an international 
and truly comprehensive effort can address. 
Antonio Maria Costa 
Executive Director 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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In the world over 15 million people use illicit opiates s 
(opium, heroin and morphine) annually. The value of  
the global opiate market is estimated at US$ 65 billion. 
In the 1990s, production shifted from South-East Asia s 
(mainly Myanmar) to Afghanistan which at present  
provides over 90 per cent of global supply.
More than 60 per cent of drug treatment demand in Asia s 
and Europe relate to opiates that are, especially heroin, 
the most deadly drugs. Deaths due to overdose are, in any 
single year, as high as 5,000-8,000 in Europe, and several 
times this amount in the Russian Federation alone.
The world consumes some 3,700 tons of illicit opium s 
per year (1/3 raw and 2/3 processed into heroin) and 
seizes 1,000 tons. Illicit opiate trade ﬂows have never 
been previously known: this report breaks new ground 
by estimating them by country (and regions). 
Every year, the equivalent of some 3,500 tons of opium s 
ﬂow from Afghanistan to the rest of the world, via its 
immediate neighbours: 40 per cent through the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 30 per cent through Pakistan, and the 
rest through Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan).
The main opiate consumer market is Europe (about 19 s 
per cent of global consumption, with a market value of 
US$ 20 billion), the Russian Federation (15 per cent), 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (15 per cent), China (12 per 
cent), India (7 per cent), Pakistan (6 per cent), Africa  
(6 per cent) and the Americas (6 per cent).
The world only intercepts one ﬁfth of the global opiate s 
ﬂows every year, with very mixed performances at the 
country level. The Islamic Republic of Iran has the  
highest seizures rate, at 20 per cent. Next are China  
(18 per cent) and Pakistan (17 per cent). In the two 
main source countries, Afghanistan and Myanmar,  
seizures represent only 2 per cent each of the world total. 
An equally insigniﬁcant 2 per cent is seized in South-
Eastern Europe, the last segment of the Balkan route  
to Europe. Along the Northern route (Central Asia - 
Russia), the interception rate is also low (4-5 per cent).
Due to dramatic production increases in Afghanistan  s 
after 2005, some 12,000 tons of opium are now stock-
piled, in unknown locations. According to UNODC 
estimates, only a fraction (maybe 10 per cent) is kept by 
Afghan farmers. The rest is likely in the hands of crimi-
nal (traders) and insurgent groups.
Of the US$ 65 billion turnover of the global market for s 
opiates, only 5-10 per cent (US$ 3-5 billion) are esti-
mated to be laundered by informal banking systems. The 
rest is laundered through legal trade activities (includ-
ing smuggling of legal goods into Afghanistan) and the 
banking system.
This report assesses the relationship between the drug s 
economy and insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
When the Taliban were in power (in the late 1990s) they 
extracted US$ 75-100 million a year from taxing opium. 
In the 2005-2008 period the cumulative revenue from 
opiate farming and trade accruing to Taliban insurgents 
is estimated at US$ 350-650 million, or an annual aver-
age of US$ 90-160 million in Afghanistan alone. This 
estimate does not include insurgents’ potential revenues 
from other drug-related activities (labs, imports of pre-
cursors) in Afghanistan and from the US$1 billion opiate 
trade in Pakistan. Also not included are revenues ex-
tracted by insurgents from licit activity that takes places 
in areas they control.
Precursor traﬃcking converges on southern and western s 
Afghanistan and, so far, has not received as much  
attention as the outﬂow of opiates. Although growing, 
seizures remain low.  
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Global opium production increasingly shifted from South-
East Asia to Afghanistan during the 1990s. This trend 
increased in the first decade of the twenty-first century to 
the point that Afghanistan’s supply of opium exceeded 
world demand. Afghanistan is now the source for more 
than 90 per cent of the world’s deadliest drug. This gener-
ates a yearly income estimated  at US$ 65 billion, most of 
which is pocketed by criminals outside of Afghanistan. 
More than 60 per cent of all drug treatment demand in Asia 
and Europe is related to opiate abuse. The Afghan drug 
trade spreads crime, corruption, addiction and HIV. It is a 
major source of revenue for insurgents, criminals and ter-
rorists. It undermines governance, public health, and public 
security within Afghanistan and along trafficking routes. In 
short, it poses a major transnational threat to health and 
security. 
In line with its mandate to ensure evidence-based policy, 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
is carrying out a programme to analyse the scale and trans-
national impact of the Afghan opiate trade. Its principal 
objectives are to: 
analyse the dimensions and ﬂows of the Afghan  s 
opiate trade; 
identify the links between drugs, crime and insurgency s 
and the impact on health, development, security and 
the rule of law;  
provide information and analysis to stimulate a  s 
policy response.  
This report presents the first findings of the programme. 
They reveal:
How the ﬂows of Afghan opiates are distributed in 1. 
the world.   
The extent to which regional insurgency or instability 2. 
is fuelled by the Afghan opiate industry. 
In addition to UNODC’s own expertise, research material 
and fieldwork in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, 
information from a variety of other sources were used for 
the preparation of this report, including experts and offi-
cials from a number of government agencies and other 
international organizations, as well as secondary literature. 
How are the flows of Afghan opiates 1. 
distributed in the world?  
Law enforcement agencies have generally been able to track 
the evolution of opiate trafficking routes, mostly through 
data on seizures and arrests. However, to date, there has 
been no systematic assessment of the actual volume of opi-
ates flowing to various destinations across the world. That 
information is essential for developing a better understand-
ing of the patterns and dynamics of the global Afghan 
opiate trade. The task is challenging and must be treated as 
work in progress, and this report presents a first estimation 
of global Afghan opiate flows.
With production increasing over the last decade, market 
destinations for Afghan opiates diversified. While illicit opi-
ates continued to be exported to the lucrative European 
market, they also increasingly started to go towards the 
potentially large market in China, emerging markets such 
as Central Asia and the Russian Federation, and even to 
more remote regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and the 
USA. While world demand for opium and heroin is more 
or less stable, demand has been increasing in countries 
along trafficking routes, bringing with it increased health 
risks, including higher rates of HIV infection. 
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The world consumes approximately 3,700 tons of illicit 
opium per year (raw or processed into heroin)
According to 2008 UNODC estimates, there are around 
15.4 million opiate users in the world. The overwhelming 
majority (11.3 million) are heroin users and the others (4.1 
million), opium users. Global heroin consumption is esti-
mated at  340 tons of pure heroin per year 
(equivalent to 2,600 tons of opium) and raw opium con-
sumption is estimated at 1,100 tons per year, bringing 
global opiate consumption to around 3,700 tons of opium 
equivalent per year. 
Close to half of all global heroin consumption is estimated 
to take place in Europe (including the Russian Federation). 
Excluding Russia, European users  account for a quarter of 
global heroin consumption. Russian users rank second with 
about a fifth of the total, and Chinese users come next with 
more than a tenth. Heroin consumption figures for Africa 
have some limitations, but available estimates suggest that 
the continent may now account for some 7 per cent of 
global heroin consumption. Pakistan, India and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran account for one twentieth of total con-
sumption each.
As regards opium, global illicit consumption is estimated at 
close to 1,100 tons  per year, used by some 4 million users. 
The lion’s share, over 42 per cent, is estimated to be con-
sumed in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Opium production has doubled since 2006 
For some 15 years (1990-2005), global annual opium pro-
duction amounted to an average of 4,700 tons, and seizures 
to some 900-1,000 tons per year. The 3,700 tons remaining 
after seizures were sufficient to meet the estimated world 
demand for illicit opiates and the illicit market was more or 
less stable. However, as of 2006, opium production almost 
doubled compared to the 1990-2005 average, due to a 
sharp increase in Afghanistan.
Major stockpiles of opium
Major overproduction during the 2006-2009 period can be 
estimated at over 12,000 tons of opium, enough to satisfy 
more than two years of world consumption. Stockpiles are 
probably in remote regions of Afghanistan, in neighbouring 
countries, or along trafficking routes. Speculation as to why 
so much opium is being withheld from the market ranges 
from economic reasons (a hedge against falling prices) to 
more sinister scenarios (a funding source for further insur-
gency or terrorist attacks). 
Every year, some 375 tons of Afghan heroin  
(and morphine) enter the world market 
The total quantity of (pure1) heroin consumed (340 tons) 
or seized (about 90 tons) in the world amounts to some 430 
tons per year. Opium from Myanmar and the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic yields some 50 tons of heroin and the 
rest, some 380 tons of heroin/morphine, is produced exclu-
sively from Afghan opium. About 5 tons are consumed and 
seized in Afghanistan itself, and the remaining 375 tons 
enter the world market. 
UNODC estimates that around 110 tons of heroin are 
exported to Europe, about 100 tons to Central Asia (the 
majority destined for the Russian Federation), some 25 tons 
to Africa, 15-17 tons to China, and some 15-20 tons to the 
1 Throughout this report, the term “heroin” refers to pure heroin which is equal 
to the purity of heroin produced in Afghanistan (70 per cent). 
Global potential opium production, 1980-2009
Source: UNODC World Drug Report (figure for 2009 based on 2009 Survey results for Afghanistan and 2008 data for the rest of the world).
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Executive Summary
USA and Canada. The remainder is smuggled to other 
destinations such as the Middle East.2 
First, heroin is trafficked to Afghanistan’s immediate 
neighbours, Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan. Some 40 per cent (150 tons) of Afghanistan’s 
heroin is trafficked to Pakistan, which is one of the main 
transit countries for Afghan heroin destined for Iran, India, 
Africa, Europe, the USA, Canada, China and East and 
South-East Asia.  About 30 per cent (105 tons) enters Iran 
and 25 per cent Central Asian countries (100 tons). It is 
possible that the remainder, some 20 tons (5 per cent) of 
Afghan heroin, is being smuggled into India. This hypothesis 
requires further research, due to current data limitations.
  
2 All the ﬁndings on opiate ﬂows rely heavily on opiate demand statistics 
provided in UNODC World Drug Reports and are subject to change as eﬀorts 
to improve demand data progress. 
30 per cent of all Afghan heroin is trafficked to Europe, 
primarily via the Balkan route  
The primary supply line for the European market is the 
“Balkan route”, flowing from the Islamic Republic of Iran 
to Europe. Between Iran and Europe, Turkey is the central 
hub from which narcotics are shipped onward to Bulgaria, 
Greece, Albania and Romania. Wholesale heroin importa-
tion into Turkey is almost exclusively from Iran, although a 
small amount is trafficked from the Syrian Arab Republic. 
Of the estimated 110 tons of Afghan heroin that reach 
Europe every year, around 80 per cent (85 tons) is traf-
ficked along the Balkan route. The rest comes via the Rus-
sian Federation (Central Asia-Russia), the Black Sea route 
(Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Black Sea), Pakistan (by air), 
Africa (by air and sea) and South-East Asia (by air). In 
recent years, probably due in part to increasing instability 
in the Caucasus, heroin trafficking via the Black Sea route 
seems to be increasing. 
Estimates of opiate stockpiles  
for the period 2006-2009*:
Total global opium production: 31,000 tons.s 
Total global opiate demand and  s 
seizures (in opium equivalent): 19,000 tons
Total opium surplus: 31,000 – 19,000 = 12,000 tonss 
Global heroin consumption (340 tons)*, 2008 
(share of countries/regions)
* 340 tons of heroin is equal to 2,600 tons of opium. 
Source: UNODC.
Global opium consumption (1,100 tons), 2008 
(share of countries/regions)
Source: UNODC.
Pakistan, 6%
(19 tons)
Others, 7%
(24 tons)
Africa, 7%
(24 tons)
USA&
Canada, 6%
(22 tons)
Europe 
(except Russia&Turkey), 26%
(88 tons)
Russian
Federation, 21%
(70 tons)
S&SE 
Asia, 5%
(17 tons)
India, 5%
(17 tons)
China, 13%
(45 tons)
Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 5%
(17 tons)
S&SE Asia, 8%
(75 tons)
Myanmar, 1%
(7 tons)
Pakistan, 7%
(80 tons)
Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 42%
(450 tons)
India, 6%
(67 tons)
Other, 9%
(90 tons)
Africa, 6%
(60 tons)
Afghanistan, 7%
(80 tons)
Russian Federation, 5%
(58 tons) Europe (except 
Russia&Turkey), 9%
(95 tons)
* Figure for 2009 based on 2009 Survey results for Afghanistan and 2008 
data for the rest of the world.
Does 75 per cent of the heroin  
consumed in the USA and Canada 
come from Afghanistan?
A total of 22 tons of heroin is estimated to be consumed 
in the USA and Canada. Until now, it was thought that 
the majority of this heroin originated in Latin America 
and Mexico. But with the amount of opium reportedly 
produced there, not more than 10 tons of heroin can be 
produced annually, half of which goes to the north. 
Either some 17-20 tons of heroin are being trafficked 
from Afghanistan (or its neighbours) to North America, 
or Colombia and/or Mexico are producing more opium 
than previously reported. 
ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY  The transnational threat of Afghan opium 
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Executive Summary
20 per cent of all Afghan heroin is trafficked to  
the Russian Federation via Central Asia
The estimated 75-80 tons of Afghan heroin flowing to 
Russia are trafficked from Afghanistan via Central Asian 
countries. The Central Asian heroin route crosses Afghani-
stan’s borders with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and particu-
larly Tajikistan. Most of the heroin (almost two thirds, or 
50 out of 75-80 tons) is then trafficked through Kazakhstan 
by road to Russia. As the last and only northbound transit 
country for Afghan opiates, Kazakhstan may be as impor-
tant as Tajikistan on the Northern route. Demand for 
Afghan heroin has increased dramatically in Russia, and the 
country has now become more a destination than a transit 
area. Indeed, there appears to be very limited heroin traf-
ficking from Russia to Europe.  
A quarter of the Chinese heroin market may now be 
supplied by Afghan heroin
New avenues of Afghan opiate distribution have emerged. 
It appears that the Chinese opiate market is no longer sup-
plied exclusively from Myanmar’s declining opium produc-
tion. Afghan heroin apparently began to be trafficked to 
China in 2000, mainly via Pakistan, but also across China’s 
borders with Central Asia. 
On the basis of tentative estimates, Afghan heroin may now 
command a 25 per cent share (15-17 tons) of the Chinese 
opiate market. This trend, combined with increased regional 
trade and migration, may result in a growing market share 
for Afghan heroin in China in the years to come.
Other countries traditionally supplied by the “golden trian-
gle” may also increasingly see Afghan heroin entering their 
domestic markets.    
The case of India
With an estimated 0.8 million heroin users, India is one of 
the largest opiate markets in South Asia. Some 15-20 tons 
of heroin may be consumed in India every year. But the 
exact source of supply is unknown.
Some 30-35 tons of Afghan heroin may be trafficked  
to Africa every year 
Demand for heroin in Africa seems to have been increasing 
since 2004. A substantial amount (some 20 tons) of heroin 
is shipped through seaports and airports to Africa from 
Pakistan every year. The rest, 10-15 tons of heroin, seems to 
be trafficked to Africa from the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
Gulf States, India and South and South-East Asian coun-
tries (except China) every year. Traffickers from West Africa 
and Nigeria in particular are known to operate in Pakistan 
and in some Central Asian countries, among others. These 
networks further smuggle Afghan heroin to the USA and 
Europe, using countries in Africa and other regions as tran-
sit points. Afghan heroin is also smuggled into Africa to 
meet demand on the continent, which is tentatively esti-
mated at around 25 tons per year.    
On average, little more than 1 per cent of opium  
production is seized in Afghanistan  
Between 2002 and 2007, a total of 395 tons of opium 
equivalents of heroin, morphine and opium were seized in 
Afghanistan. This corresponds to 1.3 per cent of the total 
amount of opium produced during these years in Afghani-
stan (29,600 tons). By contrast, during the same period, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran seized 2,063 tons (7 per cent of 
Afghanistan’s production) and Pakistan 1,057 tons (3.6 per 
cent of Afghanistan’s production) of opium equivalent. 
Between 2002 and 2006, on average, 20 per cent of the 
estimated global opiate flow was seized in the world every 
year. A closer look at drug seizures relative to drug flows 
reveals some interesting facts, and some weak links. Seizures 
as a proportion of the estimated opiate flow affecting 
Afghanistan, Africa, Myanmar and South-East Europe 
(except Turkey), East, South and South-East Asia (except 
China) and India are quite low (1-3 per cent), compared 
What is the source of opiates  
consumed in India?
Based on demand estimates, heroin consumption in 
India is estimated at 15-20 tons per year. Data show 
that heroin is also trafficked from India to various 
destinations in Africa, North America and Europe. 
Since there appears to be very limited heroin traffick-
ing from Myanmar to India, this would suggest that 
heroin comes from Afghanistan or is produced in 
India itself.  
Similarly, while illicit opium consumption in India is 
estimated at 70 tons per year, official reports from 
India state that no opium is trafficked into the country. 
This would suggest that opium for illicit domestic 
consumption is supplied by local production in India. 
25 per cent of the heroin market  
in China may now be supplied by 
Afghan heroin  
From 1998 to 2008, Myanmar’s opium production 
declined by more than 70 per cent while opium pro-
duction in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
decreased by more than 90 per cent. The Chinese 
heroin market is no longer supplied exclusively from 
the “golden triangle”, but may now be supplied also 
by Afghan heroin, which is trafficked via Pakistan, 
Central Asia, Africa and Gulf countries. 
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with the ratio for other countries, such as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (20 per cent), China (18 per cent) and 
Pakistan (17 per cent).  
Precursor chemicals are a key but overlooked link in  
the chain
A large quantity of controlled and non-controlled chemi-
cals is required to produce heroin from Afghanistan’s opium 
crop – around 13,000 tons per year. None of these chemi-
cals are produced in Afghanistan. They are diverted from 
licit channels in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and 
then smuggled to Afghanistan. The most essential precursor 
chemical for producing heroin is acetic anhydride, of which 
an estimated 1,300 tons are required annually for that pur-
pose in Afghanistan. Only 1 per cent of that quantity was 
seized in the country in 2008.    
Precursors are trafficked across all Afghanistan’s borders, 
but the southern and western borders are particularly tar-
geted. Smuggling into Afghanistan takes place at the bor-
ders with the provinces of Nangarhar, Hilmand, Kandahar 
and Nimroz, which in many places are unmanned and not 
monitored. Smuggling from the Islamic Republic of Iran 
takes place over its long borders with Afghanistan, particu-
larly those with the provinces of Nimroz and Farah.  
Region
2002 
(ha)
2009 
(ha)
Change  
2002-2009 (ha)
Central 96 132 +36
East 21,909 593 -21,316
North 691 0 -691
North-east 9,054 557 -8,497
South 39,220 103,014 +63,794
West 3,076 18,800 +15,724
Total 74,046 123,096 +49,050
Regional distribution of opium poppy  
cultivation in Afghanistan (hectares (ha))
Annual heroin/morphine and all opiates ﬂows and seizures in the world since 2002*
Country/Region
Heroin and morphine All opiates (heroin, morphine and opium) in opium equivalent
Estimated 
ﬂow 
(tons)
Average 
seizures* 
(tons)
Per cent of es-
timated ﬂow 
intercepted
Estimated 
ﬂow 
(tons)
Average 
seizures* 
(tons)
Per cent of es-
timated ﬂow 
intercepted
Afghanistan 380 4 1% 3,500 61 2%
Pakistan 150 26 18% 1,135 189 17%
Islamic Republic of Iran 140 17 12% 1,713 291 20%
Turkey 95 10 10% 768 69 9%
South-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, 
Greece, Albania, Romania, 
Serbia, The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia, 
Croatia, Montenegro)
90 1.5 2% 724 10.5 2%
Rest of Europe (except Russia) 105 9 9% 828 74 9%
Midde East& Gulf countries 
(except I.R. of Iran) 14 0.5 4% 114 4 4%
Central Asia 95 5 5% 790 39 5%
Russian Federation 77 3 4% 627 23 4%
Africa 35 0.3 1% 305 2.3 7%
Myanmar 60 1 1% 920 12 2%
India 37 1 3% 328 11 3%
China 55 9 16% 398 73 18%
Rest of S & SE Asia 30 0.7 2% 285 16 6%
Oceania 2 0.3 13% 19 2.5 13%
USA and Canada 24 2 9% 168 17 10%
* Seizure averages for 2002-2006.
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Prices for acetic anhydride have nearly tripled in Afghani-
stan in recent years. As a result, trafficking acetic anhydride 
is now more profitable than trafficking opium. It also car-
ries less risk of interception since law enforcement officials 
are focused on opiates.
98 per cent of Afghan opium production is concentrated 
in the unstable South and West
In recent years, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has 
been concentrated in the south-west of the country where 
government control is weakest. Regions of highest instabil-
ity are also the regions of highest cultivation. Just five prov-
inces account for 98 per cent of the country’s entire opium 
output. In 2009, the southern province of Hilmand alone 
accounted for 60 per cent of all opium poppy grown in 
Afghanistan. Much of the rest of the country (20 provinces 
out of 34) has become poppy free.
To what extent is regional insurgen-2. 
cy/instability fuelled by the Afghan 
opiate industry? 
Instability in Afghanistan and the region has an impact on 
the narco-industry, and vice versa.  
In the past, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
opium was used as a source of funding for the Mujahideen. 
Later it helped fuel internecine warfare between the 
Mujahideen competing for political power. Between 1995 
and 2000, the Taliban regime tolerated the drug trade and 
earned some US$ 75-100 million annually from taxing it. 
In the post-Taliban period, it was a source of revenue for 
warlords.  
As the Taliban regrouped in the south of the country and 
in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
they resumed the levying of taxes on agriculture, including, 
crucially, opium cultivation. More recently, there is evi-
dence that they are moving up the value added chain of the 
drug trade, linking up with criminal groups and reaping 
profits from drug production, trafficking, and the smug-
gling of precursor chemicals. There is growing evidence of 
the emergence of Afghan narco-cartels. 
Since 2005, there has been a conspicuous increase in the 
number of security incidents in Afghanistan in parallel with 
the sharp rise in opium production. The nexus of drugs, 
crime, and insurgency has become stronger, also spilling 
over into neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan. As 
a result, the transnational threat posed by Afghanistan’s 
opium has become more acute.
The value of the world opiate market is estimated at  
US$ 65 billion per year
An estimated 11.3 million heroin users pay around US$ 56 
billion to drug dealers every year. The value of the global 
opium market is estimated at around US$ 7 billion. Con-
sequently, the combined opium/heroin market is worth 
some US$ 65 billion per year. This number is higher than 
the GDP of more than 120 countries in the world. 
Europe represents the largest share of the global opiate 
market, with some US$ 20 billion, followed by the Russian 
Federation (US$ 13 billion) and the USA plus Canada 
(US$ 8 billion).  
Much of the money generated by the global opiate trade is 
injected into the world’s formal economies every year 
through the spread of money-laundering and the criminali-
zation of legal assets. It also fills the coffers of international 
Number of insurgent attacks in Afghanistan, January 2003 - July 2009
Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security.
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organized crime groups and finances insurgent and extrem-
ist groups active in conflict zones throughout the world. 
Nowhere is this synergy more evident than in Afghanistan 
where insurgents and drug traffickers have joined forces and 
presently control parts of the southern drug corridors into 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan.
In Afghanistan, Taliban insurgents draw some US$ 125 
million annually from the opium farmers and traders 
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan benefit from the drug 
trade at various points in the value chain and through sev-
eral mechanisms. This research has focused on the tradi-
tional taxes levied in Taliban-held areas, as well as the transit 
and trade levies that derive from drug trafficking which have 
been applied fairly systematically across southern and west-
ern Afghanistan since 2005. Estimates of Taliban insurgents 
cumulated revenue from these over a four-year period 
(2005-2008) range from US$ 350-650 million in 
Afghanistan. This translates into an average annual income 
of US$ 125 million (range: 90-160) and excludes potential 
wages and taxes related to precursor importation and 
processing facilities, among others.
The funds generated from the drugs trade can pay for 
soldiers, weapons and protection, and are an important 
source of patronage. 
Beyond the opiate economy, Taliban insurgents levy taxes 
on all forms of trade and agriculture. Although opiates are 
the highest-value drugs on the market, cannabis may also 
contribute to funding the insurgency.
The value of the opiate trade in Pakistan is estimated at 
US$ 1 billion annually, some of which likely goes to 
Pakistan-based insurgents
In Pakistan, the value of the Afghan opiate trade (including 
local consumption and transit trafficking to other coun-
tries) is estimated at around US$ 1 billion per year, with 
undetermined amounts going to insurgents active in the 
country. Despite the fact that it is a confirmed transit region 
for opiate flows out of Afghanistan, there were almost no 
seizures in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) bordering Afghanistan between 2002 and 2008. 
The twin insurgencies in Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
based all along the border between the two countries and 
FATA is a sanctuary for extremist/insurgent groups like the 
Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani network. 
Much like in Afghanistan, Pakistan-based insurgents report-
edly levy taxes on licit business and trade in this region 
(including supplies destined for the coalition) and there is 
growing evidence that this extends to the opiate trade. 
The value of the European opiate market is at least 20 
times bigger than that of Pakistan
With a figure of US$ 20 billion per year, the value of the 
Afghan opiate trade in Europe (Russia excluded) is no less 
than 20 times the value of the opiate trade in Pakistan (US$ 
1 billion). The economic power accruing to criminal organ-
izations running trafficking operations to Europe via the 
Balkan or the Northern routes dwarfs insurgents’ benefits 
in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan. As a whole, Europe’s stabil-
ity is not threatened by the opiate trade, but the very large 
revenues they extract from the drug trade have given these 
groups the means to achieve considerable influence in some 
countries along trafficking routes. 
Trans-border ties 
Transnational organized crime groups, with kin on both 
sides of the same border, as well as a diaspora farther up the 
trafficking route, are also major players and beneficiaries of 
the illicit opiate trade.   
The relation between the narcotics industry and the insur-
gency in southern Afghanistan is amplified by the role 
played by tribalism in both drug trafficking and insurgent 
networks. The strongest overlap between the insurgency, 
tribal networks and the drug trade is found in the southern 
and eastern parts of the country, and extends into Pakistan’s 
tribal areas across the Afghan border. Since 2005, there has 
been a notable increase in insurgent activity and an exten-
sion of the area under insurgent control, particularly along 
the restive Pashtun tribal belt on the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border. 
Cross-border tribal links, for example among Baluchi and 
Pashtun groups, facilitate the drug trade. Most Afghani-
stan-based criminal groups appear to operate locally, but 
the existence of diasporas in transit or destination countries 
such as Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Central 
Asia and further afield, for example the Gulf area, has 
allowed some trafficking organizations to expand their net-
works beyond the immediate region. 
Global opiate market value (US$ 65 billion/year)
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Family and tribal connections also form the basis of the 
parallel or underground banking system known as Hawala, 
a system used by both traffickers and insurgent movements 
to move money world-wide without detection.
Corruption oils the links in the supply chain 
Corruption oils the links in the opiate supply chain from 
Afghanistan to Europe and Asia.   
At the source, in Afghanistan, corruption buys protection 
against eradication, facilitates illicit shipments, and guaran-
tees impunity for drug traffickers. According to the World 
Bank, Afghanistan has been in the top 2 per cent of the most 
corrupt countries every year between 2002 and 2006. Cor-
ruption helps explain why, in 2008-2009, only 10,000 
hectares of opium were eradicated in Afghanistan (around 4 
per cent of the crop), less than 2 per cent of drugs were 
seized, and almost no major traffickers were brought to 
justice. 
Corruption also undermines trust in public institutions and 
officials, and steals badly needed development assistance.  
Average Afghans face corruption on a daily basis. In some 
areas in the south of the country, there is growing support 
for the Taliban, which is viewed as a solution to the prevail-
ing corruption and crime.
The Afghan drug trade thrives against a background of 
economic hardship in Afghanistan and the broader region, 
but with conditions varying substantially between coun-
tries. In Afghanistan, despite six years of reconstruction and 
development assistance totalling billions of dollars, unem-
ployment rates remain very high, a large proportion of the 
population still does not have access to basic services and 
80 per cent of people have no electricity. 
Poverty and economic stagnation are not only a catalyst for 
corruption; combined with weak governance and rule of 
law, they also drive ordinary citizens to take the risks associ-
ated with the production, processing and transportation of 
drugs. In Afghanistan, this combination of factors is also 
aiding insurgent recruitment.
Concluding remarks
Between 2002 and 2008, Afghan farmers earned a total of 
about US$ 6.4 billion from opium poppy cultivation, and 
Afghan traffickers approximately US$ 18 billion from local 
opiate processing and trading. During the same period, the 
transnational trade in Afghan opiates produced a total turn-
over of US$ 400-500 billion. Arrests figures suggest that 
around 1 million traffickers may be involved in bringing 
opiates to over 15 million opiate users across the world 
every year. The source of the trade is in Afghanistan, but its 
bulk takes place outside that country.
The last seven years have shown that extricating Afghani-
stan from the stranglehold of the opium economy is a long 
and gradual process, rife with setbacks and disappoint-
ments. The country may thus remain the world’s primary 
illicit opium producer for the foreseeable future. At the 
same time, there has been tangible progress, for example in 
the increasing number of poppy-free provinces, decreasing 
opium poppy cultivation during the last two years, and 
greater regional counter-narcotics cooperation.
The difficulties in eliminating opium production in 
Afghanistan and the transnational threat posed by the 
Afghan opiate trade suggest that solutions cannot be found 
in Afghanistan alone. This is a shared responsibility that 
requires a multilateral response. That is why UNODC has 
launched a number of regional and international initiatives, 
such as the Paris Pact and the Rainbow Strategy. These 
efforts must be actively supported and expanded to con-
tinue strengthening a strategic response that is based on (a) 
a growing understanding of the patterns and dynamics of 
the transnational Afghan opiate trade, and (b) a targeted, 
sequenced and cost-effective mix of interventions.
This report is designed to contribute to that process. It also 
highlights the need for further research on:
opiate demand, purity and prices; s 
links between drugs, crime and insurgency  s 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan;
international money ﬂows connected to the  s 
Afghan opiate trade;
transnational organized crime along the Balkan and s 
Northern routes;
growing penetration of Afghan opiates into East and s 
South-East Asia;
precursor chemical traﬃcking routes and procurement s 
methods.
This research will enhance our understanding of the deadly 
flows of Afghan opiates and inform policies to protect 
public health and security among affected countries.
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INTRODUCTION
In the framework of its Strategy for 2008-20111, UNODC 
has been developing monitoring and analysis programmes2 
for a number of priority transnational criminal markets and 
threats. With its severe consequences for crime, health, 
governance and security at the national, regional and inter-
national levels, the global trade in illicit Afghan opiates 
represents one of the biggest transnational drugs and crime 
threats the world has been facing over the last decade. Over 
the years, UNODC has undertaken a number of surveys 
and studies on various aspects of the issue, with a view to 
support countermeasures and initiatives at the national and 
international levels, such as the Paris Pact.  To complement 
these efforts and to help place them in an analytical frame-
work on the scale of this transnational problem, UNODC 
started, in September 2008, a programme to monitor and 
analyse the global trade in Afghan opiates and the threats it 
creates. 
The main objectives of that programme are:  
1) to gain a better understanding of the dimensions, pat-
terns and dynamics of the global trade in Afghan opiates; 
2) to identify and analyse its links with, and impact on, 
security and rule of law issues, including insurgency, organ-
ized crime, governance, corruption, money-laundering and 
other socio-economic issues; and
3) to provide analytical information that helps formulate 
strategic responses commensurate with the scale of the 
threat and aimed at dismantling the global Afghan opiate 
market.   
1 Strategy for the period 2008-2011 for the United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs 
and Crime (E/CN.7/2007/14).
2 These programmes are actually subprogrammes of a larger Trends Monitoring 
and Analysis Programme designed to implement results 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, in 
the result area Threat and Risk Analysis.
This report presents the first findings of the programme.
As global opium production increasingly shifted from 
South-East Asia to Afghanistan during the last two decades, 
the global market share of Afghan opiates grew considera-
bly. The Afghan opiate market now spans the globe and 
poses a threat for all the countries straddling trafficking 
routes as well as those hosting destination markets.
The social consequences of drug trafficking are devastating, 
particularly in states that lack resources to treat drug abus-
ers and raise public awareness of the dangers associated with 
drug abuse, including HIV infection. Areas with high drug 
abuse rates are located along well-established opiate traf-
ficking routes, from Afghanistan to destinations such as the 
Russian Federation or Western Europe. This is consistent 
with the idea that drug demand can be created through a 
“spill-over” effect along the supply chain. More than 60 per 
cent of all drug treatment demand in Asia and Europe is 
related to opiate abuse and a large number of drug-related 
deaths can be linked to the abuse of opiates produced in 
Afghanistan. Not only does drug addiction increase the 
spread of infectious diseases, it also leads to rising crime 
rates, can undermine public institutions and negatively 
impact national security.  
There is a need to determine the magnitude of opiate flows 
into transit and destination countries in order to better 
respond to the threats. However, a number of basic facts 
about the supply and demand for Afghan opiates remain 
unknown, even for established trafficking routes and desti-
nations, and new outlets seem to be emerging in Africa and 
China. This first report provides a comprehensive analysis 
of the global situation with regard to the Afghan opiate 
drug market, its size, flows and emerging patterns. 
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While thousands of tons of opiates (in opium equivalent) 
are trafficked out of Afghanistan, a comparable flow of 
precursor chemicals – crucial for processing opium into 
heroin – is smuggled into the country every year. The 
dynamics of precursor trafficking into and through Afghan-
istan are explored in section I, starting with an overview of 
suspected precursor trafficking routes on the basis of official 
seizure information, and detailing interactions across 
Afghanistan’s borders.
The opium economy in Afghanistan is a relatively recent 
phenomenon that grew out of the civil war and the resist-
ance against the Soviet Union military intervention in 
1979. For many years, opium income was used to finance 
the war efforts against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. 
Later on, it helped fuel internecine warfare between the 
seven largest Mujahedin groups, which started competing 
for political power. The Taliban regime that followed toler-
ated the drug trade and earned some US$ 75-100 million 
annually from taxing it between 1995 and 2000.3 After the 
dramatic drop in poppy cultivation and the fall of the Tali-
ban regime in 2001, the new Afghan government promptly 
prohibited opium production, but was not able to stop the 
resumption and growth of the opiate trade in Afghanistan. 
The first part also looks at the source of the threat, opium 
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. It provides an overview 
of the scale of the problem and analyses trends in Afghan 
opium production between 2000-2009. 
Links between international drug trafficking, organized 
crime, money-laundering and politically-motivated vio-
lence have been directly related to the Afghan narcotics 
industry. The value of the global opiate market is around 
US$ 65 billion per year. This trade incorporates a combina-
tion of indigenous/national, regional and international 
actors. Transnational organized crime groups are the main 
beneficiaries of this trade, which they supplement with 
other forms of crime such as arms trafficking and human 
smuggling. Insurgency groups in countries straddling drug 
routes from Afghanistan to destination countries have also 
become important financial beneficiaries and facilitators of 
the opium economy. Groups based in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
or Central Asia may gain access to only a fraction of the 
value of Afghan opiate exports, but this is still enough to 
support logistics, operations and recruitment. 
The substantial increases in insurgent visibility and mobili-
zation since 2005 coincide spatially and temporally with 
the concentration of opium production in the south. The 
continued concentration of poppies and processing in the 
south are good illustrations of links between insurgents and 
the drug trade. However, as opium poppy cultivation con-
centrates in the south, insecurity increasingly does not, 
spreading outward to areas that were previously stable, such 
as parts of north and north-west Afghanistan.
3 Kimberly L. Thachuk, Transnational Threats: smuggling and traﬃcking in 
arms, drugs, and human life, Praeger, 2007. 
The second part of the report examines the regional impli-
cations of the trafficking of Afghan opiates and associated 
transnational threats, particularly insurgencies in Afghani-
stan, but also across the border in Pakistan. Based on field-
work, official data and open sources, it analyses the views 
of analysts and law enforcement officials in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. 
All actors involved in destabilizing Afghanistan are directly 
or indirectly linked to the drug economy. For its part, the 
Taliban-led insurgency is content to reap dividends from 
the drug economy to finance war expenditures. Their abil-
ity to provide protection to farmers and traffickers (pre-
venting interdiction and eradication efforts) delegitimizes 
the national government as it links them with cultivators’ 
livelihoods, thereby (re)consolidating political influence in 
areas under their control.
For all the threats, ethnic and tribal links are important 
contextual factors. There is evidence that these facilitate 
smuggling and the movement of militants across Afghani-
stan’s porous borders. They may also widen the pool of 
potential recruits or sympathizers for both organized crime 
and insurgency. There also appears to be a link between 
opium cultivation, the shape of organized criminal net-
works and tribal identities; a link which is also analysed in 
the second part of the report.
The Afghan opiate trade represents a transnational threat, 
not only for countries on drug trafficking routes and final 
destinations, but also as a factor of international insecurity. 
Complementing other analytical efforts on the Afghan 
opiate trade, it is hoped that this report will help shed light 
on the scope and main characteristics of the global Afghan 
opiate trade and its security implications, regionally and 
internationally. 
Remarks on data sources and limitations
This report is a synthesis of information from a variety of 
sources, including information provided by Member States 
and the World Customs Organization (WCO), fieldwork 
undertaken in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries in 
2008-2009, as well as data from secondary literature and 
expert opinion, including law enforcement and govern-
ment officials. To obtain background information on the 
insurgency and suspected drug and precursor routes, the 
researchers interviewed headquarters and field officials of 
Afghan Customs, the Afghan Border Police, the Counter 
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, the Ministry of Counter 
Narcotics of Afghanistan, the Anti Narcotics Force of Paki-
stan and officials from various United Nations agencies and 
diplomatic missions, along with a number of other key 
informants.  
Estimating the scope of the global flow of Afghan opiates 
requires data on global opium/heroin demand. The lack of 
systematic statistics hinders comprehensive assessments of 
the extent of opiate abuse.  For the purpose of this report, 
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opium/heroin demand was calculated on the basis of preva-
lence data provided in UNODC World Drug Reports and 
compared with global opium production data. 
Global heroin and opium seizures were used to identify 
heroin/opium trafficking routes, and to help estimate the 
size of the heroin/opium flows in each country. For that 
purpose, UNODC Individual Drug Seizure and World 
Customs Organization databases for the years 2000-2008 
were used. In addition to the seizure data, information was 
drawn from official country reports such as ARQ (Annual 
Report Questionnaire) responses provided to UNODC. 
Available demand data was used as the key variable to esti-
mate the size of the heroin/opium flows in the world. The 
robustness of demand data varies from region to region and 
country to country and are subject to revisions and changes. 
Most countries still lack structured or organized data collec-
tion systems capable of producing scientifically sound 
demand, supply and seizure statistics. Accordingly, the sta-
tistics and estimates provided on heroin/opium demand 
and opiate flows should be viewed as work in progress and 
the best current approximations, given the available data. 
The annual profit of the Afghan Taliban from opiate trade 
was calculated on a combination of quantitative data from 
survey results (UNODC Afghan opium surveys) and qual-
itative information. These estimations are subject to change 
as additional data and information become available.
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1. THE OPIATE TRADE
GLOBA. AL DIMENSIONS  
AND FLOWS
Overall magnitude of the problem 1. 
Opium is the source material for the manufacture of mor-
phine and heroin, and more than 90 per cent of the world’s 
heroin is manufactured from opium produced in Afghani-
stan. 
Opiates are trafficked from Afghanistan to destinations 
worldwide via routes flowing into and through the neigh-
bouring countries of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. The implications of the opiate trade for 
Afghanistan and the world are grave and far-reaching. The 
Afghan opiate trade fuels opiate consumption and addic-
tion in countries along drug trafficking routes before reach-
ing the main consumer markets in Europe (estimated at 3.1 
million heroin users), contributing to the spread of HIV/
AIDS and other blood-borne diseases.
As most production and processing occurs in the south and 
west of Afghanistan, greater proportions of heroin are smug-
gled into the Islamic Republic of Iran (105 tons) and Paki-
stan (150 tons) than through Central Asia (95 tons). The 
Islamic Republic of Iran also receives an additional 35 tons 
of Afghan heroin from Pakistan. A portion of the heroin 
trafficked into Iran is distributed domestically (14 tons), 
but the bulk travels onward to Europe and the Middle East. 
In Pakistan, opiate traffickers operate routes to Iran, China, 
India and throughout Asia, but also to North America, 
Europe and other destinations. As in Iran, a significant 
domestic market absorbs a portion of the heroin trafficked 
through Pakistan (20 tons). The third opiate gateway out of 
Afghanistan is Central Asia, also known as the northern 
route. This route emerged relatively recently following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. It handles around 25 per cent 
of Afghanistan’s heroin, the majority of which is destined 
for the Russian Federation. The markets in Pakistan and 
Iran are larger than the market of Central Asia, where users 
consume some 12 tons of heroin per year.
Beyond the main traditional opiate markets of Europe, 
there are strong indications that Afghan opiates are affect-
ing various countries in the Middle East, Africa, South and 
South-East Asia and even in the Pacific region. Before 
2002, Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
were the main heroin suppliers for many of these markets. 
Following the sharp decrease in opium production in 
Myanmar and Laos, Afghanistan took over. 
China, a huge market which traditionally sourced its heroin 
exclusively from Myanmar, is now a destination country for 
Afghan opiates. Significant amounts of Afghan opiates are 
assumed to be trafficked to India, but the scale of the flow 
remains unclear.
As the following sections of this report indicate, Afghani-
stan’s production more than satisfies global demand. Since 
2006, the average opium production stands at around 
7,200 tons in Afghanistan (7,900 tons worldwide). As there 
is no indication of a dramatic increase in global heroin 
consumption, this amount far exceeds total global demand, 
to the extent that another 16 million drug users would be 
needed to absorb it. Thus, even if opiate production in 
Afghanistan were to cease immediately, there would still be 
ample supply. It is estimated that opiate stocks equivalent 
to more than two years’ global supply are currently stored 
in Afghanistan and possibly also in transit and destination 
countries.
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Afghan opiates have become a truly global commodity; one 
which doubles as a transnational threat to international 
security and global health. 
Demand and supply2. 
Heroin demand
There are an estimated 11.3 million heroin users in the 
world. Of this, four million are estimated to live in South 
and South-East Asia and Oceania. The majority of these 
users reside in China (2.2 million) and India (0.81 million), 
and use heroin produced mainly in Myanmar. 
The countries or regions in which mainly Afghan heroin is 
used host approximately 7.2 million heroin users. In 
Europe, the main destination for Afghan heroin, there are 
3.1 million heroin users. Within Europe, the Russian Fed-
eration accounts for 1.5 million users, while the remaining 
1.6 million users are distributed among other European 
countries. There are currently 1.5 million heroin users in 
the Americas. While some Afghan heroin is trafficked to 
the USA and Canada (1.3 million users), Afghan heroin is 
not currently being trafficked to Latin America, where the 
number of heroin users is estimated at approximately 0.2 
million. The number of heroin users in Africa seems to have 
been increasing since 2004 (0.8 million), reaching 1.23 
million in 2007. 
Table 1 gives the estimated level of regional heroin con-
sumption per user per year, as reported in the UNODC 
2005 World Drug Report. While these estimates are the best 
currently available, one has to be aware that they are not 
based on direct research. This reflects the absence - for most 
countries - of any structured or organized data collection 
system to arrive at scientifically sound per capita consump-
tion estimates. Therefore, heroin consumption estimates 
should be treated with caution. 
Other limitations with the available data complicate an 
understanding of the situation at the retail level or with 
regard to wholesale heroin purity. All calculations and trend 
observations in this section are drawn from the data avail-
able to UNODC as well as other sources such as country 
reports1 and individual studies. 
In addition to the above findings, there are a few other 
country studies on heroin consumption and purity:
Pakistan
There remain significant data limitations and methodo-
logical concerns with regard to consumption estimates for 
Pakistan.2 In line with the UNODC 2005 World Drug 
1 Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ).
2 In 2007, UNODC implemented a small survey of treatment centres in Pa-
kistan to determine the average opiate user proﬁle. According to this survey, 
heroin users in Pakistan consume an average of 1 gram per day and some 365 
grams annually (purity levels were unavailable). The average retail price for 
Report and country studies from Afghanistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the regional average pure heroin 
consumption rate of 35 grams was used per user per year 
for Pakistan. However, in order to broaden our understand-
ing of heroin consumption levels in Pakistan, more infor-
mation, including on heroin purity at the street level, should 
be collected and monitored. 
Central Asia
UNODC’s Regional Office for Central Asia conducted a 
similar study of selected drug treatment centres in 2008. 
According to this data, the average heroin consumption per 
user is 1-1.5 gram per day. The cost of one gram of high-
quality heroin (around 70 per cent purity) is around US$ 
10-15 in Central Asia. But the typical cost for one gram of 
heroin ranges from US$ 1.5 – 2 at street level. Hence, this 
would indicate that street level heroin purity is between 
7-10 per cent ([1.5/15] * 70) in Central Asia. Based on 
daily consumption (1-1.5 grams per day), the total annual 
heroin consumption per user is estimated at 365-550 grams 
(at 7-10 per cent purity) per year, the equivalent of 25-55 
grams (midpoint 40 grams) of pure heroin. 
heroin was recorded at US$ 2 per gram. The price per gram of high-quality 
heroin (around 70 per cent purity) is around US$ 5 in the Peshawar region, 
bordering Afghanistan. The purity of retail heroin in Pakistan can thereby 
be estimated at a maximum of 25-30 per cent ([2/5] * 70). Based on this, 
the average pure heroin consumption per user is estimated at around 150 
grams ([2/5]*365 ) annually, which is very high compared to other consumer 
markets such as Europe (57.9 grams per year). 
Average heroin consumption per user  Table 1: 
per year (pure heroin)
Source: UNODC
Region Consumption (gram)
East Africa 24.2
North Africa 28.0
South Africa 11.5
West&Central Africa 17.0
Caribbean 13.5
Central America 25.2
North America 17.0
South America 10.0
East&South-East Asia 25.2
Near&Middle East/  
South West Asia 25.2
South Asia 19.8
East Europe 33.3
West&Central Europe 57.9
South-East Europe 30.6
Oceania 56.5
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1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
Estimated number of heroin/opium users and opiate consumption in the world, 2008Table 2: 
Source: UNODC World Drug Reports.
Russian Federation
UNODC’s Russian Federation country office and the 
National Research Center on Drug Addiction (NRC) of the 
Federal Agency on Health and Social Development imple-
mented a survey on drug treatment centres to understand 
the average heroin consumption per day per user in 2009. 
According to the survey results, average heroin consump-
tion per user per day is around 1.87 gram with 5 per cent 
purity3 or 0.13 gram of pure heroin (70 per cent) per day 
per user. 
The regional average figures presented in table 1 were used 
for countries where average heroin consumption and purity 
levels were not available. Data on specific purity levels and 
heroin consumption rates are required to fill those gaps and 
better assess the level of drug consumption in a given coun-
try. 
3 The typical price for one gram of heroin (5 per cent purity) is US$ 37. 
Total estimated heroin/opium consumption in the world
Total global heroin consumption is estimated at 340 tons 
while opium consumption stands at some 1,080 tons per 
year.
Table 2 shows the number of opiate users in major produc-
tion, transit and destination countries/regions. The number 
of opiate users is further divided into two groups corre-
sponding to the two main opiate supply sources in South-
East Asia (Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic) and South-West Asia (Afghanistan). 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the distribution of heroin users 
and heroin consumption in the world. The percentage dis-
tribution of heroin users and heroin consumption for coun-
tries/regions are nearly identical. The exception is Europe 
which has the highest consumption rates per user at 50-52 
grams/year while in other regions it is around 20-40 grams/
year. 
Region/country Heroin users
Opium 
users
Heroin  
consumption 
(tons)
Opium  
consumption 
(tons)
Total opiate  
consumption 
(tons of opium  
equivalent)
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Myanmar 66,000 67,000 1.3 7.0 20.1
China 2,254,000 119,000 45.0 12.0 458.2
India 871,000 674,000 17.0 67.0 239.8
Oceania 32,500 52,000 2.0 5.0 23.4
Asia (except 
India, China, 
Myanmar)
852,000 1,118,500 17.0 75.0 245.0
Sub total 4,075,500 2,030,500 82 166 986.6
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 Afghanistan 47,000 146,000 2.0 80.0 91.8
Pakistan 547,000 145,000 19.0 80.0 213.8
Iran (I. R. of ) 391,000 531,000 14.0 450.0 547.0
Central Asia 283,000 60,000 11.0 33.0 112.2
Russia 1,490,000 166,000 70.0 58.0 548.6
Turkey 25,000 25,000 0.8 9.0 14.4
Europe (except 
Turkey and 
Russia
1,614,000 271,000 88.0 95.0 711.0
Americas 1,538,000 82,000 26.0 29.0 212.0
Middle East 
and South Asia 
(except Iran, 
Pakistan and 
Afghanistan)
63,500 491,000 1.6 16.0 27.2
Africa 1,240,000 172,000 25.0 60.0 235.0
Sub total 7,238,500 2,089,000 257 910 2,713
Total 11,314,000 4,119,500 340 1,075 3,700
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Heroin users in Europe (excluding Russia) account for 26 
per cent of total global heroin consumption. Russian users 
rank second with 21 per cent, while Chinese users follow 
with 13 per cent. Heroin consumption and the number of 
heroin users in Africa have reportedly been increasing since 
2004, and African users may now consume 7 per cent of 
the heroin on the market. Pakistani users consume 6 per 
cent and Indian, South and South-East Asian, and Iranian 
users 5 per cent each of total consumption. 
Opium demand
Global opium demand is estimated at 4 million users con-
suming 1,000-1,100 tons of opium per year. 16 per cent of 
users are in India, 13 per cent are in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and 29 per cent are in other East, South and South-
East Asian countries. Around 7 per cent of the opium users 
are in European countries (the Russian Federation and 
Turkey not included). 
Opium users in East, South and South-East Asia (excluding 
India and Myanmar) consume around 75 tons of opium 
annually. All the opium for these subregions is supplied 
from Myanmar or sourced from local production. 
According to official reports4 provided by the Indian Gov-
ernment, heroin flows to India from Myanmar, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. However, there is no reported raw opium 
trafficking to India from these or any other countries. This 
could indicate that all the opium required to meet India’s 
demand (67 tons/year) might be converted from licit opium 
cultivation in India itself. To produce this amount of opium, 
at least 1,300 ha of opium poppy (the average opium yield 
per hectare in India is 58-62 kilograms) are required. In 
4 Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ).
2007, around 6,000 hectares were under licensed opium 
poppy cultivation in India. Either 20 per cent of the licit 
production is diverted into the illicit market or there is 
illicit opium poppy cultivation in India. If neither of these 
hypotheses is correct, then the drug abuse survey results 
provided by the Indian Government to UNODC should be 
reviewed or the methodology reassessed.
The annual opiate prevalence rate for the Islamic Republic 
of Iran is 2.8 per cent, indicating some 1.36 million opiate 
users (heroin = 390,000, opium = 530,000 and other opi-
ates = 440,000) in that country. According to the Drug 
Control in 2008 report from the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the average opium consumption per user per month is 74 
grams, which amounts to an annual consumption of 451 
tons of opium. Thus, it is estimated that Iran accounts for 
42 per cent of global opium consumption. 
While most of Iran’s opium seizures took place in the 
Kerman, Khorasan, Isfahan, Fars and Yazd provinces 
between 2005-2007, seizures occur in almost all provinces. 
This indicates that opium consumption is widespread in 
the country.
In Africa, an estimated 170,000 opium users consume 
some 60 tons of opium (mainly in Egypt) per year. How-
ever, given that neither UNODC nor World Customs 
Organization (WCO) seizure data indicate opium traffick-
ing to Africa from any other region, it has to be assumed 
that the source of much of the opium is local production. 
Some 2,000 – 5,000 ha of opium poppy cultivation are 
needed to generate 60 tons of opium, depending on yield. 
With regard to Egypt, national authorities have expressed 
doubts that the national data, shown in the 2005/06 house-
Heroin users in the world, 2008 Fig. 1: 
(share of countries/regions)
Source: UNODC.
Global heroin consumption, 2008 Fig. 2: 
(share of countries/regions)
Source: UNODC.
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hold survey of Egypt5 were a fair reflection of the extent of 
opiate use in this country.6 As a result of the survey meth-
odology, it cannot be excluded that the positive responses 
included persons who used to experiment with opiates in 
the past, but are no longer involved with opiates use. Out 
of the total number of drug users (all drugs), 75 per cent 
consumed drugs regularly or were dependent drug users, 
whereas 25 per cent used them ‘for trial and amusement’ 
purposes. Applying the 75 per cent ratio, the prevalence of 
opium consumption could fall to 0.4 per cent. Extrapolat-
ing results from a national student survey in Egypt7 (out of 
18,349 students interviewed, 48 reported lifetime use of 
opium and 15 of heroin, that is, 0.3 and 0.1 per cent, 
respectively) to the national level would result in far lower 
annual prevalence rates of opiate use among the general 
population (0.14 per cent, including 0.1 per cent using 
opium). Based on the latter results, total opium consump-
tion would amount to some 12 tons, equivalent to 400-
1,000 ha under poppy cultivation. Due to the big difference 
between these two estimates, opium consumption in Egypt 
should be studied more closely. The main conclusion, how-
ever, is that illegal opium poppy cultivation is taking place 
in Egypt.
5 National Centre for Social and Criminal Research, Prof. Imad Hamdi Ghaz 
and Fund for the Control and Treatment of Addiction and Abuse, National 
Study of Addiction, Prevalence of the Use of Drugs and Alcohols in Egypt (2005-
2006).
6 275 opiate users out of 40,083 persons interviewed, equivalent to a preva-
lence rate of 0.7 per cent, of which some three quarters used opium, accord-
ing to a breakdown found in student surveys.
7 National Council for the Control and Treatment of Addiction, Fund for the 
Control and Treatment of Addiction and Abuse, Prof. Jumaa Yousuf, Use of 
Neuroactive Substances among University Students, Preliminary Indicators, Cairo 
2007.
Opium production 
Between 1990 and 2005, the total quantity of opium pro-
duced globally was more or less stable at 4,000-5,000 tons. 
During that period, it exceeded 5,000 tons only twice: in 
1994 and again in 1999. Since 2006, a production level at 
around 8,000 tons has remained well above the 5,000 ton 
mark, as a result of the massive increase in opium produc-
tion in Afghanistan. 
Production in Afghanistan increased from around 200 tons 
in 1980 to 3,300 tons in 2000, reaching a peak of 8,200 
tons in 2007 before dropping slightly to 7,700 tons in 
2008, and to 6,900 in 2009. Expressed as a proportion of 
the global illicit opium production, Afghanistan’s share rose 
from around 20 per cent in 1980 to 70 per cent in 2000, 
and to more than 90 per cent since 2006. 
Since 1996, while opium poppy cultivation has decreased 
in South-East Asia (Myanmar and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic), Afghanistan has filled and over-compensated for 
the production gap left by Myanmar in the global opiates 
market.
To calculate the potential amount of opium/heroin produc-
tion between 1995 and 2008, for Afghan opium, a conver-
sion ratio of 7:1 was used, and for Myanmar and Laos, of 
10:1.8
8 The details of the method used to estimate the amount of opium converted 
into heroin is given later in this chapter.
Opium users in the world, 2008  Fig. 3: 
(share of countries/regions)
Source: UNODC.
Global opium consumption, 2008 Fig. 4: 
(share of countries/regions)
Source: UNODC.
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Global potential opium production in Afghanistan, South-East Asia and the rest of the world, Fig. 5: 
1990-2009
 
Source: UNODC World Drug Report (figure for 2009 based on 2009 Survey results for Afghanistan and 2008 data for the rest of the world).
Average annual opium production for the periods 1990-2005, 2002-2005 and 2006-2009Table 3: 
Afghanistan Myanmar & Laos Other Total
Average opium production (tons) 3,300 1,200 210 4,710
Average amount of opium converted into 
heroin (tons) 2,315 1,107 160 3,422
Average amount of opium exported as 
raw opium (tons) 985 93 50 1,078
Amount of heroin produced (tons) 331 111 16 457
Average opium  
production, 1990-2005 (tons)
Average opium  
production, 2002-2005 (tons)
Average opium  
production, 2006-2009 (tons)
Afghanistan 2,966 3,825 7,333
South-East Asia 1,429 655 405
Other countries 246 214 184
World total 4,641 4,693 7,922
Average annual potential opium/heroin production in the world, 1995-2005Table 4: 
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1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
Opiate consumption vs. supply 
In theory, the increase in supply should be matched by a 
corresponding rise in demand. However, global demand for 
heroin has been largely stable in recent years. There is nei-
ther data to suggest a sudden increase in the number of 
heroin users worldwide, nor significant changes in prices or 
purity levels. 
Heroin retail prices have been stable since 2000, with no 
major changes observed in Europe. Likewise, there are no 
indications of a dramatic increase in the purity of the heroin 
seized worldwide – which would be an indication of 
improved supply – during the same period.
Total global heroin and opium consumption in opium 
equivalent is estimated at 3,700 tons per year. Between 
1995 and 2005, the average total opium production was 
4,700 tons, which would yield an average of 460 tons of 
heroin and 1,100 tons of opium annually. Between 2002 
and 2008, average annual seizures were 90-95 tons of heroin 
and some 250 tons of opium. Annually, the total amount 
of opiate seizures, in opium equivalent, was thus 1,000-
1,100 tons. This indicates that 4,700-5,000 tons of annual 
opium production are enough to meet global heroin and 
opium demand (including seizures). 
Between 2006 and 2009, the average annual global opium 
production was around 7,900 tons. This means that a sur-
plus of almost 12,000 tons of opium was produced between 
2006 and 2009, an amount equal to approximately 2.5 
years of global heroin consumption. The surplus accumu-
lated since 2006 may have been stockpiled anywhere 
between the production point (Afghanistan) and destina-
tion countries.
Table 5 shows the average opium production in Myanmar 
and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic for the period 
2002-2008. Based on estimates of heroin production in 
these countries, 540 tons of opium yield around 50 tons of 
heroin along with 40 tons of raw opium. Total heroin 
demand per year in South and South-East Asia and Oce-
ania amounts to 80-85 tons. Since the average amount of 
heroin seized in those regions is approximately 10 tons per 
year, a total of 90-95 tons of heroin is needed in those 
regions each year. In order to meet this high demand, 40 
tons of Afghan heroin – in addition to the heroin produced 
in Myanmar and Laos – is needed per year. 
The total estimated opium demand is around 1,000 tons 
per year and total average opium seizures per year amount 
to 200-250 tons. With 4,700 tons of opium (average opium 
production in the world between 2002-2005), it is possible 
to satisfy global demand for both heroin and opium (includ-
ing seizures). 
Heroin retail prices in Europe (US$),  Fig. 7: 
1990-2006
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Average annual opium production in  Table 5: 
Myanmar and Laos in 2002-2008
Myanmar Laos Total
Average opium 
production (tons) 500 50 550
Average amount of 
opium converted 
into heroin (tons)
460 46 506
Average amount of 
opium exported as 
raw opium (tons)
40 4 44
Amount of heroin 
produced (tons) 46 5 51
* Figure for 2009 based on 2009 Survey results for Afghanistan and 2008 
data for the rest of the world.
Estimates of opiate stockpiles  
for the period 2006-2009*:
Total global opium production: 31,000 tons.s 
Total global opiate demand and  s 
seizures (in opium equivalent): 19,000 tons
Total opium surplus:  s 
31,000 – 19,000 = 12,000 tons
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Opiate seizures3. 
The table below shows the amount of heroin, morphine 
and opium seized in the world between 1996 and 2006. At 
the time of writing, seizure statistics for 2007 and 2008 
were under quality control review. For some countries, 
there is no seizure information for years prior to 1996. 
Between 1996 and 2006, global heroin seizures increased 
by 88 per cent. Opium seizures increased by 116 per cent 
and morphine seizures saw the largest increase of 279 per 
cent. During the same period, 22 per cent of the global 
opium production was intercepted on average. 
Global opiate seizures, 1996-2006Table 6: 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
% 
Change 
1996-
2006
Aver-
age
World total opium 
production (tons) 4,355 4,823 4,346 5,764 4,691 1,630 4,520 4,783 4,850 4,620 6,610 +52% 4,636
Total heroin  
seizures (tons) 29 33 32 36 54 54 49 54 61 58 54 +88% 47
Total morphine 
seizures (tons) 12 20 23 24 27 11 25 44 39 32 45 +279% 27
Total opium  
seizures (tons) 174 196 179 239 213 106 97 133 212 342 376 +116% 206
% of heroin 
seizures (in opium 
equivalent) in total 
opium production
6.5% 6.9% 7.4% 6.3% 11.5% 33.2% 10.8% 11.3% 12.6% 12.6% 8.1%  11.6%
% of total opium 
production seized 
as morphine (in 
opium equivalent) 
2.7% 4.2% 5.4% 4.1% 5.7% 7.0% 5.5% 9.1% 8.1% 6.9% 6.9%  6.0%
% of total opium 
production seized 
as opium
4.0% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.5% 6.5% 2.1% 2.8% 4.4% 7.4% 5.7%  4.5%
% of total opium 
production seized 
as opiate (in opium 
equivalent) 
13.3% 15.2% 17.0% 14.5% 21.8% 46.7% 18.4% 23.2% 25.0% 27.0% 20.7%  22.1%
Global opiate seizure trends, 1996-2006Fig. 8: 
Source: UNODC.
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Heroin seizures 
In 2006, almost half of global heroin seizures took place in 
three countries: The Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and 
China. 
One well-known heroin trafficking route to West and Cen-
tral Europe runs from Afghanistan via the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Turkey and South-East European countries (Bul-
garia, Greece, Albania, Romania, Serbia, the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia). Known as the 
Balkan Route, it represents the shortest route to the lucra-
tive European markets. Between 1996 and 2006, as opium 
production increased in Afghanistan, commensurate 
increases in heroin seizures were observed in the Russian 
Federation (13,483 per cent), Central Asia and Transcauca-
sian countries (2,461 per cent), Iran (1,225 per cent), 
Turkey (133 per cent) and Europe (51 per cent). 
In stark contrast, and although Pakistan borders Afghani-
stan and is an important destination and transit country for 
Afghan heroin, Pakistan’s heroin seizures decreased by 52 
Rest of the world
14%
Central Asia and Transcaucasian 
countries
6%
Europe (excluding 
Russia&Turkey)
18%
Russian Federation
4%
Pakistan
5%
Islamic Republic of Iran
19%
Turkey
18%
Afghanistan
6%
China
10%
Distribution of heroin seizures in the world, 2006Fig. 9: 
Source: UNODC.
Countries/regions seizing signiﬁcant quantities of heroin (kg), 1996-2006Table 7: 
Country/
Region
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
% change  
between 
1996-2006
Pakistan 5,872 6,156 3,364 4,974 9,492 6,931 5,870 6,364 3,488 2,144 2,821 -52%
Iran (I. R. of ) 805 1,986 2,894 6,030 6,189 4,001 3,977 3,327 4,715 5,554 10,663 +1,225%
Turkey 4,422 3,506 4,651 3,862 6,338 3,999 2,583 4,705 8,847 8,195 10,312 +133%
Afghanistan N/A 1,292 815 2,388 7,771 3,600 N/A
China 4,347 5,477 7,358 5,364 6,281 13,200 9,291 9,530 10,836 8,936 5,800 +33%
Central Asia 
and Trans-
caucasian 
countries
144 2,126 1,076 1,361 3,251 5,154 4,708 6,827 6,310 3,883 3,688 +2,461%
Europe 
(excluding 
Turkey & 
Russia)
6,764 7,017 7,227 8,309 13,911 12,375 10,620 10,071 11,101 9,188 10,191 +51%
Russian Fed. 18 24 443 695 984 1,287 842 3,248 3,897 4,676 2,445 +13,483%
Rest of the 
world 6,136 7,056 5,304 5,634 7,687 7,199 10,909 9,788 11,719 15,844 7,737 +26%
Total 28,508 33,348 32,317 36,229 54,133 54,147 48,800 53,860 60,913 58,419 53,658 +88%
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per cent between 1996 and 2006. It appears that in Paki-
stan, heroin seizures are inversely proportional to supply 
trends in Afghanistan.
In 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey seized 
some 10 tons of heroin each. In contrast, Turkey’s neigh-
bours, Bulgaria (700 kg) and Greece (300 kg), together 
only seized one ton of heroin that same year, despite the fact 
that most of the heroin that flows from Turkey to Europe 
passes through Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Greece. 
Particularly after the year 2000, heroin seizures have sharply 
increased in the Russian Federation, reflecting rising levels 
of opium production and opiate trafficking from Afghani-
stan. Similar increases were not seen in countries bordering 
Russia, however. In 2006, approximately 170 kg of heroin 
were seized in Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Finland, Norway 
and Estonia, whereas 2,400 kg of heroin were seized in 
Russia. This may be an indication of limited heroin traf-
ficking from Russia to Europe via those countries, bearing 
in mind that the majority of heroin trafficked to Russia is 
consumed domestically. 
In the Middle East, between 1996 and 2006, heroin sei-
zures sharply increased in Qatar (from 3 to 722 kg) and the 
United Arab Emirates (21.6 kg to 533 kg). This may indi-
cate increases in heroin trafficking to this region and/or 
more effective law enforcement. 
The decrease in opium production in Myanmar was accom-
panied by a decrease in heroin seizures there. The total 
amount of heroin seized was 500 kg in 1996, but decreased 
to 190 kg in 2006. Similar patterns were observed in coun-
tries bordering Myanmar, such as Thailand and the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic. 
Morphine seizures
Pakistan (72 per cent) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (23 
per cent) accounted for 95 per cent of global morphine 
seizures in 2006. In Pakistan, morphine seizures have been 
steadily increasing, reaching more than 32 tons in 2006.
In Pakistan, the vast majority of morphine continues to be 
seized in Balochistan province (Chagai district), close to the 
border with Afghanistan’s Hilmand province. 
Most of the morphine in the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
seized in Sistan-Balochistan province, which borders 
Balochistan province (Pakistan) and Nimroz province 
(Afghanistan). 
Opium seizures
Globally, the amount of opium seized increased from 174 
tons in 1996 to 376 tons in 2006, a 116 per cent increase. 
The main reason is the huge volumes intercepted by the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Between 1996 and 2006, the amount of opium seized 
increased by 108 per cent in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and by 20 per cent in Pakistan. At the same time, seizures 
decreased by 22 per cent in Central Asian and South-Cau-
casian9 countries. Opium seizures in Afghanistan have been 
steadily increasing since 2002 (there is little comprehensive 
data available on drug seizures there before 2002). A total 
of 2,604 kilograms of opium was seized in Europe (includ-
ing Turkey), amounting to 0.7 per cent of the global total 
in 2006. 
Turkey and European countries have traditionally reported 
very few opium seizures. Moreover, there is no evidence of 
morphine/heroin labs in these countries to refine opium. 
Therefore, it appears likely that a significant portion of the 
opium trafficked from Afghanistan to Iran is consumed 
domestically. 
The vast majority of global opium seizures takes place in 
Iran. While Iran’s proportion of global seizures is 83 per 
cent, it hosts a quarter of the estimated global opium 
users.
In contrast, and despite the fact that 27 per cent of global 
opium users live in India, seizures there account for 1 per 
cent of total opium seizures worldwide. 
In 2006, Afghanistan seized almost 8 per cent of all opium 
seized in the world, but this only accounted for 0.5 per cent 
of the opium produced there. Some of the opium/heroin 
produced in Afghanistan never enters the international 
distribution chain because it is consumed by opium poppy 
farmers and opiate users in country.
9 Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.
Global morphine seizures (kg), 2001-2006Table 8: 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Per cent  of 
global seizures 
in 2006
Change 
between 
2001-2006
Islamic Republic 
of Iran 8,668 9,521 13,063 12,878 6,939 10,606 23% +22%
Pakistan 1,825 6,839 27,778 21,256 22,197 32,658 72% +1,690%
Rest of the world 923 8,341 2,882 5,043 2,872 2,014 4% +118%
Total 11,416 24,702 43,723 39,177 32,008 45,277 100% +297%
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Estimated amount of opium converted into heroin: 
Through a combined analysis of seizure and consumption 
figures, it is possible to calculate the amount of opium 
converted into heroin or used as raw opium. 
According to UNODC illicit crop monitoring surveys in 
Myanmar, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Afghanistan, 10-11 kg of opium from Myanmar and Laos 
are needed to produce one kg of brown heroin, whereas in 
Afghanistan, 7-8 kg are required. 
Between 2002 and 2006, heroin accounted for 95 per cent 
of opiate seizures in the regions of South and South-East 
Asia and Oceania. The total estimated heroin consumption 
in these regions amounts to 80-85 tons (equivalent to 800-
850 tons of opium from Myanmar). The total estimated 
opium consumption is around 100 tons (excluding India, 
which does not receive opium imports according to the 
Government). This means that 90-95 per cent of opiate 
consumption in the region is in heroin form. 
In countries where mainly Afghan opiates are consumed, 
72 per cent of Afghan opiate seizures were in heroin form 
between 2002 and 2006. In addition, some 257 tons of 
heroin (equivalent to 2000 tons of opium) and 900 tons of 
raw opium were consumed in these countries during the 
same period, which indicates that almost 70 per cent of 
opiates ([2000/2900]) consumed in these countries is also 
in heroin form. Calculations based on seizures and on con-
sumption thus result in similar heroin consumption ratios. 
Global opiate ﬂows 4. 
The findings in this section were calculated by examining a 
range of indicators, such as demand statistics provided in 
the previous section together with the opiate seizure data-
bases of the World Customs Organization (WCO) and 
UNODC, as well as the Annual Reports Questionnaire 
(ARQ) and individual country reports. During the estima-
tion period, experts from specialized global organizations 
such as the WCO were consulted and provided inputs. 
Similarly, all concerned UNODC field offices were con-
sulted regarding the estimations of heroin and opium con-
sumption in their respective regions. 
A trend analysis of both opiate use and seizures data for the 
1990-2008 period was carried out to track the pattern and 
estimate the magnitude of opiate flows in the world. The 
total heroin consumption was calculated for each country, 
then combined with official seizure data and balanced 
Global opium seizures (kg), 1996-2006Table 9: 
Source: UNODC Delta database.
Country/
region
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
% change 
between 
1996-2006
Islamic 
Republic of 
Iran
149,577 162,414 154,453 204,485 179,053 81,061 72,856 97,575 174,091 231,352 311,306 +108%
Afghanistan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5,582 8,412 21,446 90,990 29,423 N/A
Pakistan 7,423 7,300 5,021 16,319 8,867 5,175 2,686 5,786 2,495 6,437 8,907 +20%
Central Asia 
and Trans-
caucasian 
countries
7,318 9,954 5,055 9,552 10,870 4,956 3,126 3,032 4,689 2,787 5,740 -22%
Rest of the 
world 9,682 16,332 14,471 8,644 14,210 14,754 12,686 18,727 9,672 11,441 20,503 +112%
Total 174,000 196,000 179,000 239,000 213,000 106,000 97,000 133,000 212,000 342,000 376,000 +116%
Distribution of opium seizures in the world, Fig. 10: 
1996-2006
Source: UNODC Delta database.
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against total production. Production, consumption and 
seizure data were analyzed together. 
For example, the size of estimated heroin flows from 
Afghanistan or Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Iran 
should be similar to the amount of heroin consumed and 
intercepted in Iran and the destination and transit countries 
receiving heroin via Iran. To begin with, heroin/opium 
demand in the main destination regions/countries was 
calculated. Then, by drawing on seizure statistics from each 
country, the amounts of heroin/opium flowing between the 
countries were estimated. 
As this report aims to provide global insights as well as 
orders of magnitude, the flows represented on maps should 
be considered broadly indicative rather than definitive flow 
outlines. Flows may deviate to other countries along the 
routes and there are numerous secondary flows which may 
not be represented.
Moreover, trends respond rapidly to changes in law enforce-
ment and demand. Opiate flow estimations would there-
fore be revised if demand statistics in the UNODC World 
Drug Report were to change. The estimates will be updated 
periodically as new drug abuse data become available from 
Member States. 
Countries/regions were grouped into two categories: 1) 
primarily destination countries/regions, and 2) primarily 
transit countries/regions for heroin trafficking:
A- Heroin consumption and seizures in main 
destination countries/regions
1-Europe (excluding the Russian Federation and Turkey):
Russia is analyzed separately since heroin flows to Russia via 
Central Asian countries (northern route) and not via the 
Balkan route, which supplies most of the European 
market. 
Turkey is also analyzed separately as it is the main gateway 
for heroin trafficking on the Balkan route. 
A total of 1.6 million people are estimated to consume 
Average opiate seizures between 2002 and 2006Table 10: 
Source: UNODC Delta database.
Heroin 
(tons)
 Morphine 
(tons)
Opium 
(tons)
Total 
opiate 
(tons)
Per cent of 
heroin seizures 
in total opiate 
seizures
Per cent of 
opium seizures 
in total opiate 
seizures
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China 8.88 0.16 1.36 91.8 99% 1%
India 1.04 0.07 2.13 13.2 84% 16%
Oceania 0.26 0.00 2.6 100% 0%
Asia (except India,  
China, Myanmar) 1.57 0.02 0.34 16.2 98% 2%
Sub total 12.25 0.64 6.62 135.5 95% 5%
   
M
aj
or
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
ro
ut
es
 o
f A
fg
ha
n 
he
ro
in
 
Afghanistan 3.13 0.77 33.48 60.8 45% 55%
Pakistan 4.14 22.15 5.28 189.3 97% 3%
Islamic Republic of Iran 5.65 10.60 177.44 291.2 39% 61%
Central Asia and  
Transcaucasian countries 5.09 0.00 3.63 39.3 91% 9%
Russian Federation 3.02 0.01 1.36 22.5 94% 6%
Turkey 6.93 2.94 0.24 69.3 100% 0%
Europe (except Turkey 
and Russia 10.43 0.02 0.74 73.9 99% 1%
Americas 4.48 0.03 1.36 33.0 96% 4%
Middle East and South 
Asia (except Iran,  
Pakistan and Afghanistan)
0.55 0.00 0.24 4.1 94% 6%
Africa 0.32 0.01 0.05 2.3 98% 2%
Sub total 44 37 224 786 72% 28%
World total 56 37 230 921 78% 22%
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some 90 tons of heroin per year in Western, Central and 
Eastern Europe. European law enforcement institutions 
seize around 10 tons of heroin per year. Additionally, heroin 
trafficking from Europe to North America (USA and 
Canada) could be around 5 tons per year. To meet this 
combined demand, traffickers need to ship approximately 
105-110 tons of heroin into Europe every year. 
According to seizure information from UNODC and 
WCO for the years 2000-2008, 84 per cent of the heroin 
seized in Europe – (85-90) tons – was shipped from South-
Eastern European (Balkan) countries. 
Seizure data show that some 93 per cent – (80-85) tons – of 
the heroin seized in West and Central Europe transited 
Turkey before reaching South-East European (Balkan) 
countries. The remaining 6 tons traveled directly from the 
Islamic Republic of Iran via the Afghanistan-Iran/Central 
Asia-Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan/Georgia-Black Sea-Bulgaria 
route. 
Seizure statistics indicate that the vast majority (98 per 
cent) of the heroin seized in Turkey comes from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran while the remaining 2 per cent (2 tons) 
flows from the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic. 
As for the heroin trafficking to Western and Central Europe 
via Eastern Europe, seizure data show that around 6 per 
cent of the total heroin seized in Europe – roughly equiva-
lent to five tons – travel to Western and Central Europe 
from Eastern Europe every year. Of that total, around one 
ton is trafficked via the Russian Federation (according to 
seizure statistics from Eastern European countries), and 
one ton via the Afghanistan-Iran/Central Asia-Caspian 
Sea-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Black Sea-Ukraine route. The 
remaining three tons reach East Europe via the Afghani-
stan-Iran-Turkey-Ukraine route. 
Heroin trafficking from Eastern Europe to Western and 
Central Europe is limited, although this route has been 
seeing more activity since 2007.
Some 2-3 tons are estimated to be trafficked to Europe via 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Africa-route. So, around 2 per 
cent of the total heroin seized in Europe was trafficked from 
Africa. Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana are the main Afri-
can states sourcing heroin to Europe.
Between 2000 and 2008, 5 per cent of heroin seizures in 
Europe originated from Pakistan. This means that almost 5 
tons of heroin are trafficked from Pakistan to Europe 
(mainly the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) each 
year. UK authorities estimate that around 25 per cent of the 
heroin found on their market is shipped directly from Paki-
stan to the UK (by air or sea). 
Share of heroin seized in West and  Table 11: 
Central Europe by departure country/region, 
2000-2008
Departure country/region Per cent of total
Africa 1.6%
Central Asia 0.3%
Eastern Europe 5.7%
Gulf area and Middle East 1.4%
India 0.8%
Pakistan 4.7%
South-East Europe 83.8%
South-East Asia 1.4%
South America 0.2%
Share of heroin seized in South-Eastern  Table 12: 
Europe by departure country, 2000-2008
Departure country Per cent of total
Islamic Republic of Iran 7.3%
Turkey 92.7%
Share of heroin seized in Turkey by  Table 13: 
departure country, 2000-2008
Departure country Per cent of total
Islamic Republic of Iran 98%
Syrian Arab Republic 2%
Share of heroin seized in Eastern  Table 14: 
Europe by departure country/region, 
2000-2008
Departure country/region Per cent of total
Central Asia 2%
Islamic Republic of Iran 4%
Russian Federation 20%
Turkey 59%
South Caucasus 14%
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Country
Average heroin  
seizures between 
2002 and 2006 (kg)
Per cent of total 
average heroin 
seizures in 
Europe
Number 
of heroin 
users
Heroin  
consumption 
(kg)
Per cent of 
total heroin 
consumption in 
Europe
United Kingdom 2,290 22% 321,440 18,610 21%
Italy 2,080 20% 305,360 17,680 20%
France 680 7% 165,290 9,570 11%
Germany 720 7% 117,940 6,830 8%
Ukraine 50 0% 131,370 4,370 5%
Spain 290 3% 74,320 4,300 5%
Poland 110 1% 55,000 3,180 4%
Portugal 120 1% 50,760 2,940 3%
Netherlands 940 9% 33,210 1,920 2%
Switzerland 230 2% 31,160 1,800 2%
Belgium 180 2% 28,950 1,680 2%
Austria 130 1% 25,650 1,490 2%
Hungary 210 2% 20,830 1,210 1%
Greece 280 3% 19,640 1,140 1%
Denmark 30 0% 19,480 1,130 1%
Ireland 50 0% 14,650 850 1%
Bulgaria 650 6% 26,450 810 1%
Estonia 0 0% 13,800 800 1%
Romania 180 2% 23,950 730 1%
Serbia and Montenegro 370 4% 22,420 690 1%
Slovakia 10 0% 11,670 680 1%
Norway 70 1% 10,240 590 1%
Czech Republic 30 0% 9,350 540 1%
Lithuania 0 0% 8,950 520 1%
Sweden 50 0% 8,370 480 1%
Slovenia 130 1% 7,450 430 0%
Latvia 0 0% 7,100 410 0%
Croatia 70 1% 10,000 310 0%
Albania 100 1% 9,680 300 0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 30 0% 8,100 250 0%
Finland 10 0% 3,600 210 0%
Macedonia, FYR 130 1% 5,550 170 0%
Luxembourg 10 0% 2,930 170 0%
Malta 0 0% 1,610 90 0%
Belarus 10 0% 2,150 70 0%
Monaco 0 0% 1,940 60 0%
Cyprus 0 0% 950 50 0%
Iceland 0 0% 800 50 0%
Montenegro 0 0% 1,340 50 0%
Liechtenstein 0 0% 50 0 0%
Andorra 0 0% N/A N/A N/A
Republic of Moldova 0 0% N/A N/A N/A
Total 10,250  1,613,500 87,160
Heroin seizures and consumption in Europe (excluding the Russian Federation and Turkey)Table 16: 
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1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
Heroin seizures reported in Greece in 2003Map 4: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
Once heroin shipments are trafficked into Greece/Bulgaria 
from Turkey, some 20-25 tons of heroin travel to Italy and 
Switzerland via Albania (by sea) or via the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia-Serbia-Bosnia & Herzegovina-Slov-
enia/Croatia (by land). This amount is equivalent to the 
estimated heroin consumption in Italy and Switzerland. The 
rest (approximately 55-60 tons) goes to Germany/Nether-
lands via the Serbia/Romania-Hungary-Austria-Germany/
Netherlands route. Once heroin reaches Germany/Nether-
lands, it is trafficked further to France, the UK and Spain. 
In the consumer zone, seizure rates rise significantly. The 
total estimated heroin consumption in the UK is 18.6 tons, 
in Italy 17.6 tons, in France 9.5 tons and in Germany 6.8 
tons per year. The correlation (correlation coefficient = 
0.92) between heroin seizures and consumption indicates 
that most of the heroin seizures are proportionally larger in 
destination countries when compared to transit countries in 
South-East Europe.
Conversely, Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Greece seize only 
1.5-2 per cent of the estimated  quantity of heroin flowing 
through their territory. In Europe, major destination coun-
tries like the UK and Italy seize around 10 per cent of the 
heroin flowing (consumption + seizures) through their ter-
ritory. 
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Heroin seizures reported in Bulgaria, 2002-2007Map 5: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
Heroin seizures reported in Romania, 2002- 2007Map 6: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
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1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
Heroin seizures reported in Germany, 2002-2007Map 7: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
Heroin seizures reported in Europe, 2002-2008Map 8: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
France
Poland
Germany
Austria
Hungary
Croatia
Slovakia
Czech Republic
Belgium
Switzerland
Denmark
Netherlands
Slovenia
Goch
Kiel
Bunde
Herne
Köln
Lunen
Berlin
Gronau Kassel
Kerpen
Malsch
PenkunBriesen
Hamburg
Laatzen
Leipzig
Augsburg
Breuberg
Bruchsal
Hannover
Ismaning
München
Nettetal
Raubling
Waidhaus
Amstetten
Flensburg
Frankfurt
Göttingen
Griesheim
Lohfelden
Deggendorf
Reutlingen
Hengersberg
Irschenberg
Bad Bentheim
Vohenstrauss
Weil am Rhein
Bad Reichenhall
Offenbach an der Queich
Heroin seizures
") < 10 kg
") 11 - 50 kg
") 51 - 100 kg
") 101 - 200 kg
") 201 - 300 kg 0 150 30075 Km
Italy
")
")
")
")
") ")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
") ")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
") ")") ")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
") ")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
") ")
")
")
")
") ")
")
")
")
")")
") ")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
") ")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
") ")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")
")")
Turkey
France
Sweden
Spain
Ukraine
Russian Federation
Finland
Norway
Italy
PolandGermany
Morocco
Belarus
Romania
Latvia
Bulgaria
Austria Hungary
Lithuania
Estonia
0 500 1,000250 Km
Heroin seizures
") < 10 kg
") 10-100 kg
") 10 - 1,000 kg
") 1,000 - 10,000 kg
") > 10,000 kg

45
1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
Heroin seizures reported in the Russian Federation, 2000-2008Map 10: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
started being shipped to China. Despite the lack of detailed 
seizure information from China, data from Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, India and Thailand 
indicate trafficking of Afghan heroin from these countries 
to China. 
Most heroin in China, however, continues to be produced 
in and trafficked from Myanmar and the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, with which it shares 2,000 km of 
borders. According to the 2008 report of the National Nar-
cotics Control Commission of China, Myanmar and Laos 
are the primary sources of foreign-produced drugs in China. 
WCO seizure data indicate that almost 70 per cent (38 
tons) of the heroin seized in China comes from Myanmar. 
It appears that the remainder, some 25 per cent or about 
15-17 tons, may be sourced in Afghanistan.
This estimate is supported by individual seizure data from 
Pakistan and the WCO which show that 11 per cent of the 
heroin seized in China comes from Pakistan. Thus, some 
6-7 tons of heroin travel to China from Pakistan every year. 
Approximately one ton of heroin is also estimated to flow to 
China from countries of the Gulf and Middle East. Addi-
tionally, some four tons of heroin are trafficked to China 
from Africa every year. Seizure data from WCO and ARQ 
reports also indicate that between one and two tons of 
heroin are shipped to China from India, while an additional 
three to four tons are trafficked from other South-East Asian 
countries to China every year. Seizure statistics also show 
limited heroin trafficking from Central Asian countries to 
China (one ton per year) bringing the total estimated Afghan 
heroin flow into China to around 18 tons per year.
According to some reports,11 the level of heroin trafficking 
from Central Asia (especially from Tajikistan) to China 
may be higher than currently estimated. Given the paucity 
of information, it is currently difficult to estimate the 
importance and extent of this relatively new phenomenon. 
11 The Risk to China From Traﬃcking in Afghan Opiates, The Program for  
Contemporary Silk Road Studies Narcotics, Organized Crime and Security  
in Eurasia, Uppsala University, Jacob Townsend.
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Share of heroin seized in China by  Table 17: 
departure country/region, 2000-2008
Source: WCO.
Departure country/region Per cent  of total
Africa 7.0%
Central Asia 0.8%
Gulf area and Middle East 1.3%
Hong Kong, China 0.2%
India 1.8%
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.2%
Myanmar 68.6%
Pakistan 11.0%
Other South-East Asian countries 8.3%
Turkey 1.0%
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Similarly, undetermined quantities of heroin are also being 
moved from Afghanistan directly to China, mainly by air. 
China is both a transit and destination country; it seizes 
around 16 per cent of the total estimated heroin trafficked 
across its borders. 
4-India:
India is a significant heroin consumption market with 
870,000 heroin users estimated to consume around 17.2 
tons of heroin per year. Interviews at selected treatment 
centres in New Delhi revealed that the average user con-
sumes 1 gram of heroin (at typical street purity of 5 per 
cent) per day, roughly equivalent to 0.05 grams of pure 
heroin per day. This means that individual users consume 
on average 20 grams of pure heroin annually.
Some seven tons of heroin are trafficked to North America 
from India, according to seizure data and ARQ responses 
from North American countries. Six tons of heroin are 
shipped to East and South-East Asia (mainly to Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka), three tons to African 
countries and two tons to China. Additionally around one 
ton of heroin is estimated to be trafficked to West and 
Central Europe from India, bringing the total outflow of 
heroin to 19 tons. Lastly, Indian law enforcement officials 
seize around one ton of heroin per year. Thus, a total of 37 
tons of heroin are needed to meet domestic demand and 
trafficking from India.
Some 13 tons of heroin are estimated to be trafficked to 
India from South-East Asia (excluding Myanmar) every 
year. Around three tons of heroin enter India directly from 
Afghanistan by air, and approximately one ton of heroin 
enters India from Myanmar. For the remaining 20 tons, the 
source is unknown. It might be sourced from Afghanistan 
via Pakistan and/or other routes and/or be produced in 
India (diverted from the licit to the illicit market).12 In 
order to clarify this, an in-depth heroin consumption and 
trafficking study should be carried out in India.
5-South and South-East Asia – excluding India  
and China:
A total of 17 tons of heroin is needed every year to satisfy 
the demand of the estimated 850,000 heroin users in this 
region. Additionally, an average of two tons of heroin and 
morphine are seized annually in this region. 
12 According to individual seizures and ARQ data from India, there is some di-
version of licit opium, but the exact amount is unknown. Moreover, in 2007, 
the Central Bureau of Narcotics and West Bengal police destroyed 6,500 
hectares of illicit opium cultivation in two districts of West Bengal. Although 
most of the illicit opium cultivation in this region was eradicated, the size 
of the area under cultivation raises questions about the level of illicit opium 
cultivation in India. 
Heroin seizures reported in China, 2002-2008 Map 11: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
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1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
Heroin seizures reported in India, 2002-2008Map 12: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Moreover, an estimated 22 tons of heroin are trafficked 
from these two sub regions to China (3 tons), North Amer-
ica (3 tons), Europe (1 ton), India (13 ton), Oceania (1 ton) 
and Africa (1 ton).
Thus, a combined (consumption, seizures and trafficking) 
total of around 40 tons of heroin should flow to South and 
South-East Asia every year. 
One fifth (9-10 tons) of the total average heroin production 
in Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic is 
transported to other South and South-East Asian countries 
every year. 
An estimated 6 tons of heroin are shipped from India to 
meet demand in Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri 
Lanka per year. 
Around 1 ton is imported via the Gulf area and Middle 
Eastern countries to South and South-East Asia every year. 
The remaining 25 tons arrive from Pakistan.13
6-Oceania:
There are a total of 32,000 heroin users in Australia (28,000) 
and New Zealand (4,000), consuming around 1.8 tons of 
heroin per year. As total average heroin seizures hover at 
around 0.3 tons per year in both countries combined, a 
13 According to WCO seizure data.
total of around 2 tons of heroin flows into Australia (1.7 
tons) and New Zealand (0.3 ton) every year. 
Most of the heroin flowing into these countries is shipped 
from China (1 ton) and other South and South-East Asian 
countries. 
7-North America (USA and Canada):
Based on opium production data provided to UNODC, the 
total estimated heroin consumption in the Americas is 26 
tons per year. The majority is consumed in the USA (20-21 
tons, by 1.2 million users), followed by Canada (about 1.3 
tons, by 76,000 users). The average annual heroin seizure 
total in the USA is 2.1 tons, and around 50 kilograms in 
Canada. Combined, the total heroin flow to the USA and 
Canada is estimated at around 24-25 tons per year. 
About 6 tons (30 per cent of the total estimated flow) of the 
heroin that reaches the USA and Canada via Latin America 
and Mexico is also produced there. The total heroin pro-
duction of Latin America and Mexico is estimated at around 
10 tons per year. Another 7 tons of heroin reaches the USA 
and Canada via South Asia (mainly India), and two tons 
come from Pakistan by air routes. 11 per cent (3 tons) of 
the heroin consumed in the USA and Canada could be 
traced back to Africa, whereas an average of 5 tons (20 per 
cent) flows from Europe every year. 
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1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
2-The Islamic Republic of Iran 
According to the UNODC annual opium survey reports, 
approximately 105 tons (around 30 per cent) of Afghan 
heroin is trafficked directly into the Islamic Republic of 
Iran from Afghanistan. As explained previously, an addi-
tional 35 tons of heroin flow from Pakistan to Iran every 
year. The total amount of Afghan heroin entering Iran is 
thus around 140 tons per year. 
Iran has an estimated heroin user population of around 
400,000 individuals, consuming almost 14 tons of heroin 
per year. An average of 16 tons of heroin – 11 per cent of 
the total heroin flow to Iran – is seized in Iran annually. 
In addition, some 95 tons of heroin flow from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to Turkey to meet European demand. 
Turkish seizure data indicate that almost all heroin shipped 
to Turkey comes by way of Iran. 
Some heroin is trafficked through Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-
Black Sea to Bulgaria. Seizures statistics since 2007 indicate 
that 7 per cent of the heroin (approximately 6 tons) reaches 
South-East European countries via this route. 
Since 2007, another emerging trafficking route has been 
observed, running from the Islamic Republic of Iran to 
Ukraine via the Caspian Sea or the Azerbaijan-Georgia 
route. The instability in the Caucasus17 has facilitated the 
development of illicit drug trafficking and may further 
encourage traffickers to opt for this route rather than the 
traditional Iran-Turkey corridor. The Iran-Caucasus 
(Azerbaijan – Georgia) – Ukraine (via Black Sea) route 
gained importance after 2006. For example, a total of 
around one ton of heroin was seized in Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine with the help of intelligence from the Turkish 
narcotic police18 in 2007 and 2008. It is cautiously esti-
mated that around two tons of heroin are being trafficked 
via this route annually. Accurately estimating the size of the 
heroin flow on this route remains difficult due to the lack 
of data. 
Additionally, an estimated two tons of heroin are trafficked 
from the Islamic Republic of Iran to other Middle Eastern 
countries, mainly the UAE. 
To summarize, a total of 140 tons of heroin flow through 
Iran annually. Out of this, 105 tons come from Afghani-
stan. The remaining 35 tons are trafficked along the 
Afghanistan – Pakistan route into south-eastern Iran. Out 
of 140 tons, 110 tons leave the country. 
17 Areas concerned include Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh, as well as 
the semi-autonomous republic of Ajaria.
18 Reported by a Turkish delegate in Paris Pact meetings in 2007 and 2008.
Heroin seizures reported in Pakistan, 2002-2008Map 14: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Heroin seizures reported in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2002-2008Map 15: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
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Individual drug seizure data from the Islamic Republic of 
Iran indicate a heroin flow from Pakistan to Iran and from 
Iran towards Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan. 
There are reports of heroin trafficking from Iran to Iraq, 
but information is sparse as a result of the security situation 
in this region. Traffickers may take advantage of that situa-
tion to establish new routes through Iraq. Over the past two 
years, 117 arrests related to drug trafficking were reported 
by Iraqis officials in northern Iraq (Sulaymaniyah province 
bordering Iran).19 
3-Central Asian countries (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan):
Some 75-80 tons of heroin flow into the Russian Federa-
tion through the Afghanistan-Central Asia route. While 
Central Asian (CA) countries are the main trafficking route 
for Afghan heroin into the Russian Federation, they also 
have growing domestic markets. Around 12 tons of heroin 
is estimated to be consumed by 280,000 heroin users in CA 
countries annually. CA governments seize an average of 5 
tons of heroin per year. All together, some 95 tons of heroin 
(25 per cent of Afghan heroin production) is estimated to 
be trafficked from Afghanistan to CA countries. 
19 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2009, United States 
Department of State.
Heroin enters Central Asia (CA) through Afghanistan’s 
borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the 
majority through the Afghanistan/Tajikistan borders, which 
are difficult to control due to their remoteness and chal-
lenging terrain. A quarter (25 tons) of the total flow is traf-
ficked to the Russian Federation by rail and air from 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The remaining 
50-55 tons are trafficked toward the Russian Federation 
using overland routes, mainly via Kazakhstan. All highway 
and rail lines pass through Kazakhstan (with the exception 
of traffic through Turkmenistan’s port on the Caspian Sea) 
as it is the only CA country which has land borders with 
the Russian Federation. Almost all the overland trafficking 
to Russia uses the following routes: 
Afghanistan - Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan - Kazakhstan, 1. 
Afghanistan - Uzbekistan - Kazakhstan, 2. 
Afghanistan - Turkmenistan - Kazakhstan,3. 
Afghanistan - Uzbekistan - Kyrgyzstan - Kazakhstan. 4. 
The locations of heroin seizures in Central Asian countries 
and in the Russian Federation indicate the use of the above 
mentioned routes. An additional smaller route runs from 
Turkmenistan to the Russian Federation via the Caspian 
Sea. 
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1. The opiate trade: A. Global dimensions and flows
Heroin seizures reported in Uzbekistan, 2002-2008Map 17: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Heroin seizures reported in Tajikistan, 2002-2008Map 16: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Heroin seizures reported in Turkmenistan, 2002-2008Map 18: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
Heroin seizures reported in Kyrgyzstan, 2002-2008Map 19: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
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Heroin seizures reported in the United Map 22: 
Arab Emirates, 2007
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the 
designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accept-
ance by the United Nations.
African law enforcement officials seize around 0.3 tons of 
heroin per year. As previously explained, heroin is trans-
shipped from Africa to North America (3 tons/year), China 
(4 tons/year) and Europe (2 tons/year). Consequently, 
around 30-33 tons of heroin need to be shipped to Africa 
to satisfy local and international markets. 
Most heroin trafficked to Africa travels from Pakistan. Of 
the estimated 33-ton African heroin market, up to 20 tons 
may be sourced in Pakistan. The remainder is trafficked 
from the United Arab Emirates and the Middle East (5 
tons), the Islamic Republic of Iran (4 tons), India (3 tons) 
and 1 ton from South and South-East Asian countries.
7-United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Gulf area 
and Middle Eastern countries (excluding the Islamic 
Republic of Iran):
The total estimated heroin consumption of the 26,000 
users in the Gulf area and the Middle East (excluding the 
Islamic Republic of Iran) is around 1.6 tons per year. These 
countries seize approximately 0.5 tons of heroin per year.
Around 10-12 tons of heroin is trafficked from Pakistan to 
the Gulf area and Middle Eastern countries each year. This 
is supplemented by an additional four tons trafficked from 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is in line with the seizure 
information from the UAE which estimates that 20 per cent 
of the heroin trafficked to the UAE is shipped from Iran. 
Out of 12-13 tons of incoming heroin, 2 tons are con-
sumed and seized in the Gulf area and Middle Eastern 
countries. The rest, some 10 tons, proceeds to China (one 
ton), Africa (five tons – mainly Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tan-
zania), Europe (one ton), Turkey (two tons), and South and 
South-East Asian countries (one ton), according to the 
combined seizure data from these countries and the UAE. 
Heroin seizures reported in Turkey, 2002-2007Map 21: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
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Opium seizures reported in Central Asia, 2002-2008Map 23: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Opium trafﬁcking
A total of 4 million opium users worldwide consume 1,000-
1,300 tons of raw opium annually. Half of all users live in 
South and South-East Asia and Oceania, regions that are 
supplied by opium from Myanmar. India is a major market 
with around 675,000 users estimated to consume around 
70 tons of opium per year. The remaining users in these 
regions are estimated to consume approximately 100 tons 
of opium per year. Nearly all the opium consumed in these 
regions originates from Myanmar or is produced locally in 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Viet Nam, Thailand 
and some other South and South-East Asian countries, but 
to a very limited extent.
According to Government reports, opium is not being traf-
ficked into India. Consequently, the 70 tons of opium 
estimated to be consumed in India annually should be pro-
duced locally. 
A total of 900-950 tons of opium is consumed domestically 
in countries and regions to which Afghan opium is traf-
ficked (the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia, 
the Russian Federation, Turkey, Europe and Africa). There, 
the total annual average amount of opium seized is around 
220 tons. It is thus cautiously estimated that a total of 
1,100 -1,200 tons of opium is required to meet the demand, 
after seizures, in these regions annually. 
Russian opium users are estimated to consume 55-60 tons 
per year, while those in Central Asia consume approxi-
mately 30-35 tons. Opium users in the Baltic and Eastern 
European countries consume around 35 tons per year. In 
these regions, total average opium seizures amount to 
Opium  
seizure (kg) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Average 
(1996-
2007)
Kazakhstan 502 1,000 314 170 136 36 14 193 353 669 637 336 363
Kyrgyzstan 1,490 1,640 172 151 1,405 469 109 46 318 117 302 271 541
Tajikistan 3,405 3,456 1,190 1,269 4,778 3,664 1,624 2,371 2,316 1,104 1,387 2,542 2,426
Turkmenistan 1,750 1,410 1,412 4,600 2,419 267 1,200 138 666 749 2,656 2,284 1,629
Uzbekistan 1,866 2,364 1,935 3,292 2,008 241 76 151 385 108 759 731 1,160
Total 9,013 9,869 5,024 9,483 10,747 4,678 3,023 2,898 4,036 2,746 5,741 6,163 6,118
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approximately 5 tons. This means that 120-130 tons of raw 
opium are trafficked from Afghanistan to Central Asia, and 
of this, 90-95 tons reach Russia. 
Although opium consumption in the Russian Federation 
has been increasing since 1999, the amount of opium seized 
by the Central Asian countries (except Kazakhstan) 
decreased sharply after 2001. As shown in table 20, between 
2001 and 2006 opium seizures in Central Asian countries 
were significantly below the 11-year average (6,118kg/year 
between 1996-2007). Exceptionally, in 2007, and especially 
in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, the amount of opium 
seized was above the 11-year average. 
1-Europe
A total of 95 tons of opium is estimated to be consumed in 
South-Eastern, Western and Central European countries 
per year. The average amount of opium seized in this region 
is around 740 kg per year. In Turkey, opium users consume 
nine tons, and an average of 200 kg is seized annually. This 
would indicate that 100 tons of opium are needed to meet 
demand, after seizures, in these countries every year. Most 
of this is trafficked via the Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey route. 
2-The Islamic Republic of Iran
In Iran, 531,000 opium users are estimated to consume 450 
tons of opium per year. Between 2002-2006, an average of 
170-200 tons opium was seized each year. Thus, including 
the outbound opium trafficking from Iran, a total of 600-
750 tons of raw opium is trafficked from Afghanistan to 
Iran every year. This calculation rests on the assumption20 
that there is no (or very limited) opium to heroin conver-
sion being carried out in Iran, Turkey and Eastern Europe. 
Opium mainly enters the Islamic Republic of Iran from the 
Nimroz, Farah and Hirat provinces in western Afghanistan. 
The locations of opium seizures in Iran and Pakistan also 
show possible Afghan opium trafficking from Pakistan into 
Iran’s eastern Sistan-Balochistan province. Around 17 per 
cent of the total opium seized in Pakistan is intercepted in 
the Iran/Pakistan border area, which indicates Afghan 
opium trafficking from Western Pakistan into the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
There were comparatively few opium interceptions close to 
the Iran/Iraq and Iran/Turkey borders, and along the coast-
line. However, some opium seizures were carried out on the 
Iran/Turkmenistan border, which may indicate opium traf-
ficking from Iran to Turkmenistan, and/or vice versa.
Generally, most opium seizures in Iran are carried out in 
July and August, following completion of the harvest in 
most Afghan provinces (especially the southern provinces). 
20 This assumption is based on the absence of oﬃcial data indicating that such 
conversion would be taking place in the countries concerned.
Opium seizures reported in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2002-2007Map 24: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations.
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3-Africa
In Africa, opium use is reported only by Egypt. According 
to the World Drug Report 2008, 0.7 per cent of the adult 
population, or 343,000 people, are opiate users. Half are 
heroin users and the other half opium users. Opium users 
in Egypt are estimated to consume around 55-60 tons of 
opium per year (an average of almost one gram per day per 
user). However, no opium seizures from any country have 
Egypt as their purported destination. The government has 
reported a small amount of opium poppy cultivation, but 
in order to produce 60 tons of opium, at least 1,000 ha of 
poppy cultivation is needed. This indicates that either the 
figure for opiate/heroin users should be revised or the level 
of opium poppy cultivation in Egypt is higher than cur-
rently estimated.21
21 Egyptian authorities have questioned the national data, as reported in the 
2005/06 household survey of Egypt (275 opiate users out of 40,083 persons 
interviewed, equivalent to a prevalence rate of 0.7 per cent, of which some 
three quarters used opium, that is, 0.5 per cent, according to a breakdown 
found in student surveys) accurately reﬂected the extent of opiate use in the 
country. The way the survey was conducted, it cannot be excluded that the 
positive responses included persons who used to experiment with opiates in 
the past, but no longer use opium. Out of the total number of drug users (all 
drugs), 75 per cent consumed drugs regularly or were dependent drug users 
and 25 per cent used them ‘for trial and amusement’ purposes. Applying the 
75 per cent ratio, the prevalence of opium consumption could fall to 0.4 per 
cent. Extrapolating results from a national student survey in Egypt (lifetime 
use of opium by 48 students and of heroin by 15 students out of 18,349 
students interviewed, that is, 0.3 per cent and 0.1 per cent, respectively) to 
the national level would result in far lower annual prevalence rates of opiate 
4-Pakistan
Some 80 tons of opium are consumed annually in Pakistan 
(similar to Afghanistan). 
Since 1996, the highest volumes of opium seizures in Paki-
stan were recorded in 1999 and 2007. Between 1996 and 
2007, Pakistani law enforcement officers seized an average 
of 7,200 kg of opium per year, making Pakistan the second 
most important interception country in the world (after the 
Islamic Republic of Iran). 
Between 2004 and 2007, 97 per cent of opium seizures in 
Pakistan were carried out in 17 cities. Eight of these are 
located in Balochistan province, which accounts for 72 per 
cent of total opium seizures in Pakistan. Punjab province 
accounts for 21 per cent. 
Highlights on opiate ﬂows 
Heroin consumption in the world is estimated at around 
340 tons per year. Europe consumes more than a quarter 
(26 per cent) of this amount (excluding the Russian Fed-
eration), followed by the Russian Federation with 21 per 
cent and China with 17 per cent. The average amount of 
use among the general population (0.14 per cent, including 0.1 per cent 
using opium). Based on the latter results the necessary opium consumption 
would amount to some 12 tons, equivalent to areas under poppy cultivation 
between 400 and 1,000 ha. 
Opium seizures reported in Pakistan, 2000-2008Map 25: 
Source: UNODC/WCO. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
Islamabad
Nepal
Kech
Zhob
Jhang
Kalat
Kasur
Karak
Kohat
Lahor
Uthal
Khyber
Chagai
Chaman
Gaddan
Gilgit
Gwadar
Kharan
Multan
Nushki
Pishin
Quetta
Sangur
Sukkur
Turbat
Maidani
Chakwal
Karachi
Khuzdar
Loralai
Saindak
Sanghar
Gulistan
Mianwali
Peshawar
Nok Kundi
Dalbandin
Hyderabad
Jafarabad
Faisalabad
Rawalpindi
Makran Division
Dera Ismail Khan
Lasbela District
North Waziristan Agency
0 310 620155 Km
Opium seizures
!( < 10 kg
!( 10 - 100 kg
!( 100 - 1,000 kg
!( 1,000 - 10,000 kg
!( > 10,000 kg
Islamic
Republic
of Iran
India
Pakistan
Afghanistan Jammu & Kashmir
Turkmenistan
China 
ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY: The transnational threat of Afghan opium 
58
heroin seized every year is around 90-95 tons. Thus, 430-
440 tons of heroin are sufficient to meet annual global 
demand and seizures. Of this, 50 tons are supplied by 
heroin production in Myanmar. The rest is met by Afghan 
production. 
Global annual opium consumption is estimated at 1,100 
tons. Raw opium from Myanmar is consumed in South and 
East Asia, whereas opium from Afghanistan is consumed in 
South-East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. 
In addition to the opium production in these two coun-
tries, opium is produced in other regions like South Amer-
ica, Africa, South and East Asia. 
Data from 1995-2005 indicate that the average opium 
production in the world amounted to 4,700 tons. Of this, 
around 3,300 tons (70 per cent) was processed into heroin 
and the rest was consumed (including seizures) as raw 
opium. According to currently available demand and sei-
zure statistics, 4,700 tons of opium are sufficient for the 
heroin and opium consumption of the more than 15 mil-
lion opiate users in the world, after deduction of 1,000 tons 
of seizures. 
Since 2006, the average annual opium production in 
Afghanistan has been 7,300 tons (8,000 tons worldwide). 
There is no indication of a dramatic increase in global 
heroin consumption in recent years. This amount therefore 
far exceeds total global demand, to the extent that another 
16 million drug users would be needed to consume it. It is 
estimated that around 12,000 tons of opium is stockpiled 
somewhere between Afghanistan and transit/destination 
countries. 
Before 2002, Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic were the main heroin suppliers for markets in 
China, India and other countries in South, East and South-
East Asia, and Oceania. But following the sharp decreases 
in opium production in Myanmar and Laos, Afghan heroin 
has started to be trafficked to all regions of the world. 
Between 2002 and 2006, around half of global heroin and 
morphine seizures were made by two of Afghanistan’s 
neighbours: Pakistan (31 per cent) and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran (19 per cent). Moreover, the same two countries 
made more than 90 per cent of global morphine seizures: 
Pakistan (61 per cent) and Iran (30 per cent). Morphine is 
used either to produce heroin or consumed as is. 
Whereas Colombia, the main cocaine producing country, 
seizes around a quarter of its cocaine production, Afghani-
stan (like Myanmar) seizes only about 1 per cent of the 
heroin produced on its territory. 
Region
Percentage of total 
opium seized in 
Pakistan
City
FATA 1% Maidani
Punjab 1% Rawalpindi
Balochistan 1% Saindak
NWFP 1% Peshawar
NWFP 1% Attock
Sindh 1% Karachi
Punjab 2% Faisalabad
Balochistan 2% Dalbandin
Balochistan 3% Chagai
Balochistan 3% Mekran
Balochistan 6% Turbat
Balochistan 6% Kharan 
Balochistan 12% Pishin 
Punjab 18% Kohat
Balochistan 39% Quetta
Distribution of opium seizuresTable 19:  reported in  
Pakistan by location, 2002-2008
Global heroin consumption (340 tons)*Fig. 12: 
* 340 tons of heroin is equal to 2,600 tons of opium. 
Source: UNODC.
Heroin and morphine seizures worldwide, Fig. 13: 
2002-2006
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Afghanistan 6 105 95 150 3 20 379
Myanmar 2 38 1 9 50
Europe 5 5
Turkey 85 85
Islamic Re-
public of Iran 95 9 2 2 4 112
Caucasus 7 7
Central Asia 2 77 1 80
Russia 4 4
Gulf area and 
Middle East 1 2 1 5 1 10
Pakistan 5 35 11 6  20 2 25 104
China 1 1
India 1 2 3 7 6 19
Africa 2 4 3 3 12
Ocenia 0
USA and 
Canada 0
Rest of
S & SE Asia 1 3 13 1 1 3 22
Unknown 20 20
Total 8 0 106 97 140 11 97 77 13 150 55 37 33 2 20 44
Annual heroin/morphine and all opiates ﬂows and seizures in the world since 2002* Table 20: 
*Seizure averages for 2002-2006. **Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Romania, Serbia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro.
Heroin ﬂows worldwide (tons) after 2002Table 21: 
Country/Region
Heroin and morphine All opiates (heroin, morphine and opium)  in opium equivalent
Estimated 
ﬂow (tons)
Average 
seizures* 
(tons)
Per cent of 
estimated ﬂow 
intercepted
Estimated 
ﬂow (tons)
Average 
seizures* 
(tons)
Per cent of 
estimated ﬂow 
intercepted
Afghanistan 380 4 1% 3500 61 2%
Pakistan 150 26 18% 1135 189 17%
Islamic Republic of Iran 140 17 12% 1713 291 20%
Turkey 95 10 10% 768 69 9%
South East Europe** 90 1.5 2% 724 10.5 2%
Rest of Europe (except Russia) 105 9 9% 828 74 9%
Midde East& Gulf countries 
(except Iran) 14 0.5 4% 114 4 4%
Central Asia 95 5 5% 790 39 5%
Russian Federation 77 3 4% 627 23 4%
Africa 35 0.3 1% 305 2.3 7%
Myanmar 60 1 1% 920 12 2%
India 37 1 3% 328 11 3%
China 55 9 16% 398 73 18%
Rest of S & SE Asia 30 0.7 2% 285 16 6%
Oceania 2 0.3 13% 19 2.5 13%
USA and Canada 24 2 9% 168 17 10%
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Ofﬁcial border crossing points between Afghanistan and its neighboursMap 28: 
\ 
Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kash-
mir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
in Chagai district (Balochistan province), near Hilmand’s 
border with Pakistan. However, there is no official border 
crossing point between Afghanistan and Pakistan in this 
area (Chagai). There is also a lack of government presence 
in southern Nimroz, a major trafficking hub for smuggling 
into Iran and Pakistan. In addition, there are numerous 
heroin labs in Hilmand province, which indicates likely 
precursor trafficking from Dalbandin and other border 
cities of Pakistan into Hilmand province. 
Pakistan
Heroin and opium enters Pakistan from Afghanistan’s east-
ern and southern provinces. 
From eastern Afghanistan, through Nangarhar, Kunar, 
Khost and Paktika provinces, heroin and opium are traf-
ficked into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
region of Pakistan where insurgent groups linked to the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda increasingly hold sway. 
Negligible opiate seizures have been reported in FATA over 
the last several years. Significant heroin seizures have been 
reported in the adjacent North Western Frontier Province 
(NWFP) region which, although similarly restive, is under 
the full control of the Pakistan Government. 
Opiates are trafficked through FATA in three main direc-
tions:
Towards China via Gilgit (northern areas), by roada. 
Towards India through the NWFP - Chakwai/b. 
Rawalpindi - Sailkot - Wagha route 
Towards Karachi via NWFP - Rawalpindi - Chawai-c. 
Faisaba - Mutan-Sukkur route
Opiate trafficking in this region is mainly controlled by 
Pakistani drug trafficking groups, most of whom have kin-
ship ties across the border and some of whom enjoy the 
support and protection of insurgency groups. Moreover, 
Pakistani authorities have indicated increasing involvement 
of West African groups, particularly Nigerians, in the opiate 
trade in and out of Pakistan.
Opiates leave southern Afghanistan through Hilmand, 
Kandahar and Nimroz provinces, mainly into the cities of 
Quetta and Dalbandin in Balochistan. Some of these opi-
ates then travel to Karachi to be hidden in cargo containers 
for shipment via air or sea or via commercial airlines. 
Another portion is trafficked to eastern Iran by road and 
rail. A third route is via the southern sea ports of Pakistan 
(Gwadar and Pasni) through Panjgour city in Pakistan. 
From Pakistan, opiates are shipped to several destinations 
worldwide:
 China: by air or roadi. 
 India (only heroin): by road ii. 
 East and South-East Asia: by air and seaiii. 
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districts, and then mostly travel via the following routes:
Hakkari/Van - south-eastern cities - central Anatolia a. 
cities - Istanbul - Edirne to Bulgaria/Greece
Hakkari/Van - south-eastern cities - southern/b. 
western Anatolia cities to Greece/Cyprus with sea 
transportation
Hakkari/Van - south-eastern cities - central Anato-c. 
lia cities - northern Anatolia cities - Ukraine (with 
smaller amounts to Georgia). 
There is also opiate trafficking by air from Turkey to Europe. 
However, the Turkey/Europe land route has established 
infrastructure to support the vast majority of the trafficking 
which takes place via road or rail transport. On a monthly 
basis, the average number of vehicles entering or leaving 
Turkey is around 350,000. Almost half of this number is 
recorded at the Turkey/Bulgaria border (Kapikule) where 
around 5,000 vehicles cross every day. Each month, an 
average of 10,000-13,000 vehicles cross the Turkey - Greece 
border in both directions.
An average of 20,000 vehicles travel from the Gurbulak 
(Iran/Turkey) border each month. The Iraq - Turkey border 
crossing (Habur) processes significantly more vehicles 
(around 80,000 vehicles per month) than Gurbulak, how-
ever.
There is also a rail network connecting Turkey/Bulgaria, 
Turkey/Greece, Turkey/Iran and Turkey/Iraq. 
Balkans
The vast majority of the heroin and opium that enters Bul-
garia and Greece is trafficked via Turkey by road and rail 
transportation. These opiates are then trafficked to two 
main destinations: Germany/Netherlands and Italy.
Traﬃcking route to Germany/Netherlands: From a. 
Bulgaria, opiates are smuggled to Romania and 
Hungary, continue to Austria, and then to Germany/
Netherlands. A smaller amount passes through the 
Bulgaria - Serbia - Austria route. Once heroin/opium 
reaches Germany, it travels further to the UK via the 
Netherlands and France.
Traﬃcking route to Italy: Most of the opiates smug-b. 
gled into Italy come via Albania and to a lesser extent 
form Greece. 
Another route to Italy is the Albania-Croatia-Slovakia cor-
ridor. A portion is also trafficked to Switzerland from 
Croatia/Italy. 
This route is largely dominated by Albanian criminal groups 
using the Balkan region as a base for their drug smuggling 
activities. 
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Opiate trafﬁcking routes in Central AsiaMap 31: 
Source: UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia.
Northern route
Afghan opiates enter Central Asia via the borders of 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and proceed to 
their destinations in the Russian Federation. Apart from air 
routes, Kazakhstan is an obligatory transit corridor to reach 
Russia.
Opiates enter Tajikistan from the provinces of Badakshan, 
Takhar and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan. The ship-
ments are then transported by road across the country into 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. There is also heroin trafficking 
by air and railway from Tajikistan to Russia. 
Opiates enter Uzbekistan from a) Balkh and Kunduz prov-
inces of Afghanistan, b) Tajikistan’s border with Uzbekistan, 
and c) Kyrgyzstan’s border with Uzbekistan. 
From Uzbekistan, opiates travel further to Kazakhstan, but a 
small amount is trafficked to Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Opiates are also trafficked to Russia from Uzbekistan by air. 
Kyrgyzstan does not have a border with Afghanistan, which 
means that the country sources Afghan opiates from 
Tajikistan (Pamir highway) and Uzbekistan (Ferghana 
valley). Once in Kyrgyzstan, flows converge towards the 
Kazakhstan border. There is an air and railway network 
from Kyrgyzstan through Kazakhstan to the Russian Fed-
eration which is also used for opiate trafficking. 
Opiates enter Turkmenistan from Afghanistan (through 
Hirat, Badghis, Faryab and Jawzjan provinces) and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Once in Turkmenistan, the main 
opiate routes run through Kazakhstan (via the Caspian Sea 
and/or Uzbekistan). Another opiate route travels to Azerba-
ijan or Russia via the Caspian Sea. 
Once opiates reach Kazakhstan, they are further smuggled 
through its north-western borders into the Russian Federa-
tion. Within Russia, opiates travel in almost every direction 
since Russia is a main destination country for Afghan opi-
ates. Opiates not destined for the Russian market travel 
further into South-Eastern Europe via its borders with 
Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine by road, sea and railways. An 
additional opiate route runs through Russia into northern 
Europe via the border with Finland. 
Other routes
Afghan heroin is trafficked to almost all regions worldwide. 
Trafficking on the northern and Balkan routes is under-
taken primarily by road. With the additional use of air and 
sea transportation networks, Afghan heroin is shipped to 
the following destinations:
North America: By commercial aircraft from Europe, s 
Africa, Pakistan and India. 
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China: By air, mainly from Pakistan and the United s 
Arab Emirates. 
South Asian countries: By air or sea via Pakistan.s 
Australia: From China (heroin from Myanmar) and s 
South-East Asian countries (Afghan heroin). 
Europe: Mainly by air and sea from Africa and s 
Pakistan.
Ukraine: Since 2007, heroin traﬃcking to Ukraine via s 
the Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Black Sea route has been 
increasing. 
In 2008, heroin traﬃcking cases from Georgia to Bul-s 
garia via the Black Sea were reported. 
Value of the opiate trade6. 
The opiate market (like all illicit drug markets) is controlled 
by well-established trafficking organizations of various sizes 
in cooperation with corrupt officials. In some regions, the 
trade is facilitated by insurgent groups. The total value of 
the opiate market is estimated at US$ 65 billion, or 20 per 
cent of the US$ 320 billion23 global illicit drug trade. 
An estimated 11.3 million heroin users pay around US$ 56 
billion to drug dealers per year. The size of the opium 
market is estimated at around US$ 7 billion. Consequently, 
the combined total heroin/opium market is worth upwards 
of US$ 60-65 billion per year. This amount is higher than 
the GDP of 120 countries in the world and comparable to 
the GDP of Viet Nam (US$ 71 billion). 
One kilogram of pure brown heroin at the Afghanistan/
Pakistan border costs US$ 3,200, while in Europe, the same 
heroin fetches US$ 150,000-170,000 per kilogram, a 
markup of 30-50 times the original price. 
Estimating the value is difficult because of the substantial 
price increases that occur as goods move along trafficking 
routes, as well as the number of times a shipment may 
change hands. One kilogram of high quality heroin at the 
Iran/Afghanistan or Iran/Pakistan border is around US$ 
5,000/kg. When the same heroin reaches the Iran/Turkey 
border its price per kilogram increases to approximately 
US$ 8,000, a 60 per cent increase. Based on the estimated 
flows through this route, organized crime groups or indi-
viduals organizing the heroin trafficking from the Afghani-
stan/Iran border to the Turkey/Iran border stand to pocket 
some US$ 450-600 million per year. 
The estimated worth of opiates trafficked through the 
Afghanistan/Iran border is US$ 1 billion. Iranian opiate 
users spend around US$ 1.4 billion a year. European opiate 
users spend more than ten times that amount on Afghan 
heroin and opium, an average of US$ 20 billion/year. 
As heroin gets closer to its main destinations, the profit 
23  2007 World Drug Report. 
level increases and organized crime groups realize higher 
profit margins. The wholesale price of high quality heroin 
at Turkey’s borders with Bulgaria and Greece is around US$ 
20,000. That price more than doubles (to US$ 45,000) 
once it reaches Germany. The estimated annual profit of 
organized crime groups managing heroin trafficking 
between Iran/Turkey and further to the Turkey/Bulgaria 
and/or Turkey/Greece borders is around US$ 8,000 per 
kilogram, totalling US$ 600-700 million. Groups organiz-
ing the heroin trafficking from Turkey/Bulgaria to Ger-
many generate profits of US$ 25,000 per kg.
The total estimated value of opiate trafficking in Pakistan is 
around US$ 1 billion per year. In addition to supporting 
independent drug traffickers and organized groups, the 
drug trade may also serve as a significant source of funding 
for some of the insurgent groups active in the border areas 
of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Chinese opiate users pay approximately US$ 10 billion/year 
to domestic drug dealers. Chinese heroin wholesalers pay 
around US$ 98,000 to Chinese/Myanmar traffickers for a 
kilogram of heroin at the China/Myanmar border and sell 
it to retailers in China for around US$ 130,000 per kg. 
In North and South America, the total size of the opiate 
market is estimated at US$ 21 billion/year. In the USA 
alone, the market is worth an estimated US$ 7.8 billion/
year to drug dealers (US$ 2.5 billion for opiates from Latin 
America/Mexico and US$ 5.3 billion for Afghan opiates). 
Central Asia is a major transit route for Afghan heroin/
opium. Around 25 per cent of all the Afghan heroin flows 
through Central Asia into the Russian Federation. The 
estimated value of opiates trafficked through the Afghani-
stan/Central Asia border area is around US$ 350-400 mil-
lion. This amount increases several times on the way to 
Global opiate market value  Fig. 14: 
(US$ 65 billion/year)
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Russia. Kazakhstan is the main hub in Central Asia before 
the Afghan opiates reach the Russian Federation. It is esti-
mated that at least 50 tons of Afghan heroin flow to Russia 
(Russian opiate users pay around US$ 13 billion/year to 
drug dealers) via Kazakhstan. This means that a considera-
ble amount of drug money is circulating in Central Asia. 
Central Asian economies are highly cash-based and there 
are always differences between official and informal 
exchange rates. This provides a potential money-laundering 
mechanism for drug traffickers. 
Afghan opiates in new markets7. 
Until 2002, the main destination for Afghan opiates was 
Europe (and to a lesser extent the USA and Canada). In 
parallel with the decrease in opium production in Myan-
mar, the availability of Afghan opiates increased in these 
traditional markets and in a number of other markets across 
the world. In the year 2000, opium production in South 
and South-East Asia (mainly Myanmar and the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic) was 1,260 tons, but by 2002 it had 
decreased to 950 tons and in 2007, 469 tons. Conversely, 
as of 2000 (except in 2001), opium production in Afghan-
istan began to increase. 
As there was no proportional decrease in heroin consump-
tion in East, South and South-East Asia and the Pacific, the 
heroin gap in these markets was filled by Afghan heroin. 
Seizures of Afghan heroin have been reported in almost all 
countries in this region. With a large population of heroin 
users, China became an especially attractive market for 
Afghan heroin after 2002. 
Africa is an emerging destination for Afghan heroin. One 
of the indicators is the rise in the number of heroin users, 
which increased by an estimated 54 per cent between 2004 
and 2008. Perhaps due to improved security along tradi-
tional trafficking routes, some African countries are increas-
ingly used as transit points for Afghan heroin trafficking, 
especially to Europe and North America. 
As of the year 2000, the Russian Federation became another 
important destination for Afghan heroin, due to the increase 
in the number of heroin users in that country. 
Precursor trafﬁcking8. 
Without precursor chemicals there can be no heroin 
processing, but precursor control has lagged behind other 
drug control initiatives. Afghanistan’s neighbours have 
tended to develop border security and counter-narcotics 
policies in isolation, while limited capacity within Afghani-
stan has inhibited effective cooperation in areas such as 
backtracking investigations. The bulk of Afghan law 
enforcement resources and manpower is directed toward 
interdicting opiate exports. While the Government is pub-
licly committed to precursor control, recent donor interest 
in this area is starting from a low base. Only a handful of 
agencies include precursor modules in their law enforce-
ment training curricula, and relevant equipment is not 
widely held, even among otherwise well-equipped forces.
The chemicals used in heroin processing range from unre-
stricted, common chemicals to internationally monitored 
and more exotic substances. UNODC estimates that 
approximately two thirds of Afghan opium production is 
transformed into heroin in-country.24 Around 10,000 tons 
of precursor chemicals are required, including acetic anhy-
dride, ammonium chloride, hydrochloric acid, acetone, 
lime and sodium bicarbonate.25 
This section begins with a discussion of the chemicals of 
major concern for heroin precursor control. With a focus 
on acetic anhydride, price data is considered, which shows 
significant increases in procurement costs. Mapping sei-
zures in Afghanistan, source and transit countries demon-
strates that only a tiny proportion of flows has been 
interdicted. Precursor trafficking for Afghan heroin produc-
tion is multi-directional and multi-modal. 
Targets for heroin precursor control
Acetic anhydride is the most common chemical used to 
convert morphine to heroin. However, it does have poten-
tial substitutes. The most likely of these is acetyl chloride, a 
chemical that is more difficult to handle but which is not 
internationally controlled. UNODC noted in India that 
“[o]ne recent trend detected during certain investigations 
has been the use of acetyl chloride as a substitute chemical 
for acetic anhydride”.26 The United States Drug Enforce-
ment Administration has also observed that acetyl chloride 
can be used to convert opium into heroin.27
Small quantities of acetyl chloride have been found in 
heroin laboratories outside Afghanistan, although acetic 
anhydride was also present. The acetyl chloride appeared to 
be used as a ‘kick-starter’ before the application of acetic 
anhydride. A sizeable seizure of acetyl chloride occurred in 
Iran in 2008 (see further discussion below). Overall, how-
ever, it appears that acetyl chloride remains much less com-
monly used than acetic anhydride. If some laboratories have 
found ways to bypass acetic anhydride in heroin synthesis, 
there is a general consensus that such chemicals would be 
of the acetyl family, a common group that includes acetic 
acid. Theoretically, acetic anhydride may be manufactured 
on-site in Afghanistan from acetic acid (or any other sub-
24 UNODC, “Precursors used in heroin manufacture: strengthening operational 
activities in Eurasia”, 2006. 
25 Not included in the 10,000 tons and often forgotten, wood and water are two 
inputs required in large quantities for heroin production. Around 500 litres 
of water are needed for each kilogram of heroin, a constraint on the location 
of laboratories. Signiﬁcant stocks of ﬁrewood are also needed to heat cooking 
barrels.
26 UNODC, “South Asia Regional Proﬁle”, 2005.
27 U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, “Opium 
Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Processing in Southeast Asia”, March 2001. 
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stance containing the active acetyl group). The Director 
General of the Pakistani Anti Narcotic Force (ANF) 
reported to UNODC that a number of non-restricted 
chemicals were being smuggled to Afghanistan, including 
acetic acid and acetyl chloride.28 Significant movements 
and seizures of acetic acid have been noted, such as: 
From 1998 to 2001, Customs in Urumchi (Xinjiang, s 
China) reported conﬁscating 69 tons of acetic acid (no 
other details are available).29
In 2001, a drug traﬃcking network attempted to de-s 
liver 50 tons of acetic acid, disguised as fabric products, 
via South Korea to the Islamic Republic of Iran.30
Two consignments of acetic acid (17.7 tons and 16.2 s 
tons) were stopped in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
July 2005.
A seizure of 1,200 litres of acetic acid in May 2008 s 
during Operation TARCET at the Hayraton check-
point on the Uzbek-Afghan border.
Most chemists currently believe that on-site manufacturing 
of a chemical to effectively acetylize morphine in Afghani-
stan would be exceedingly difficult with limited expertise 
and in the rudimentary facilities used for heroin processing. 
Among others, the head of Counter Narcotics Police of 
Afghanistan’s (CNPA) intelligence and analysis section 
agreed.31 Conversely, UNODC sources in the south reported 
that each fixed laboratory has one foreigner (Pakistani and 
Turkish were two nationalities mentioned) who could likely 
provide sufficient expertise.
UNODC is aware of only one seizure confirmed as acetic 
acid within Afghanistan, in August 2005 (120 litres). How-
ever, precursor seizure information is sparse in Afghanistan 
and it is common to refer to all liquid suspected precursors 
as ‘acid’. It is therefore possible that acetic acid has been 
seized but not identified.32 A high-ranking CNPA officer 
also reported to UNODC that acetic acid had been seized 
during lab interdictions but provided no further details.33
Sizeable seizures of sulphuric acid, particularly in Central 
Asia, have led some to speculate that it may be used in some 
step of heroin processing. It is commonly thought to be 
used solely in cocaine manufacturing,34 although a 2002 
DEA35 report described one heroin recipe in Afghanistan as 
involving “3 ½ litres of methanol, 5 litres of sulphuric acid, 
0.5 litres of ammonium hydroxide and 3 cups of charcoal.”36 
28 UNODC mission to Pakistan, 2007.
29 Xinjiang Ribao, Urumqi, in Chinese, 3 April 2002. 
30 Yonhap news agency, 25 September 2005.
31 Interview with CNPA oﬃcial, June 2008.
32 In illicit heroin production, acetic acid can also be used in place of ammo-
nium chloride or ammonia solutions as a reagent to adjust alkalinity in the 
precipitation of morphine from an opium solution.
33 Interview, November 2008.
34 One kilogram of cocaine base requires the use of 3 litres of concentrated 
sulphuric acid, 10 kilograms of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of 
potassium permanganate, and one litre of concentrated ammonia.
35 Drug Enforcement Administration, USA.
36 DEA, Heroin Laboratories in Afghanistan, April 2002, p. 40. See also 
In March 2008, the Drug Control Agency (DCA) of the 
Kyrgyz Republic reported two seizures of sulphuric acid 
totalling 5,493 kilograms. During the second stage of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Channel-
2007 operation, the Tajik DCA reported seizing 1,856 
kilograms of the substance. The same report claimed the 
acid was used to produce heroin from opium.37 Further-
more, Afghanistan’s Drug Regulation Committee (DRC) 
and the Uzbek authorities have dealt with a complex but 
ultimately unsuccessful attempt by an Afghan company to 
import tons of sulphuric acid. 
Prices
Throughout 2008 and into 2009, UNODC received acetic 
anhydride price reports in Afghanistan that clustered quite 
consistently in the range of US$300-400 per litre. Prices up 
to US$750 per litre were also reported several times, most 
of these coming from Badakshan.38 To put this price in 
perspective, licit purchases of acetic anhydride cost less than 
US$1 per litre. As recently as 2005, processors in Afghani-
stan were paying around US$65 per litre. Earlier, 1998 
prices ranged from US$13 - 34.39 Overall, there appears to 
have been a large and quite rapid increase in the price of 
illicit acetic anhydride. 
A similar trend has been observed in China, which reported 
an increase in illicit acetic anhydride prices of nearly 50 per 
cent between 2004 and 2007, from approximately 
US$10,300 per ton to US$17,500 per ton.40 Taken together, 
these developments suggest that the trade in heroin precur-
sors may be experiencing disruption, presumably as a result 
of better international cooperation and improved interdic-
tion of acetic anhydride in particular.
At these prices, acetic anhydride makes up a significant pro-
portion of the costs of processing heroin. For example, in 
February 2009 in Nangarhar, acetic anhydride costed around 
US$350 per liter. A kilogram of dry opium was US$108. 
On the understanding that 2 litres of acetic anhydride and 
7 kg of dry opium are required for 1 kg of white heroin 
hydrochloride, the cost of these inputs is US$1,456. In the 
same month, the highest purity heroin found by UNODC’s 
price monitoring in Nangarhar was selling for US$1,902 per 
kilogram. On face value, that leaves a margin of only US$446 
per kilogram, excluding all other input costs, such as other 
precursor chemicals and labour.
The most likely explanation is that between lab and sale 
there is significant cutting of the heroin, which means that 
UNODC, opium poppy survey 2006 p.129.
37 Sulphuric acid can also be used to make Hydrochloric acid in illicit labo-
ratories by mixing it with common sodium chloride (table salt, rock salt or 
iodized salt); (source: US Department of justice DEA, “Chemicals used in the 
clandestine production of drugs”, p.50, September 2000). 
38 It is likely that these were generated by laboratories in Badakshan seeking 
acetic anhydride quickly to fulﬁl an immediate order for heroin.
39 UNODC, “The opium economy in Afghanistan: an international problem”, 
2003.
40 “China’s Drug Control Eﬀorts”, Oﬃce of China National Narcotics Control 
Commission, June 25, 2008.
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1 kg from the lab becomes 1.5, 2 or 3 kg when sold. Nev-
ertheless, the comparison between US$700 of acetic anhy-
dride and US$756 of opium indicates the relative importance 
of precursors in the cost structure of heroin processing, 
even in a province such as Nangarhar, where the opium 
price is at least 30 per cent higher than in the south. 
Seizures in Afghanistan
If two thirds of Afghan opium is converted to heroin within 
Afghanistan, this requires approximately 1,300 tons of 
acetic anhydride. As Afghanistan has no licit use of acetic 
anhydride at present, the country does not produce it and 
has not issued any licences for its importation. In other 
words, all acetic anhydride used in heroin processing has 
been smuggled into Afghanistan and any acetic anhydride 
in the country is illegally possessed. Moreover, none of 
Afghanistan’s neighbours (Central Asian countries, Paki-
stan, the Islamic Republic of Iran) officially produce acetic 
anhydride and few shipments of licitly traded acetic anhy-
dride were reported to the International Narcotics Control 
Board by Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours.
It is difficult to obtain comprehensive seizure information 
in Afghanistan. In 2008, UNODC’s seizure database regis-
tered the quantities shown on the following page. The fact 
that the largest seizures were of ‘other precursors’ indicates 
the limited capacity for chemical testing in Afghanistan at 
present. With an estimated 1,300 tons of acetic anhydride 
required for heroin production, the seizure statistics suggest 
that only 1.09 per cent of illegal imports were seized.41 
 
41 There is a thriving ‘secondary trade’ in precursor chemicals, that is, interdicted 
shipments which are then sold on by seizing oﬃcers/agencies. UNODC’s 
seizure database attempts to exclude these, the quantities of which are still 
ﬂowing into the drug trade.
Significantly, more than half of the quantity seized occurred 
in just two incidents (in Kandahar and Paktya).
Two major caveats are relevant. First, it is quite possible that 
‘other precursors’ include acetic anhydride that was never 
positively identified prior to destruction. This can be con-
sidered acetic anhydride removed from the drug trade, 
although the deterrent and punitive effect is obviously 
smaller without associated criminal justice responses. 
Second, there are huge quantities of chemicals stored near 
Afghan border crossing points, where they have been placed 
by border authorities, generally because their attempted 
importation had no accompanying paperwork. Again, it’s 
possible that these include acetic anhydride, although those 
attempting to import it would have a strong financial incen-
tive to salvage these chemicals through bribery or unauthor-
ized removal from the haphazard storage sites.
The following figures summarize UNODC’s data on pre-
cursor seizures in Afghanistan in 2008. In assessing the 
seizures by agency, it should be noted that the 2008 data-
base did not capture multi-agency seizures, but only 
permitted the identification of a lead agency. In particular, 
this may underestimate the activities of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), who provided security 
support to several raids on heroin processing facilities and 
drug/precursor storage sites.
The significant quantity of precursors seized by the ABP is 
related to the large border stockpiles mentioned above – 
particularly at Kandahar’s crossings – but also suggests little 
overlap between lab destructions and precursor seizures. 
Even stripping out ABP seizures on the grounds that very 
few were positively identified as precursors relevant to 
heroin production (most were ‘other precursors’), it remains 
Acetic anhydride prices in Afghanistan, Fig. 15: 
2006-2008 (US$)
Source: Counter Narcotic Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)
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Precursor seizures in Afghanistan in 2008, by province Table 22: 
Source: UNODC Afghanistan Office.
true that most lab raids do not result in large quantities of 
precursors being seized. This is indicative of the logistical 
arrangements involved in precursor distribution (see below). 
It also suggests that the highest-value targeting would 
involve identifying large volumes in transit near the borders 
or in illicit stockpiles before distribution to labs.The three 
provinces that witnessed more than 10,000 kg of seizures in 
2008 – Nangarhar, Hilmand and Kandahar – all host sig-
nificant numbers of heroin processing laboratories.
The relatively small seizures in Hirat, Farah and Nimroz are 
a concern, given what is known and suspected about the 
large quantities of chemical imports over the western bor-
ders, as well as the proliferation of processing facilities in 
these areas. 
There have been three notable precursor seizures in 
Afghanistan in 2009:
Interception at Kabul airport of 220 litres of acetic 1. 
anhydride on a ﬂight arriving from Delhi. It appears  
that the chemicals were diverted after purchase from 
France. Strangely, the cargo wrapping placed on the 
containers did not match the airline by which the 
chemicals were smuggled.
Around 4 tons of ammonium chloride2. 42 in  
Kunduz province, where there were no precursor 
seizures recorded in 2008. Details on the intended 
destination(s) were not available.
A raid of several days’ duration in Marja district  3. 
of Hilmand, infamous as a hub for drug traﬃck- 
 
42 Ammonium chloride is a non-controlled chemical used to precipitate opium 
into morphine base.
Province Ammonium chloride (kg)
Sodium 
bicarbonate 
(kg)
Ammonia 
(L)
Acetic 
anhydride 
(L)
Acetone 
(L)
Lime 
(kg)
Carbon 
(kg)
Hydroch.
acid (L)
Other  
precursors 
(kg)
Wardak 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 172
Zabul 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kapisa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
Baghlan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,281
Nimroz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 748
Paktya 2,382 0 0 2,310 0 0 0 0 0
Takhar 20 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 184
Kabul 5,489 737 0 880 0 0 174 0 773
Badakhshan 474 0 10 40 0 0 126 0 209
Kandahar 55 278 0 7,500 0 0 0 0 22,375
Balkh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Hirat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Hilmand 8,270 370 0 82 0 0 480 0 2,564
Nangarhar 2,664 280 0 3,282 30 718 750 890 4,572
Total 19,414 1,665 10 14,234 30 718 1,530 890 33,927
Seizures of all precursors by agency in Afghanistan (kg equivalents), 2008Fig. 16: 
Source: UNODC Afghanistan Office.
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ing and an area held tightly by the insurgency. As a 
result, nearly 2 tons of acetic anhydride were seized 
along with 24 tons of ammonium chloride and other 
chemicals.
Seizures in source and transit countries
Pakistan
The manufacturing of acetic anhydride was discontinued in 
Pakistan in 1995, but the country borders two major chem-
ical producers, China and India. Based on seizure data, 
Pakistan appears to be a major source of precursors entering 
Afghanistan. “Traditional routes”, such as precursor smug-
gling across the Indo-Pakistan border, seem to have fallen 
in disuse. The largest precursor flows arrive at Karachi or 
other seaports on Balochistan’s coast, in recent years often 
from or via the Republic of Korea. The majority then 
crosses Pakistan’s borders with the southern Afghan prov-
inces of Nimroz, Hilmand and Kandahar. A primary hub 
appears to be the Baramcha bazaar43 (Dishu district of 
Hilmand), a village that straddles the border. Former 
Afghan Border Police (ABP) officers also asserted that the 
Gardi Jangle refugee camp44 south of Baramcha was a major 
precursor supply route for southern labs.45 
Seizure data and field research in eastern Afghanistan indi-
cate that significant precursor trafficking occurs along the 
43 Phone interview with Nimroz border oﬃcial, 14 September 2008
44 Gardi Jangle is an old Afghan refugee camp. It is located in the Dalbandin 
area of Chagai district. In 2007, there were reportedly some 43,000 residents 
still inhabiting the camp. Source: Thomas H. Johnson, On the Edge of the 
Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan, China and Eurasia Fo-
rum Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 2 (2007) p. 93-129, http://www.silkroadstud-
ies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2007/Johnson.pdf
45 UNODC Mission to Afghanistan Mazar-Sharif and Hairatan, (25-27 March 
2008).
eastern belt of Paktya and Nangarhar, which border the 
Khyber and Kurram Agencies of Pakistan’s Federally Admin-
istered Tribal Areas (FATA). The major legal crossing point 
in the area is Torkham, which processes hundreds of vehi-
cles a day.
While eastern Afghanistan requires significant quantities of 
precursor chemicals for its processing facilities, there have 
been no seizures of acetic anhydride reported from Karachi, 
the main seaport. One confirmed route crosses into Paki-
stan’s Kurram agency through the town of Sada and into 
Paktya province, although it is unknown how the chemicals 
reached Pakistan. It remains likely that acetic anhydride 
entering eastern Afghanistan arrived in Pakistan by sea, but 
smaller amounts may also come by air into Islamabad (or 
Peshawar). Backtracking investigations related to precursors 
in eastern Afghanistan are needed to determine whether 
they have branched off the Karachi/Baluchistan trunk 
routes or are fed by other means.
The Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran shares a 949 kilometre long border with the Afghan 
provinces of Hirat, Farah and Nimroz.46 Iran’s road and rail 
infrastructure is useful for smugglers and there are numer-
ous entry points into Afghanistan that are used by various 
networks to smuggle goods, weapons and narcotics. The 
continued development of trade links with Iran will provide 
further opportunities for precursor traffickers to blend in 
with licit trade flows, while numerous smuggling routes on 
the Afghan-Iranian border (particularly in Farah and 
Nimroz) have good potential for precursor traffickers. 
One established route through Iran runs from Busan 
46 Iran also shares a 976 km border with Pakistan’s Balochistan province.
Location of precursor seizures in 2008, by provinceMap 32: 
Source: UNODC Afghanistan Office.
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port in South Korea to Afghanistan via Bandar Abbas port 
(Iran), using commercial containers. Bandar Abbas remains 
the likeliest entry point for large shipments of acetic anhy-
dride and other chemicals and most of Iran’s reported 
precursor seizures in the past fifteen years have occurred 
there.47 In 2001, two shipments of acetic anhydride (38 
tons concealed in textile shipments) from South Korea 
destined for Afghanistan were intercepted at Bandar 
Abbas.48 Perhaps the most telling suggestion that precursor 
smuggling from Iran still takes place came from an April 
2008 seizure during Operation TARCET,49 uncovering a 
shipment of 5 tons of acetic anhydride at Bandar Abbas, 
also destined for Afghanistan. Earlier that year, Iranian 
customs had seized nearly 16 tons of acetyl chloride, a 
chemical which can also be used in heroin production. 
Assuming that precursor shipments follow transportation 
corridors, those shipped through Bandar Abbas likely head 
for Nimroz province in Afghanistan along the 950 km 
Bandar Abbas-Milak/Zaranj road.50
47 Summary of the Turkish Drug Report 2001, http://candidates2003.emcdda.
europa.eu/download/tr/turkey-nr-2001-en.doc. 
48 Ibid.
49 TARCET is an international operation coordinated by the INCB Precursors 
Unit, the objectives of Operation Tarcet are twofold: (a) to educate key law 
enforcement oﬃcers on methods used to identify and intercept smuggled 
consignments of chemicals; and (b) to intercept consignments of smuggled 
chemicals using modern methodologies.
50 Iran Daily, February 24 2005, www.iran-daily.com/1383/2221/pdf/i5.pdf.
There is also evidence that shipments of precursors transit 
Iran by road, including two large acetic acid51 consignments 
(17,700 kilograms and 16,173 kilograms) from Turkey 
stopped at Bazargan Customs on the Iran-Turkey border 
(July 2005).52 Such shipments would likely head east 
towards the Islam Qala crossing point in Hirat province. 
Central Asia
Afghanistan’s borders with the Central Asian countries of 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are 2,600 kilome-
tres long. The Uzbek and Tajik borders are marked by the 
Amu Darya River, while the area around the Turkmen 
border is for the most part undulating desert gradually 
ceding to the Amu Darya River in the north near Afghani-
stan’s Jawzjan province. This blue border is punctured by 
three river ports, Keleft (Jawzjan province-Turkmenistan), 
Hayraton (Balkh province-Uzbekistan) and Sher Khan 
Bandar (Kunduz-Tajikistan). Most cross-border trade is 
conducted through Hayraton and Sher Khan Bandar. 
Beyond bilateral trade, Afghanistan provides an important 
link between Central and South Asia, especially in giving 
Central Asian countries access to the seaports of Pakistan 
and Iran. Despite this, trade between Central Asia and 
Afghanistan is far below its potential, according a recent 
51 In illicit heroin production, acetic acid can also be used in place of ammo-
nium chloride or ammonia solutions as a reagent to adjust alkalinity in the 
precipitation of morphine from an opium solution.
52 The acetic acid was transiting from Iran toward Uzbekistan using TIR Carnet.
Precursor seizures reported in and around Afghanistan, 2000-2008Map 33: 
Source: UNODC Delta database.
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assessment by ADB experts,53 and presenting fewer oppor-
tunities for precursor smugglers than the eastern or south-
ern borders, which see larger trade volumes. 
Central Asia was a major transit region for acetic anhydride 
during the 1990s. From 1996-2000, Turkmenistan reported 
seizing nearly 150 tons and Uzbekistan approximately 72 
tons of this chemical.54 Since then, very few seizures of 
acetic anhydride have been reported in Central Asia. One 
exception was a 2002 seizure of 200 litres of unidentified 
precursors in Termez (on the Uzbek-Afghan border close to 
Hayraton), travelling in a humanitarian cargo vehicle.55 In 
addition, in June 2008, a seizure of 156 litres of acetic 
anhydride was reported in the Tajik capital Dushanbe.
The region’s proximity to major acetic anhydride producers 
– China and Russia – still puts it at risk of being a transit 
zone for chemicals destined to Afghanistan. Of note, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan both reportedly manufacture, 
import and export controlled chemicals, including acetic 
anhydride, for the needs of chemical, mining, pharmaceuti-
cal and other industries.56
Russian Federation
According to the International Narcotics Control Board, 
Russia was identified as the source of a number of acetic 
anhydride seizures in Turkey from 2004-2006. A more 
recent example concerns a seizure in November 2007 of 10 
tons of acetic anhydride destined for Afghanistan, occur-
ring in Dzerzhinsk57 and involving a Russian citizen of 
Afghan origin.58 According to Russian law enforcement 
the seized chemicals59 were to be shipped in a truck to 
Afghanistan via Tajikistan.60 The substance was reportedly 
a smaller portion of a much larger delivery to Afghani-
stan.61
China
Precursors may also be sourced east of Central Asia, in 
China, which is a major licit producer of precursors includ-
ing acetic anhydride. Available Chinese statistics on seizures 
53 Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan’s Trade with CAREC Neighbors: 
Evidence from Surveys of Border Crossing Points in Hairatan and Sher Khan 
Bandar, October 29, 2008. 
54 No seizures were reported in Tajikistan during this period.
55 Economic Cooperation Organization Drug Control Coordination Unit 
(ECO DCCU), Uzbekistan Country Proﬁle 2003.
56 Minutes of the UNODC/DEA seminar, 8-12 December 2003, Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan.
57 The chemicals were produced in Dzerzhinsk, a town approximately 250 miles 
east of Moscow.
58 “Russian police seize large batch of heroin precursor destined for  
Afghanistan”, ITAR-TASS news agency, 7 November 2007.
59 Some other seizures include 1,500 litres of acetic anhydride in Voronezh 
(February 2005) which were sold wholesale at 293 dollars per litre. Source: 
Police seize large stockpile of drug components in central Russia, BBC moni-
toring, 8 February 2005.
60 The chemicals were to be disguised as mosquito repellent and solvent used  
in plastic production.
61 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2008.
do not usually include disaggregated data on type of chem-
ical and place of apprehension. China reported seizing 15 
tons of acetic anhydride in 2003,62 but no further details 
were available. Nevertheless, there were large seizures of 
chemicals in Xinjiang province (bordering Pakistan, Cen-
tral Asia and a remote area of Afghanistan). More recently, 
a 2006 Chinese media report quoting Urumchi Customs at 
Korgas (Kazakh-Chinese border) and Irkeshtam (Kyr-
gyzstan-Chinese border) which reported seizing more than 
75 tons of acetic anhydride (along with 4 tons of potassium 
permanganate) in “recent years”.63 Although the destination 
was not specified, it is possible that some of these precursors 
were destined for Afghanistan. Indeed, it is possible that 
Chinese-produced precursor chemicals will be increasingly 
exported to Afghanistan due to the decline of Myanmar as 
a heroin producer.
More recent cases of illicit precursor export attempts from 
China include a 2007 shipment of 80 tons of acetic anhy-
dride to Afghanistan stopped by Chinese authorities.64 In 
Afghanistan itself, fragmentary evidence suggests that some 
precursor chemicals have Chinese origins, such as an 11-ton 
seizure of acetic anhydride in Nangarhar province in Janu-
ary 2003.65 
China has a 76 km manned border with Afghanistan, and 
there are plans to establish a customs post of the Afghan 
side.66 There are, however, few reasons to imagine much 
precursor trafficking across these two remote borders since 
easier alternatives exist. There are small but well established 
opiate trafficking routes from China’s South-east to its 
western borders. Many analysts believe that these routes 
continue into Central Asia. Other forms of smuggling – 
such as in metals or household goods – across Central 
Asian-Chinese borders have been observed.67 It is also pos-
sible that precursors are shipped by sea to Pakistan from 
China, taking advantage of the bilateral trade flows.
India
India is a licit manufacturer of precursor chemicals, includ-
ing acetic anhydride. Precursors are also trafficked from 
India, but seizure data seems to mostly confine this to air 
routes. This included the abovementioned 200 litres of 
acetic anhydride in 2009, arriving from Delhi after diver-
sion from a company in France. More recently, India’s 
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence quoted by media 
sources reported seizing 110 litres of acetic anhydride in 
62 Information provided by the UNODC Regional Centre for Asia and the 
Paciﬁc, Bangkok, 2006.
63 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-04/11/content_4409290.htm 
(In Chinese).
64 http://www.incb.org/pdf/precursors-report/2007/en/chapter-iii.pdf.
65 According to the INCB, barrels of hydrogen peroxide “purportedly” from the 
Republic of South Korea were hidden in larger drums labeled as petroleum 
jelly - apparently shipped from China. 
66 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2008/CAREC-Tariﬀ-Collection-
Supervision/Afghanistan-Country-Report.pdf.
67 UNODC, “Precursor control on Central Asia’s borders with China”, 2006.
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Amristar (India-Pakistan border) which was to be smuggled 
into Pakistan.
The logistics of precursor trafﬁcking
Some precursor chemicals have licit uses in Afghanistan, 
and those intended for heroin production have been able to 
camouflage themselves easily within trade flows. Move-
ments of acetic anhydride with no licit use, however, have 
relied on low awareness, lack of testing equipment, corrup-
tion, unregulated crossing points, fraudulent declaration 
and concealment. In all cases, the large volume of trade and 
traffic between Afghanistan and its neighbours, including 
the widespread use of ‘semi-official’ border crossing points, 
provides useful cover.
A recurring theme in interviews with Afghan law enforce-
ment officials was that chemicals were being smuggled into 
Afghanistan disguised as motor oil. This is logical since 
liquids are the easiest way to conceal or falsely declare 
chemicals like acetic anhydride. UNODC found the same 
in its 2007 drug flow survey and one recent seizure of 12 
tons of acetic anhydride in Korea was to be disguised as 
motor oil.68 Similarly, one CNPA officer argued that some 
traffickers were involved in the car oil business, which 
would be a useful cover for precursor trafficking. Other 
false declarations of liquids have included hydrogen perox-
ide, with one network using this disguise to send over 50 
tons of acetic anhydride to southern Afghanistan between 
April 2007 and March 200869.
The conventional view of precursor trafficking holds that, 
unlike opiates trafficking, it is generally confined to service-
able roads and railways, mostly using container trucks. This 
is partly due to the hazardous nature of some chemicals and 
the large quantities required. It is also because precursor 
smuggling has faced a lower risk of interdiction than drug 
smuggling and has enjoyed a lower profit margin in the 
past. Combined with the direction of trade flows men-
tioned above, this view encourages a focus on four major 
transport routes into Afghanistan, that is, the major road 
crossings of Islam Qala, Torkham and Spin Boldak, plus the 
railway across Hayraton into Balkh. 
As an example of the importance of cross-border trade to the 
Afghan economy, commercial cargo makes up more than 
half of Afghanistan’s operational budget through duties at 
Islam Qala (Iran-Pakistan) and Torkham on the Afghan-
Pakistan border.70 Other important crossings include Zaranj 
(Nimroz province-Iran), Torghundi (Hirat province-Turk-
menistan), Aquina (Faryab Province-Turkmenistan) Sher 
Khan Bandar (Kunduz province-Turkmenistan) and Ghulam 
Khan (Khost province-Pakistan).
68 “South Korean police arrest Taliban-linked drug ring”, Taipei 
Times, July 5 2008, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/
archives/2008/07/05/2003416563.
69 CARICC information bulletin 29, August 4, 2008.
70 Interview with Afghanistan General Directorate for Customs, July 25 2008.
Fieldwork and seizures in neighbouring countries suggest 
that smugglers use heavy transport and railways to approach 
the Afghan border. However, the four routes mentioned 
above are not the only methods used to deliver into Afghan-
istan. All manners of land-based conveyances have been 
noted, including pack animals, human carriers and private 
vehicles.71 
Once across the border, there is again a great range of 
onward logistics. Some ventures have involved disaggregat-
ing shipments to cross the border, then consolidating them 
to move in bulk throughout Afghanistan. This was appar-
ently the case with a truck intercepted in Paktya in 2006. 
At the same time, small consignments are also seized in 
transit in Afghanistan, most likely from internal hubs to 
specific labs. 
The recent price rises of acetic anhydride may be expected 
to cause changes in the logistics of precursor trafficking, 
although the distribution of risk makes it unclear what 
these changes will be. Whereas the traditional view sug-
gested that it would be a high-volume, low-margin busi-
ness, theoretically it would now be quite profitable to 
smuggle even minor amounts of acetic anhydride. This 
could encourage a greater use of irregular crossings and 
small-scale shipments. 
However, as mentioned earlier, it appears that price rises 
have been driven primarily by better control mechanisms in 
source countries. If the risk of diversion is greater than the 
risk of interception near or in Afghanistan – a reasonable 
hypothesis given low seizure rates in Afghanistan – then it 
is likely that profit margins are high at the start of the traf-
ficking chain, that is, immediately after diversion. Given 
that licit acetic anhydride is mostly used in bulk industrial 
processes, the somewhat counter-intuitive fact is that 
attempting to divert quantities less than a few hundred 
litres is more suspicious than large purchases. 
The profit margin for moving acetic anhydride across the 
Afghan border may therefore not be very attractive. Small 
cross-border shipments would only make sense if they were 
integrated into a drug processing network so that the risk 
and labour could be internalized into the network’s costs of 
production. Alternatively, they would make sense for a 
group specialized in and contracted to divert and deliver 
into Afghanistan. Again, the relatively small additional 
margin to cross the Afghan border would be compensated 
by reaping the entire wedge between licit prices and prices 
in Afghanistan. 
In light of this, the absence of seizures at Afghanistan’s 
major crossing points may be interpreted in two ways. First, 
it may indicate that precursor smuggling already carries 
risks so high that smugglers rely primarily on irregular 
crossings (note that this does not necessarily mean small -
71 Of note, extensive cross-border smuggling of other goods takes place using 
pack mules, including opiates (often accompanied by armed guard escort).
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scale shipments). Second, it may indicate an effective com-
bination of corruption and little technical capacity at official 
crossings, so that risks remain low of using transport cor-
ridors. 
Opiates and precursors – do routes overlap?
In a general sense, major opiate and precursor routes use the 
same transport infrastructure across Afghanistan’s borders. 
For example, drugs are trafficked along the Islam Qala/
Bandar-Abbas or Zaranj/Bandar Abbas corridors, which 
also double as precursors transport routes into Afghanistan. 
Similarly, the Karachi-Kandahar precursor route is an 
important route for opiates trafficking in the reverse direc-
tion, onwards to Europe (via Gulf-area states).72 The Iran-
Turkey-SEE Balkan route has also historically been a major 
precursor trafficking route in the reverse direction.73 Fur-
ther afield, major acetic anhydride sources for Afghanistan 
– such as Europe, China and the Russian Federation – are 
also big consumers of Afghan opiates, which creates the 
possibility that long-range networks exporting opiates from 
Afghanistan make contacts to obtain precursors for impor-
tation.
Once at the Afghan border and given 1) the number of 
entry points and 2) the seeming ease by which some net-
works operate, there is at least some degree of overlap if 
only because of the convergence on provinces such as 
Hilmand or Nangarhar. Regarding the latter, opiate seizures 
indicate that Nangarhar doubles as a major trafficking and 
72 UNODC, Illicit drugs situation in the regions neighboring Afghanistan and the 
response of ODCCP, October 12 2002, p.13.
73 INCB, 2001, Report on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traﬃc in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
of 1988, www.incb.org/pdf/e/tr/pre/2002/precursors_2002_3b_2.pdf.
exit point for narcotics. Some smaller opiate trails lead to 
drug bazaars in Pakistan’s FATA and are reportedly used for 
precursor trafficking in the opposite direction. Some sources 
suggest that vehicles carrying precursors unload in Afghan-
istan, re-load with opiates and reverse course into Pakistan,74 
a practice common for other contraband exchanges in Paki-
stan.75
Opiates and precursors – do actors overlap?
Successful economic networks in Afghanistan tend to com-
bine licit and illicit activities, at least because petty corrup-
tion is needed to expedite business. Thus, even if the 
logistics of moving large amounts of chemicals are some-
what different to those involved in transporting opiates, the 
same contacts can be used to avoid detection – and ship-
ments of more than a ton of opiates are quite common. 
Additionally, the apparent pressure on precursor supplies 
may have led to a consolidation of this market, which 
would tend to favour a few larger networks capable of fund-
ing and concealing major diversions.
CNPA officials have assessed that many smugglers are 
involved in both opiate and precursor trafficking, but pro-
vided no further specifics. There is some evidence of net-
work overlap since a number of in-country seizures (not 
including lab interdictions) have included both drugs and 
precursor chemicals. A prominent example was the recent 
operation in Marja (Nad Ali district – Hilmand province), 
74 Interview with CNPA Nangarhar, Kabul, 2008. 
75 Most goods smuggled into Pakistan are in fact returning goods. Under a long-
standing agreement, goods destined for Afghanistan enter the port of Karachi 
duty free, The merchandise is ferried north across the border and then 
routinely smuggled back and sold in Pakistan at higher prices. See: Irfanullah, 
Akberzai, Mini Subsector Assessment: Edible Oil Subsector -Eastern Region of 
Afghanistan, ALP-ER, September 2005.
Truck movements at key border points of Afghanistan, 2007-2008Fig. 17: 
Source: Afghan Directorate for Customs, Ministry of Finance, Asian Development Bank
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which found opium, heroin and precursor chemicals all 
under the protection of the Taliban in a major illicit bazaar. 
Similarly, seizure data in-country indicates that trafficking 
takes place along or close to the main ring road. This indi-
cates that the logistics used in other forms of trafficking 
seem to apply as demonstrated by a 2007 UNODC study 
on opiate flows which concludes that approximately 70 per 
cent of drug trafficking takes place along the main roads, 
sustained by the strong support and involvement of the 
local governmental authorities.76 
The direct exchange of heroin for precursors has been 
reported only in Badakshan. Given the high quality opium 
in Nangarhar and current prices of acetic anhydride, one 
litre of acetic anhydride could potentially fetch 5-6 kg of 
opium. Outside Afghanistan, the INCB 2004 report 
described a seizure of 370 litres of acetic anhydride from 
Albania being smuggled to Turkey for a similar exchange.77 
Laboratories
The ultimate destination for all precursor chemicals are the 
hundreds of heroin labs puncturing the Afghan landscape, 
which are for the most part makeshift. Some recent devel-
opments illustrate the constantly changing nature of the 
Afghan drug trade. Laboratories are increasingly mobile78 
and many are using fuel instead of wood.
Heroin processing laboratories have proliferated in recent 
years. They are concentrated in Nangarhar (east) and Bada-
khshan (north-east), and in the south and west of the 
country. The emerging pattern has been a continuous shift 
in favour of southern provinces where widespread cultiva-
tion and low or no government control make labs attractive 
targets for both processors and traffickers. 79 
While southern pre-eminence is clearly evident in the high 
numbers of heroin and morphine labs, the western region 
compares well with a near equal amount of total labs but 
more morphine labs. One observation is that many labora-
tories are situated close to the border such as in Nangarhar 
(Aichin district) and Hilmand (Baramcha bazaar), which 
limits cross-country transportation. Proximity to the border 
is one factor for the concentrations of labs, but so is insta-
bility. Security issues in both regions undermines interdic-
tion efforts against laboratories and proximity to the border 
facilitates smuggling logistics for processors and precursor 
chemicals. Conversely, the fact that illicit precursor ship-
ments will need to move towards only these few final desti-
nation points should lead to greater vulnerability in the 
supply chains. 
76 UNODC, Monitoring of drug ﬂows in Afghanistan, October 2007.
77 INCB, 2003, Report on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traﬃc in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
of 1988, http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/tr/pre/2004/precursors_3.pdf.
78 Interview with CNPA intelligence and interdiction unit, Kabul, June 2008; 
interview with ISAF analysts, Kabul, July 2009.
79 An example of this is the 2007 relocation of a dozen laboratories from 
Badakshan to Hilmand province where the highest concentrations of labs is 
observed.
Precursor control 
Given current knowledge of heroin processing and the 
logistics of precursor trafficking, a focus on acetic anhy-
dride and on the major transport routes into Afghanistan is 
warranted. In Afghanistan, precursor control is at an embry-
onic stage and although it might seem a modest aim, forc-
ing precursor trafficking to be more like drug trafficking 
– smaller-scale with more reliance on irregular crossings – 
would be a good first step in increasing its intelligence 
footprint and the inconvenience involved in supplying labs. 
Targeting Islam Qala, Torkham and Chaman-Spin Boldak 
for increased precursor awareness plus (basic) procedures 
and equipment to raise the risks of trafficking through these 
arteries would be a good start. A watching brief on the 
Hayraton railway is also justified.
Beyond this, the two highest-value targets for mobile pre-
cursor detection are the Kandahar/Hilmand southern 
border and the Farah/Nimroz western border. Large-scale 
use of irregular crossings for precursor trafficking across 
these borders is probably common. Afghan Border Police 
(ABP) capacity is necessary, but law enforcement agencies 
would also likely require Afghan National Army (ANA)/
ISAF support to deal with the security situation in these 
areas. 
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 THE SOURCE OF THE TRADEB. 
Opium poppy cultivation patterns: 1. 
2002-200980
Opium poppy cultivation has been a staple of Afghanistan’s 
economy for over two decades with the last five years pro-
ducing bumper crop upon bumper crop. The opium econ-
omy is now deeply entrenched in Afghanistan and its reach 
extends far beyond its borders. Opium leaves no one 
untouched - including the law enforcement agencies tasked 
with curbing the drug trade - and increasingly fuels domes-
tic consumption, which affects the most disadvantaged 
segments of Afghan society. The problems associated with 
drug use have worsened steadily over the past two decades 
in Afghanistan.
Opium is the country’s biggest export and one in seven 
Afghans is reportedly involved in some aspect of the trade. 
UNODC estimates that 6.581 per cent of the Afghan popu-
lation is involved in growing poppy. In areas such as 
Hilmand, where cultivation is concentrated, this share rises 
to a staggering 80 per cent. Criminal revenues thus con-
tinue to comprise a significant component of the national 
economy.
The pattern in Afghanistan in recent years has been concen-
tration of the area under opium poppy cultivation. As such, 
reductions in cultivation in the northern, eastern and cen-
tral regions are offset and even supplanted by a parallel 
expansion in opium production in the south. 
Cultivation mirrors the shifting of routes in response to 
interdiction and law enforcement presence. Based on 
UNODC’s observations of recent opium poppy planting, 
southern pre-eminence has once again intensified. In 2009, 
80 At the time of the preparation of this report, 2009 Afghanistan opium  
cultivation/production ﬁgures were only available at the provincial and 
national levels. The analysis of district patterns and trends thus refers to the 
period 2002-2008. 
81 UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2009.
the southern province of Hilmand accounted for 60 per 
cent of Afghanistan’s opium production. To the east of 
Hilmand, Kandahar province produced 17 per cent. 99 per 
cent of Afghanistan’s opium economy is based on produc-
tion in southern and western provinces. Western provinces 
accounted for 12 per cent of the total opium production in 
2009. Opium production in the rest of Afghanistan was 
negligible. 
Opium poppy cultivation is not a new phenomenon in 
Afghanistan, but the country’s global pre-eminence as an 
exporter is relatively recent. Opium poppy was traditionally 
cultivated in some parts of Afghanistan as far back as the 
eighteenth century.82 The first significant increases in culti-
vation levels were reported in the 1980s as Turkish, Paki-
stani and Iranian anti-narcotics policies were being 
successfully enforced. This gradual shift further solidified 
towards the end of the Soviet period (1987) and during the 
“warlord period” when opium became a surrogate currency 
to fund various factions at war with one another. There was 
no let up during the Taliban period as cultivation continued 
to expand, reaching 91,000 ha in 1999, which was then the 
highest level of cultivation ever recorded in the country. 
During the Taliban regime (1996-2001) a 10 per cent “agri-
cultural tax” was levied on opium farmers. In 2001, the 
Taliban regime announced an opium poppy ban and culti-
vation decreased to 8,000 ha. The Taliban successfully 
appealed to religious sentiments to justify the ban in the 
south, but also made use of more robust methods in the 
more resistant east (such as Nangarhar province).83 It should 
be noted that while the opium ban concerned opium poppy 
cultivation, no policy toward opium trading and heroin 
manufacture was enunciated and the Taliban continued to 
levy taxes on these activities. 
82 UNODC, The opium economy in Afghanistan: An international problem, 2003.
83 UNODC, The Impact of the Taliban Prohibition on Opium Poppy Cultivation 
in Afghanistan, 25 May 2001.
Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 1994-2009Fig. 18: 
Source: UNODC.
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Following the Taliban’s ouster, large-scale opium produc-
tion resumed, amounting to 6,900 tons in 2009. Between 
1995 and 2005, the average annual opium production was 
around 3,300 tons. This stable trend came to an end in 
2006 as production increased sharply, reaching 6,100 tons 
in 2006, 8,200 tons in 2007, 7,700 tons in 2008 and 
decreased to 6,900 tons in 2009. The average dry opium 
yield per hectare was 56 kg/ha in 2009 in Afghanistan, an 
increase from the previous year when it stood at 49 kg/ha. 
According to UNODC opium poppy surveys, this is the 
highest average yield ever recorded for Afghanistan.
Between 2002 and 2009, a total of 44,200 tons of opium 
were produced in Afghanistan, an amount roughly equiva-
lent to 6,314 tons of heroin. Afghanistan became the 
principal illicit opiate exporter in the world, especially after 
the sharp decrease in opium production in Myanmar in 
2002, which increased the relative importance of Afghan 
opium production even further. 
During the same period (2002-2009), 80 per cent of the 
opium was produced in six Afghan provinces (Hilmand, 
Nangarhar, Kandahar, Badakshan, Uruzgan and Farah). 
Badakshan and Nangarhar aside, the bulk of the production 
took place in four provinces in southern Afghanistan. Almost 
half of all opium was produced in Hilmand province (44 per 
cent). The next provinces in order of importance were Kan-
dahar (9 per cent) and Nangarhar (9 per cent). 
During the period 2003 and 2009, the total farm-gate value 
of the total opium produced in Afghanistan was US$ 5.9 
billion. Out of US$ 5.9 billion, 2.2 billion (38 per cent) 
went to Hilmand farmers and 874 million (15 per cent) to 
Nangarhar farmers. 
Opium production in Afghanistan, 1994-2009Fig. 19: 
Source: UNODC.
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Opium production (2002-2009) and farm-gate income (2003*-2009) Table 23: 
* No income data available for 2002.
Province
Total opium  
production for the 
period 2002-2009 (tons)
Per cent  
of total
Total farm-gate  
income (billion of US$) for 
the period (2003-2009)
Per cent  
of total
Hilmand 19,620 44% 2,262 38%
Nangarhar 4,035 9% 874 15%
Kandahar 4,007 9% 475 8%
Badakshan 2,581 6% 505 9%
Uruzgan 2,520 6% 356 6%
Farah 2,297 5% 263 4%
Other 9,141 21% 1,165 20%
Total 44,200 100% 5,865 100%
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Expansion of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan
In 2002, total opium poppy cultivation covered 74,000 ha, 
spread across 17 provinces (the total number of provinces 
in Afghanistan is 34) and production reached 3,400 tons. 
In 2009, opium poppy cultivation was observed in 14 prov-
inces, but cultivation increased by 66 per cent (123,000 ha) 
and production by 129 per cent (6,900 tons) compared to 
2002. Following a chronological order from 2002 and 
2009, Afghan provinces can be categorized into five groups 
on the basis of their opium poppy cultivation status:
Consistently poppy-free provinces:a.  Ghazni, Logar,  
Paktika and Panjshir. All four provinces maintained a 
poppy-free status between 2002 and 2009.
Reclaimed provinces:b.  Bamyan, Khost, Kunduz,  
Nuristan, Paktya, Parwan, Saripul and Wardak. These 
eight provinces regained their original opium poppy-
free status in 2008 (and continued to be poppy free 
in 2009) after ﬁve years of continuous cultivation 
between 2003 and 2007. 
Gained provinces:c.  Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Ghor, 
Jawzjan, Kapisa, Takhar and Samangan. These prov-
inces were cultivating opium poppy in 2002 and be-
tween 2007 and 2009 had all become poppy-free.
Progressive provinces:d.  In four provinces (Badakshan, 
Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar), the total opium 
poppy cultivated area was 30,000 ha in 2002 but by 
2009 it had decreased to 1,100 ha 
Relapsed provinces:e.  In 10 provinces (Hilmand, Hirat, 
Kabul, Kandahar, Badghis, Day Kundi, Farah, Nim-
roz, Uruzgan and Zabul), opium poppy cultivation 
has shown a marked increase in 2009 compared to 
2002. In 2002, the total area under cultivation in 
these provinces was 40,500 ha but in 2009, it had 
increased threefold reaching 122,000 ha. The most 
dramatic increase in terms of magnitude and on a 
Share of opium production by province,  Fig. 20: 
Afghanistan (2002-2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC.
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percentage basis was in Hilmand province (39,990 
ha). During the same period, opium poppy cultiva-
tion also sharply increased in Farah (11,905 ha), 
Kandahar (15,840 ha), Nimroz (430 ha) and Uruz-
gan (4,120 ha). In other provinces (Hirat, Kabul, 
Badghis, Day Kundi and Zabul), increases in cultiva-
tion were comparatively modest. 
Comparing 2002 and 2009, opium poppy cultivation 
increased in the south and west, decreased in the east, north 
and north-east and remained mostly stable in the central 
provinces of Afghanistan. 
Cultivation trends in “relapsed provinces” 
Total opium poppy cultivation appears to be essentially 
confined to these provinces, which account for 99 per cent 
of total opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2009, 
leaving the remaining provinces (24) either poppy-free or 
nearly poppy-free. Among the “relapsed  provinces”, the 
most critical are Hilmand, Farah, Kandahar, Badgish, Uruz-
gan, Zabul and Day Kundi. In the provinces of Nimroz, 
Hirat and Kabul opium poppy cultivation is limited to a 
few districts, and the increase in cultivation is not very 
high, relative to 2009 figures. The security situation is also 
comparatively better than in the seven critical provinces. 
Hilmand: 
Hilmand has long been one of the most important opium 
producing provinces in Afghanistan, with a history of pro-
duction dating back to before the 1950s. Production 
increased from the 1990s onward,84 and between the years 
1990 and 2000, Hilmand accounted for 40-55 per cent of 
the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghani-
stan. 
In 2002, Hilmand’s share was 41 per cent of total cultiva-
tion. From 2002-2005, it annually ranged from 19-26 per 
cent, due to increases in Kandahar, Farah, Hirat, Badghis, 
Baghlan, Day Kundi, Faryab, Zabul and Nimroz. As of 
2006, Hilmand’s share of total opium production in 
Afghanistan increased sharply, climbing to 57 per cent in 
2009. Compared to 2002, total opium poppy cultivation in 
Hilmand increased by 131 per cent in 2006, nearly dou-
bling to 243 per cent in 2007, 245 per cent in 2008 and 
133 per cent in 2009. These figures are a clear indication 
that opium poppy cultivation patterns changed dramati-
cally in Hilmand especially after 2005. Otherwise, from 
84 Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, World Bank and UNODC, p 95.
Region 2002 (ha) 2009 (ha)
Change 
2002-2009 
(ha)
Central 96 132 +36
East 21,909 593 -21,316
North 691 0 -691
North-east 9,054 557 -8,497
South 39,220 103,014 +63,794
West 3,076 18,800 +15,724
Total 74,046 123,096 +49,050
Province 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Change 
2002-2009 
(ha)
Change  
2002-2009 
(per cent)
Badgish 26 170 614 2,967 3,205 4,219 587 5,411 +5,385 +20,712%
Day Kundi 0 2,445 3,715 2,581 7,044 3,346 2,273 3,002 +3,002 +100%
Farah 500 1,700 2,288 10,240 7,694 14,865 15,010 12,405 +11,905 +2,381%
Hilmand 29,950 15,371 29,353 26,500 69,324 102,770 103,590 69,883 +39,933 +133%
Hirat 50 134 2,531 1,924 2,287 1,525 266 556 +506 +1,012%
Kabul 58 237 282 - 80 500 310 132 +74 +128%
Kandahar 3,970 3,055 4,959 12,989 12,619 16,615 14,623 19,811 +15,841 +399%
Nimroz 300 26 115 1,690 1,955 6,507 6,203 428 +128 +43%
Uruzgan 5,100 4,698 7,365 2,024 9,703 9,204 9,939 9,224 +4,124 +81%
Zabul 200 2,541 2,977 2,053 3,210 1,611 2,335 1,144 +944 +472%
Other  
provinces 33,459 47,934 70,586 35,689 41,815 27,466 915 1,004 -32,455 -97%
Total 74,000 80,000 131,000 104,000 165,000 193,000 157,253 123,000 +49,000 +66%
Regional distribution of opium poppy  Table 24: 
cultivation in 2002 and 2009
Opium poppy cultivation trends in “relapsed provinces”, 2002-2009Table 25: 
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1994 to 2005 (except 2001), the amount of opium poppy 
cultivation was in the range of 15,000-45,000 ha. The cru-
cial 2006-2009 period should therefore be carefully ana-
lyzed in order to understand the motivations behind opium 
poppy cultivation in Hilmand province. 
In 2007 and 2008, opium cultivation in Hilmand covered 
slightly more than 100,000 ha which is nearly 3.5 times 
higher than the 2002 level, and the highest amount of cul-
tivation ever reported at the national level in Afghanistan. 
But in 2009, cultivation dropped to 69,883 ha, almost the 
level of 2006 (69,324 ha). The total arable land in Hilmand 
covers 316,400 ha85 and 22 per cent of it was under poppy 
cultivation in 2009, compared to 18 per cent in 2002. 
These figures are much higher than in other Afghan prov-
inces. As an example, in 2009, opium poppy was cultivated 
on 7 per cent of total arable land in Kandahar and 8 per 
cent in Farah province. 
The population of Hilmand is around 782,000, according 
to the Central Statistics office of Afghanistan. Around 95 
per cent of Hilmand’s population (or 739,000 people) live 
in rural areas. According to UNODC reports, the vast 
majority of the farmers in Hilmand province (approxi-
mately 114,000 families) grow opium poppy. In Afghani-
stan, the average opium cultivated land per farmer was 0.43 
ha, while in Hilmand it stood at 0.9 ha per farmer in 2008. 
The average poppy cultivated area per farmer in rural areas 
is highest in Naway-Barakzayi (2.1 ha) and Musa Qala 
 (1.7 ha) districts. Musa Qala district was under intermit-
tent Taliban control after 2005.
Opium poppy is cultivated in all of Hilmand’s districts but 
85 Afghanistan opium survey 2008, UNODC.
the crop coverage is denser and more concentrated in the 
districts of Nad-e-ali, Nahri Sarraj, Musa Qala and Naway-
i-Barakzayi. In 2008, these four districts accounted for 57 
per cent of the total opium poppy cultivation in Hilmand 
province. 
In most poppy growing provinces in Afghanistan, the crop 
is not generally cultivated close to provincial centres. But in 
Hilmand, poppy cultivation is much denser in the provin-
Province 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Badgish 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 2.9% 1.9% 2.2% 0.4% 4.4%
Day Kundi 0.0% 3.1% 2.8% 2.5% 4.3% 1.7% 1.4% 2.4%
Farah 0.7% 2.1% 1.7% 9.8% 4.7% 7.7% 9.5% 10.1%
Hilmand 40.5% 19.2% 22.4% 25.5% 42.0% 53.2% 65.9% 56.8%
Hirat 0.1% 0.2% 1.9% 1.9% 1.4% 0.8% 0.2% 0.5%
Kabul 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1%
Kandahar 5.4% 3.8% 3.8% 12.5% 7.6% 8.6% 9.3% 16.1%
Nimroz 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 1.6% 1.2% 3.4% 3.9% 0.3%
Uruzgan 6.9% 5.9% 5.6% 1.9% 5.9% 4.8% 6.3% 7.5%
Zabul 0.3% 3.2% 2.3% 2.0% 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 0.9%
Other 
provinces 45.2% 59.9% 53.9% 34.3% 25.3% 14.2% 0.6% 0.8%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100 % 100% 100% 100% 100%
Distribution of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2002-2009Table 26: 
Average opium poppy cultivation per Table 27: 
family in Hilmand* by district, 2008
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
District
Total rural 
population 
(1,000)
Total 
number of 
families 
Average  
poppy area  
per family (ha)
Baghran 68.4 10,523 0.4
Dishu 
(Registan) 17.2 2,646 0.3
Garmser  
(Hazarjuft) 73.8 11,354 0.7
Kajaki 59.9 9,215 0.7
Lashkar Gah 50.5 7,769 1.0
Musa Qala 49.7 7,646 1.7
Nad Ali 99.2 15,262 1.4
Nahri Sarraj 90.1 13,862 1.0
Naw Zad 78.0 12,000 0.3
Naway-i  
Barakzayi 42.7 6,569 2.1
Reg (Khan 
Nishin) 22.1 3,400 1.4
Sangin 50.3 7,738 0.7
Washer 13.0 2,000 0.8
Province 714.9 109,985 0.9
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cial centre, Lashkar Gah, and adjacent districts. One reason 
is the availability of efficient irrigation systems in these 
districts. Another is the lack of Government control even in 
the district centre. Residents of Hilmand thus have little to 
fear from eradication or government actions against poppy 
cultivation. 
Between 1996 and 2005, the amount of opium poppy 
cultivation was largely stable in all Hilmand districts. There-
after, sharp increases were observed, especially in Nad Ali 
(784 per cent), Musa Qala (663 per cent), Lashkar Gah 
(490 per cent) and Naway-I Barakzayi (448 per cent). 
Kandahar: 
Similar to Hilmand province, opium poppy cultivation in 
Kandahar was stable between 1996 and 2004 (except 2001). 
In 2005, cultivation increased threefold compared to 
2004. Since then, the rate has hovered between 12,000 and 
17,000 ha. 
District 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Change 
between 
2005-
2008 (%)
Baghran 1,267 2,754 2,910 2,794 2,653 1,800 2,309 2,232 2,507 2,890 4,287 4,279 +71%
Dishu 
(Registan) - 369 911 851 1,160 688 -24%
Garmser 
(Hazarjuft) 942 1,993 1,205 2,643 2,765 2,020 462 1,922 1,912 6,168 6,523 8,000 +318%
Kajaki 2,814 3,904 3,959 5,746 4,625 2,640 1,392 1,676 1,639 6,760 5,807 6,240 +281%
Lashkar 
Gah 1,054 1,325 1,869 2,528 3,145 1,140 605 1,380 1,332 4,008 6,320 7,857 +490%
Musa Qala 3,924 4,360 5,574 7,013 5,686 3,690 2,455 2,404 1,664 6,371 8,854 12,687 +663%
Nad Ali 4,035 5,102 5,156 8,667 8,323 5,880 870 4,177 2,356 11,652 20,045 20,824 +784%
Nahri  
Sarraj 4,309 4,807 2,426 4,041 4,378 1,850 1,575 6,486 3,548 10,386 22,769 13,270 +274%
Naw Zad 3,596 1,585 3,605 4,424 5,085 2,650 3,096 1,051 3,737 2,707 6,192 3,863 +3%
Naway-i 
Barakzayi 505 722 1,150 2,581 3,246 2,730 1,240 3,506 2,552 10,168 6,314 13,978 +448%
Reg (Khan 
Nishin) 222 1,940 1,893 2,772 3,765 8,484 4,720 +70%
Sangin 1,909 1,971 1,734 2,646 1,711 2,810 777 1,365 1,184 2,862 5,150 5,532 +367%
Washer 555 877 1,084 1,469 1,014 800 590 892 386 735 865 1,653 +328%
Total 24,910 29,400 30,672 44,552 42,853 0 29,950 15,371 29,353 26,500 69,323 102,770 103,590 +291%
Distribution of opium poppy cultivation  Fig. 21: 
in Hilmand by district, 2008
Extent of opium poppy cultivation  Map 35: 
in the districts of Hilmand, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2008, UNODC.
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Opium poppy cultivation in the districts of Hilmand, 1996-2008*Table 28: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
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In Kandahar province, Ghorak and Maywand were two 
important opium cultivating districts before 2001. After 
2001, cultivation decreased in Ghorak, while it remained 
stable or increased slightly in Maywand. As of 2004, Shah 
Wali Kot (which is far from the provincial centre) and Pan-
jwayi (including Zhari district) joined Maywand as impor-
tant cultivation districts. In 2008, the majority of cultivation 
took place in districts far from the provincial centre like 
Zhari, Nesh, Miya Nishin, Maywand and Khakrez. Dis-
tricts near the centre like Arghandab, Arghistan, Daman 
and Dand were nearly poppy-free, unlike in neighbouring 
Hilmand province. This indicates better government con-
trol (in terms of opium poppy cultivation) in the central 
part of the province. The districts of Maywand (Kandahar), 
Lashkar Gah and Naway-i-Barakzayi (Hilmand) have been 
under intensive poppy cultivation since 2005. They are on 
the main road from Kandahar to Hilmand, between Dand 
(Kandahar) and Nad Ali (Hilmand). 
District 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Arghandab 211 87 331 561 399 750 459 330 139 261 287 735 1,016 57
Arghistan 38 13 80 14 651 2,449 784 310 28
Daman 110 50 190 357 895 775 183 375 19
Ghorak 347 803 692 1,503 1,126 1,109 574 380 166 241 233 336 1,445 232
Kandahar 
(Dand) 320 53 234 21 73 227 156 640 293 0 1,367 1,220 590
Khakrez 362 274 627 286 518 632 320 560 312 145 185 217 132 1,224
Maruf 30 16 1 3 5 17 - 63 117 150 464 914 182
Maywand 256 333 618 1,278 2,497 2,022 995 1,090 353 514 1,281 1,362 2,878 3,375
Miya Nishin 322 1,603
Nesh 432 3,284
Panjwayi** 250 357 266 255 134 132 184 150 482 864 4,687 4,714
Reg 0 327 4 0
Shah Wali Kot 678 97 94 127 162 236 238 260 489 923 2,379 1,593 1,258 560
Shorabak 111 45 19 409 308 4
Spin Boldak 1,170 107 194 91 317 261 26 290 277 303 218 454 768 541
Zhari 5,232 2,923
Total 3,624 2,127 3,057 4,122 5,229 5,522 3,034 0 3,970 3,055 4,959 12,990 12,618 16,615 14,623
Opium poppy cultivation in the district of Kandahar province, 1996-2008*Table 29: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing. 
 ** As of 2007, Panjwayi district ceased to exist and was replaced by the districts of Miya Nishin and Zhari.
Average opium poppy cultivation per Table 30: 
family in Kandahar by district, 2008*
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing. 
District
Total rural 
population 
(1,000)
Total 
number of 
families 
Average 
poppy area 
per family (ha)
Arghandab 51.6 7,938 0.01
Arghistan 28.9 4,446 0.01
Daman 24.8 3,815 0.00
Ghorak 8.0 1,231 0.19
Kandahar 
(Dand) 144.3 22,200 0.03
Khakrez 19.2 2,954 0.41
Maruf 27.7 4,262 0.04
Maywand 40.7 6,262 0.54
Miya Nishin 12.6 1,938 0.83
Nesh 11.3 1,738 1.89
Reg 1.6 246 0.00
Shah Wali Kot 36.4 5,600 0.10
Shorabak 9.6 1,477 0.00
Spin Boldak 41.0 6,308 0.09
Zhari 49.5 7,615 0.38
Province 507.2 78,031 0.19
Extent of opium poppy cultivation in  Map 36: 
the district of Kandahar province, 2008
Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2008, UNODC.
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An estimated 672,000 people (103,000 families) live in 
Kandahar’s rural areas.86 The average opium poppy cultiva-
tion area per family was 0.16 ha, which is 7 times less than 
Hilmand in 2008. This indicates that most families in Kan-
dahar were not involved in opium poppy cultivation or that 
they cultivate smaller amounts than farmers in Hilmand. 
The average area per family is highest in Kandahar’s Nesh 
district (1.89 ha). 
The total arable land in Kandahar is 299,000 ha. In 2009, 
7 per cent of the arable land was under opium poppy cul-
tivation. 
Nimroz
Until 2005, opium poppy cultivation always stood at less 
than 1,000 ha in Nimroz. However, as of 2005, cultivation 
started to increase very sharply, and amounted to 6,507 ha 
in 2007 and 6,200 ha in 2008. In 2009, cultivation dropped 
to 428 ha as the part of the main poppy cultivating district 
Khash Rod is now administrated under Farah province. 
The main opium poppy growing districts in Nimroz are 
Khash Rod (border district with Farah and Hilmand prov-
inces) and Charburja. Since 2006, farmers in Khash Rod 
district (especially in the north-western part of the district) 
have been irrigating new agricultural areas in the desert 
through the use of deep wells. These newly created fields are 
100 per cent covered with opium poppies. 
Khash Rod district is at the border of Nimroz/Farah prov-
ince where anti-government elements are very active. The 
increase in opium poppy cultivation in Nimroz seems to be 
at least partly insurgency-driven. In other districts of 
Nimroz, there is negligible opium poppy cultivation due to 
a lack of water and land. The total estimated rural popula-
tion of Nimroz province is 139,000. Around 19,000 people 
(2,900 families) live in the rural areas of Khash Rod district. 
The total estimated amount of cultivated opium poppy in 
the district was 6,197 ha in 2008. The average opium 
poppy land per family is 2.1 ha in Khash Rod, much higher 
than the average in Hilmand (0.9 ha).
Total arable land in Nimroz is 66,000 ha. In 2008, 9.3 per 
cent of this was under opium poppy cultivation. 
86 Central Statistics Oﬃce of Afghanistan.
Farah
Farah was not an important opium poppy growing prov-
ince before 2003 when cultivation began to increase. By 
2005, the level of opium poppy cultivation was six times 
higher than in 2003. In 2009, it had reached 12,400 ha, 
nearly a 25-fold increase over 2002 levels. Opium poppy is 
mainly cultivated in the Bala Buluk and Bakwa districts, the 
latter of which borders Nimroz. 
In Farah, the average opium poppy cultivated area was 1.32 
ha in Gulistan district and one hectare in Bakwa district. 
Pusht Rod, Farah and Bala Buluk districts are also impor-
tant opium poppy growing districts. Available agricultural 
areas in the western part of the province (bordering the 
Islamic Republic of Iran) are limited and cannot support 
much opium poppy cultivation. 
Opium poppy cultivation in districts of Nimroz province (ha), 1996-2008*Table 31: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
District
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Chahar Burja         65 526 1,119 87 4
Chakhansur         0  0 0 1
Kang 1 107 5 2     0  40 0 0
Khash Rod 135 535 6 201 219   26 50 1,164 661 6,421 6,197
Zaranj           135 0 0
Total 136 642 11 203 219 0 300 26 115 1,690 1,955 6,507 6,203
Extent of opium poppy cultivation in the Map 37: 
districts of Nimroz province, 2008
Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2008, UNODC.
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The total arable land in the province is 136,200 ha. In 2009, 
9 per cent of this was under opium poppy cultivation. 
Badghis
Opium poppy cultivation in Badghis was first reported in 
2000. The following year, the province was again poppy-
free, but as of 2002, cultivation picked up again. In 2005, 
cultivation dramatically increased, rising to 2,967 ha. It 
increased further in 2006, reaching 3,205 ha, and 4,219 ha 
in 2007. Due to severe drought problems, cultivation 
sharply decreased in 2008 (to 587 ha), but again increased 
to 5,400 ha in 2009.
Opium poppy is cultivated mainly in the Ghormach, 
Murghab and Qadis districts. Farmers mainly use rain-fed 
areas for opium poppy cultivation. 
Increases in opium poppy cultivation ran parallel with 
increases in insecurity in Badghis province after 2003. After 
2006, a few heroin labs were also reported close to the 
Turkmenistan border in the Ghomarch and Murghab dis-
tricts. Although cultivation increased sharply, it still only 
accounted for 0.7 per cent of the total arable land in 2007. 
Opium poppy cultivation in districts of Farah province, 1996-2008* Table 32: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
Average opium poppy cultivation per Table 33: 
family in Farah by district, 2008
Extent of opium poppy cultivation in the Map 38: 
districts of Farah province, 2008
Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2008, UNODC.
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District 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Anar Dara         91 1,828 143 16 239
Bakwa 13 129 31 129 259    39 390 1,093 3,458 3,090
Bala Buluk 19 169 36 186 183   513 336 1,665 1,669 5,312 1,509
Farah 18 18 10 44 73    87 729 905 1,328 1,013
Gulistan 581 252 94 428 849   1,187 447 163 202 1,132 4,756
Khaki 
Safed         84 432 537 99 609
Lash Wa 
Juwayn         41 1,568 215 233 109
Pur  
Chaman         409 293 363 1,549 1,046
Pusht Rod         554 2,482 1,709 1,314 1,588
Qalay-I-
Kah         189 407 506 337 888
Shib Koh         12 283 352 87 163
Total 631 568 171 787 1,364 0 500 1,700 2,289 10,240 7,694 14,865 15,010
District
Total rural 
population 
(1,000)
Total 
number of 
families 
Average 
poppy area 
per family (ha)
Anar Dara 22.3 3,431 0.07
Bakwa 20.1 3,092 1.00
Bala Buluk 48.4 7,446 0.20
Farah 46.4 7,138 0.14
Gulistan 23.4 3,600 1.32
Khaki Safed 17.0 2,615 0.23
Lash Wa 
Juwayn 26.8 4,123 0.03
Pur Chaman 38.8 5,969 0.18
Pusht Rod 32.7 5,031 0.32
Qalay-I-Kah 21.6 3,323 0.27
Shib Koh 16.7 2,569 0.06
Province 314.2 48,338 0.31
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In the same year, the average opium poppy cultivated land 
per household in Badghis was 0.09 ha, with the highest 
amount in Murghab district (0.45 ha). 
Badghis farmers are not very skilled in opium poppy culti-
vation and opium is not a major source of income for the 
province. Farmers are thus less likely to grow the plant and 
should government control increase, cultivation is likely 
to continue to decrease until the province is once again 
poppy-free. 
Uruzgan
Between 1996 and 2005, the level of opium poppy cultiva-
tion in Uruzgan consistently ranged between 4,500 and 
7,800 ha. In 2005, due to severe drought and disease, cul-
tivation fell sharply in the province. This was short-lived, 
however, as it increased dramatically in 2006, reaching 
9,703 ha. Cultivation levels remained more or less stable for 
the next three years. Cultivation in Uruzgan is mainly con-
centrated in the Dihrawud, Shahidi Hassas and Tirin Kot 
districts. 
A total of 251,400 people (38,677 families) live in the rural 
areas of Uruzgan. In 2008, the average opium poppy culti-
vated land area per household was 0.26 ha in this province. 
Dihrawud and Tirinkot are the traditional opium poppy 
growing districts. In Shadi Hassas, cultivation started to 
increase in 2006, reaching 4,403 ha in 2008 which is seven 
times higher than the level recorded in 2005. 
The total arable land in Uruzgan province is 63,400 ha. 
In 2009, 15 per cent of this was under opium poppy culti-
vation. 
Opium poppy cultivation in the districts of Badghis province, 1996-2008*Table 34: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
Average opium poppy cultivation per Table 35: 
family in Badghis by district, 2008
District
Total rural 
population 
(1,000)
Total 
number of 
families 
Average 
poppy area 
per family (ha)
Ab Kamari 39.7 6108 0.00
Ghormach 39.5 6077 0.04
Jawand 53.8 8277 0.01
Muqur 19.3 2969 0.05
Murghab 51.0 7846 0.45
Qadis 63.6 9785 0.02
Qala-i-Naw 30.4 4677 0.00
Province 297.3 45738 0.09
District
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
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20
03
20
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20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Ab Kamari           127 0 11
Ghormach     20  4 101  944 624 250 328
Jawand         226 134 431 66 13
Muqur           220 149 7
Murghab     21  22 69 345 1,889 1,034 3,557 81
Qadis           391 198 146
Qala-i-Naw         43  378 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 41 0 26 170 614 2,967 3,205 4,219 587
Extent of opium poppy cultivation in the Map 39: 
districts of Badghis province, 2008
Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2008, UNODC.
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Zabul
Opium poppy cultivation was negligible in Zabul province 
before 2003. Since 2003, it has ranged between 1,500 and 
3,000 ha in total. Limited cultivation has been observed in 
all districts of the province. Although the security situation 
seems to favour opium poppy cultivation, poor weather 
conditions do not, and the crop potential ratio remains 
negative in the province. 
District
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
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20
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20
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20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Chora 1,574 233 652 932 1,179 0 1,330 975 1,402 259 2,024 71 316
Dihrawud 2,923 1,870 1,033 1,243 726 0 1,340 1,282 2,523 209 1,704 3,538 2,849
Khas Uruzgan 0 0 0 0 130 0 - 580 358 338 886 173 304
Shahidi Hassas 0 0 1,158 1,110 802 0 1,190 1,333 782 646 1,127 3,109 4,403
Tirin Kot 3,271 2,484 1,445 1,194 1,494 0 750 469 1,874 221 3,348 2,312 2,067
Total 7,872 4,986 4,661 4,989 4,725 0 5,100 4,698 7,365 2,025 9,703 9,203 9,939
Opium poppy cultivation in the districts of Uruzgan province, 1996-2008*Table 36: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
District
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
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20
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20
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20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Arghandab 0 0 0 74 139 0  302 526 205 346 79 55
Atghar        188 32 86 36 16 3
Daychopan 0 0 0 41 114 0  646 431 1,016 742 389 422
Kakar (Khak-e Afghan)            104 110
Mizan 255 154 160 373 383 0  309 251 56 123 129 289
Qalat 0 0 1 46 40 0  689 317 188 657 78 310
Shahjoy      0  178 679 240 538 320 237
Shamulzayi        65 44 16 35 159 153
Shinkay        164 287 102 228 139 105
Tarnak wa Jaldak 0 0 0 77 48 1   410 145 506 136 608
Total 255 154 161 537 585 1 200 2,541 2,977 2,053 3,211 1,549 2,291
Average opium poppy cultivation per Table 37: 
family in Uruzgan by district, 2008
District
Total rural 
population 
(1,000)
Total 
number of 
families 
Average  
poppy area  
per family (ha)
Chora 35.0 5,385 0.06
Dihrawud 49.5 7,615 0.37
Khas  
Uruzgan 57.5 8,846 0.03
Shahidi  
Hassas 51.0 7,846 0.56
Tirin Kot 58.4 8,985 0.23
Province 251.4 38,677 0.26
Extent of opium poppy cultivation in the Map 40: 
districts of Uruzgan province, 2008
Source: Afghanistan opium  survey, 2008, UNODC.
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Opium poppy cultivation in the districts of Zabul province, 1996-2008*Table 38: 
*District estimations for 2009 are not available.
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The estimated average opium poppy cultivated area per 
household is 0.06 ha in Zabul province. 
Kabul
In Kabul province, opium poppy cultivation has been lim-
ited to the Surobi district since 1999. The rest of the prov-
ince has maintained a poppy-free status. Security in Surobi 
district is much more precarious than in other districts in 
Kabul province and government control there is limited. 
Only 7,500 families reside in Surobi and cultivation was 
limited to 310 ha in 2008 (average 0.04 ha per family). 
This indicates that only a limited number of households are 
relying on opium poppy cultivation and the district can 
become poppy-free with stronger law enforcement. 
Hirat
Opium poppy cultivation (above 100 ha) was first reported 
in Hirat in the year 2000. In 2001 and 2002, cultivation 
amounted to less than 100 ha (poppy-free status). In 2003, 
cultivation rose slightly above this threshold but in 2004, a 
sharp increase brought it to a total of 2,531 ha. Between 
2004 and 2007, opium poppy cultivation was largely stable 
Average opium poppy cultivation per family in Zabul by district, 2008Table 39: 
District Total rural population (1,000) Total number of families 
Average poppy area  
per family (ha)
Arghandab 27.4 4,215 0.01
Atghar 7.3 1,123 0.00
Daychopan 33.1 5,092 0.08
Kakar (Khak-e Afghan) 20.2 3,108 0.04
Mizan 11.4 1,754 0.16
Qalat 19.8 3,046 0.10
Shahjoy 49.1 7,554 0.03
Shamulzayi 37.5 5,769 0.03
Shinkay 19.7 3,031 0.03
Tarnak wa Jaldak 14.4 2,215 0.27
Total 239.9 36,908 0.06
Opium poppy cultivation in the districts of Kabul province (ha), 1996-2008*Table 40: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
District
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
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20
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08
Bagrami           0 0 0
Chahar Asyab           0 0 0
Dih Sabz           0 0 0
Farza            0 0
Guldara           0 0 0
Istalif           0 0 0
Kabul           0 0 0
Kalakan           0 0 0
Khaki Jabbar           0 0 0
Mir Bacha Kot           0 0 0
Musayi           0 0 0
Paghman           0 0 0
Qarabagh           0 0 0
Shakar Dara           0 0 0
Surobi    132 340 29 58 237 282  80 500 310
Total 0 0 0 132 340 29 58 237 282 0 80 500 310
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at 2,000 ha. In 2008, cultivation decreased dramatically 
and was restricted to only three districts of Hirat province. 
Most of the opium production takes place in Shindand 
district where insurgent groups are very active. 
In 2008, the average opium poppy cultivated land per 
family was 0.008 ha in the Adraskan, Kushk and Shindad 
districts of Hirat. 
Opium poppy-free provinces2. 
A region is defined as “opium poppy-free” when it is esti-
mated to have less than 100 ha of poppy cultivation. Figure 
22 represents the number of opium producing and poppy-
free provinces in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009. The 
years 2002 and 2008 are nearly identical in the numerical 
breakdown of poppy growing and opium free provinces. 
But in 2009, the number of opium poppy free provinces 
increased to the highest level since 2002. Between 2003 and 
2006, the number of cultivating provinces increased before 
declining in 2006. The opposite trend is observed for the 
number of poppy-free provinces. 
In 2006, UNODC presented a report which outlined a 
strategy to gradually increase the number of poppy-free 
provinces in Afghanistan and reduce cultivation in opium 
producing provinces. That same year, the main stakeholders 
(the USA and the United Kingdom) on counter narcotics 
in Afghanistan jointly with the Afghan Government 
announced the Good Performers Initiative (GPI)87 under 
87 http://www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/sbgs/
prj_cntf.htm.
the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF)88 in Afghani-
stan. The objective of the GPI is to support provinces 
which achieve sustained progress towards opium poppy 
elimination or remain poppy-free by providing financial 
support for their priority development projects. 
88 Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF), oﬃcially established on 29 October 
2005, aims to mobilize additional resources needed by the Afghan Govern-
ment to implement the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). 
District
19
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Adraskan         133 9 99 196 22
Chishti Sharif         166 42 42 0 0
Farsi        134 28 110 111 0 0
Ghoryan         60 238 204 302 0
Gulran         240 33 32 0 0
Guzara         88 231 233 0 0
Hirat         0 16 16 0 0
Injil         41 394 382 0 0
Karukh         265 124 121 0 0
Kohsan         4 72 73 146 0
Kushk         73 64 50 367 43
Kushki Kuhna         3 15 15 0 0
Obe         842 144 131 0 0
Pashtun Zarghun  38   38    154 249 242 0 0
Shindand     146    427 54 408 516 201
Zinda Jan         7 128 129 0 0
Total 0 38 0 0 184 0 50 134 2,531 1,924 2,288 1,526 266
Opium poppy cultivation in districts of Hirat province (hectares), 1996-2008*Table 41: 
*District estimations for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
Number of opium growing and opium  Fig. 22: 
poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan, 
2002-2009
Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC.
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In 2006 each of the six poppy-free provinces were awarded 
US$ 1,000,000 and eight provinces were awarded US$ 
500,000 for having less than 1,000 hectares of opium 
poppy cultivation. 
Seven more poppy-free provinces were announced in August 
2007 bringing the total number of poppy-free provinces to 
13. This figure reached 18 in 2008. In 2009, 20 provinces 
were declared opium poppy-free. 
Consistently poppy-free provinces: Ghazni, Logar, Paktika and 
Panjshir provinces have maintained their poppy-free status 
irrespective of the security in the province or the financial 
status of the farmers. The people of Panjshir have tradition-
ally been averse to drugs as evidenced by the prohibition of 
even tobacco under the late Commander Masood. Weather 
conditions in Ghazni and Logar are not favourable to 
opium poppy cultivation, and the farmers in these prov-
inces have not shown any interest in opium poppy cultiva-
tion in the past. Although suitable weather conditions and 
an extremely volatile security situation would seem to 
favour opium poppy cultivation, the people of Paktika seem 
to prefer cannabis cultivation instead. 
Reclaimed provinces: a total of ten provinces, namely 
Bamyan, Faryab, Khost, Kunduz, Nuristan, Paktya, Parwan, 
Saripul, Samangan and Wardak were opium poppy-free in 
2002. After five years of intermittent cultivation between 
2003 and 2007, they regained opium poppy-free status in 
2008 and in 2009. 
The highest combined total opium cultivation for the nine 
provinces was 11,827 ha in 2005. In these provinces, opium 
poppy cultivation mainly started in the year 2000 and 
increased after 2002. The residents of these provinces gen-
erally respect and follow the government’s decisions. Only 
a very limited number of households tried opium poppy 
cultivation in these provinces but later stopped it. Addi-
tionally, in some of these provinces, like Wardak and Nuris-
tan, weather conditions are not favourable to opium poppy 
cultivation. 
“Gained provinces”: Balkh, Baghlan, Ghor, Jawzjan, Kapisa, 
Takhar and Samangan provinces were not opium poppy-free 
in 2002, when the total area under cultivation was 3,800 ha. 
In 2008 and 2009, all became opium poppy-free. Within 
these provinces the most important one is  Balkh since 
opium poppy cultivation reached up to 11,000 ha in 2005. 
Having this province achieve poppy-free status can be seen 
as an important milestone for the Afghan Government and 
the international community. 
Balkh
Balkh province did not have high levels of poppy cultivation 
until 2005 when the total area under opium poppy cultiva-
tion increased sharply to 10,837 ha. The following year, the 
area under cultivation progressively decreased again and the 
province was opium poppy-free in 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
Balkh province has around 640,000 ha of arable land. Water 
is available throughout most of the province and farmers are 
mainly involved in wheat, vegetable and fruit cultivation. In 
the past, Balkh was the main cotton producing centre of 
Afghanistan, a sector heavily damaged after the Soviet inva-
sion. 
Opium poppy cultivation in the “reclaimed” provinces (ha), 1996-2009Table 42: 
Province
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96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Bamyan 0 0 0 0 610 803 126 17 0 0 0
Faryab 0 0 0 0 36 0 28 766 3,249 2,665 3,040 2,866 291 0
Kunduz 38 489 0 16 49 224 275 102 0 0 0
Nuristan 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 648 765 1,554 1,516 0 0 0
Paktya 0 0 0 29 46 1 38 721 1,200 0 0 0 0 0
Parwan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,310 0 124 0 0 0
Samangan 0 54 614 100 101 1,151 3,874 1,960 0 0 0
Sari Pul 0 146 0 57 1,428 1,974 3,227 2,251 260 0 0
Wardak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,735 1,017 106 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 4 67 771 616 239 7,058 11,693 11,827 9,010 3,126 291 0
Opium poppy cultivation in Balkh, Fig. 23: 
1996-2009
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In 2005, only 1.5 per cent of the total arable land in the 
province was used for opium poppy cultivation. This indi-
cates that opium has not been a major source of income in 
the province. Cultivation was mainly concentrated in three 
districts, Charbolak, Balkh and Chimtal. These districts are 
located in the centre of the province. Successfully maintain-
ing the province poppy-free for two consecutive years is a 
testament to the strong commitment of the Governor, cen-
tral government and the international community.  
Between 2002 and 2007, a total of US$ 166 million89 of 
alternative livelihood investment was provided to the prov-
ince by international stakeholders. The amount of alterna-
tive livelihood investments to the province was increased 
following record levels of opium poppy cultivation in 2005. 
These encouraging results show that a commitment to rural 
development combined with strong law enforcement meas-
ures are essential to achieving poppy-free status. 
Of course, significant problems remain, particularly affect-
ing the poorest of Balkh residents. Most of Balkh’s residents 
have accumulated debt.90 The looming financial problems 
may leave them unable to feed their families, and some have 
started cannabis cultivation as a coping strategy, signalling 
a shift in agricultural livelihood strategies (also witnessed in 
Nangarhar). 
Proﬁle of opium poppy growing 3. 
farmers and non-growing farmers
Although Afghanistan’s gross domestic production (GDP) 
has increased sharply since 2002, it remains one of the 
poorest countries in the world.
In 2008, the national GDP was 180 per cent higher than 
in 2002. Despite this substantial improvement, 53 per cent 
of the total population in Afghanistan still lives below the 
poverty line . Most of Afghanistan’s socio-economic indica-
tors fall far short of the global average. 
89 Alternative Livelihood Database Analysis Report, UNODC, 2008.
90 Priority needs assessment summary report, UNODC, 2008.
Afghanistan has historically suffered from underdevelop-
ment which became chronic and finally led to economic 
regression as various internecine conflicts ravaged the coun-
try. In 1980, the national GDP was $ 3.6 billion, while in 
2001, it had dropped to $2.4 billion. As of 2002, with a 
new Afghan Government and substantial support from the 
international community, the Afghan economy started to 
grow again. For many Afghans, the growth has, however, 
been offset by increases in food and oil prices, which are 
causing a rise in inflation rates. Annual inflation reached 
20.7 in 2008 (from March 2007 to March 2008), severely 
impacting the day-to-day life of most Afghans, and the 
International Monetary Fund estimates an average con-
sumer price inflation of 24 per cent in 2008/09.91
Opium economy
Between 2002 and 2008, Afghan opium farmers earned a 
total of US$ 6.4 billion while Afghan traffickers earned 
approximately US$ 18 billion. About 2 million people were 
involved every year, on average, in opium poppy cultivation 
in Afghanistan. 
After 2003, due to the drop in dry opium prices, the income 
of Afghan opium poppy cultivating farmers decreased. In 
2009, dry opium prices amounted to US$ 64/kg, a 81 per 
cent decrease from 2002. At the same time, the total export 
value of opium to neighbouring countries increased due to 
the rise in production and a relatively smaller decrease in 
heroin prices. 
In 2004, the level of the opiate economy was equal to 61 
per cent of the total licit economy in Afghanistan. But this 
dropped to 33 per cent in 2008.
In 2002, farmers in southern Afghanistan expanded the 
area under opium poppy cultivation, along with their 
opium income. In 2009, almost 90 per cent of the total 
opium income generated in the country was shared among 
southern Afghanistan farmers. The remaining 10 per cent 
was shared among farmers in western Afghanistan (9 per 
cent) and others (1 per cent). In 2003, this picture was 
remarkably different: 34 per cent of opium income was 
shared among southern cultivators, another 34 per cent was 
divided among eastern farmers; 15 per cent among central 
farmers; 10 per cent among north-eastern farmers; 5 per 
cent among northern farmers and 1 per cent among farmers 
in western Afghanistan. 
Agriculture is an important income source, but many 
Afghans in rural areas also rely on diversified livelihood 
strategies to generate household income. Almost half of 
Afghan households depend on income from agriculture. 
Figure 26 shows the distribution of income generation 
sources for Afghan households.
Income sources and distribution vary from region to region. 
In southern Afghanistan, 40 per cent of household income 
91 Economist Intelligence Unit country report for Afghanistan, 2008.
Afghanistan GDP, 2002-2008Table 43: 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Year GDP,  current prices (US$)
Change  
(per cent)
2002 4,009  
2003 4,435 +11%
2004 5,402 +22%
2005 6,483 +20%
2006 7,048 +9%
2007 8,842 +25%
2008 11,238 +27%
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is derived from opium poppy cultivation. This contrasts 
sharply with central Afghanistan, where only 1 per cent of 
the total household income comes from opium poppy.92 
The share of opium poppy in total household income has 
been decreasing for both north and north-eastern farmers 
in parallel with the decrease in cultivation. A sudden change 
in income sources may lead to poverty problems similar to 
92 Afghanistan opium survey, UNODC.
the previously noted situation in Nangarhar province in 
2005 after cultivation fell by 96 per cent. 
In 2005 and 2006, the vast majority of Nangarhar farmers 
abstained from cultivating opium poppy but were not able 
to compensate for the loss in income through other crops. 
As a result, opium poppy cultivation bounced back to 
18,739 ha in 2007. In 2008, cultivation in Nangarhar prov-
ince was negligible (less than 100 ha). The provision of 
alternative income sources for Nangarhar farmers may help 
to sustain the province’s opium poppy-free status. 
The vast majority of the northern and north-eastern farm-
ers have abandoned opium poppy cultivation. Given the 
severe drought in these regions in 2008, farmers might face 
further economic hardship in 2008 and 2009. 
Heroin prices at Afghanistan’s borders Table 45: 
(US$)
Location 2002 2008 Change
Afghanistan /  
Iran border 5000 3270 -35%
Afghanistan /  
Pakistan border 4110 3256 -21%
Afghanistan / 
Tajikistan border 4540 3150 -31%
Value of the opiate economy compared to Fig. 24: 
the licit economy
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Dry opium farm gate prices in Afghanistan (US$)Table 44: 
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09 Change between 2002 
and 2009 (per cent)
333 425 142 138 125 122 95 64 -81%
Afghan opium export value, 2002-2009Table 46: 
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09 Total  
(2002-2008)
Total  
(2005-2008)
Total farm gate income  
(million US$) 1,200 1,534 600 560 760 1,000 732 438 6,386 3,052
Total export value of 
opium to neighbouring 
countries
N/A 2,300 2,800 2,700 3,100 4,000 0 N/A 18,300 13,200
Number of persons 
involved in opium poppy 
cultivation (million)
N/A 1.7 2.3 2 2.9 3.3 2.4 3.4 - -
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In eastern Afghanistan, average annual income levels do not 
differ greatly between non-poppy and poppy growing farm-
ers. In central Afghanistan provinces, however, non-poppy 
growing farmers enjoy higher returns. In this region, farmers 
are growing poppy mainly for their personal consumption. 
In north-eastern Afghanistan, non-poppy growing farmers 
also earn higher levels of income than poppy growers. This 
is due to the spike in wheat prices and a decrease in opium 
prices and opium poppy cultivation.
In western and northern Afghanistan, the income of opium 
poppy growing farmers is 25 per cent higher than for farm-
ers cultivating other crops. Farmers in the south, whether 
growing poppy or other crops, generally earn higher incomes 
than farmers in other regions. 
Compared to 2005, farmers’ debt decreased in all regions in 
2008. The highest decreases were observed in southern 
Afghanistan (41 per cent) followed by the eastern region (30 
per cent), the north-eastern region (30 per cent), the central 
region (25 per cent) and lastly the northern region (9 per 
cent). The smallest share was observed in the western region 
(5 per cent). 
The vast majority of Afghans still lack access to electricity, 
safe drinking water, health systems and education.93 Only 
19 per cent of Afghan households have televisions and six 
per cent have fridges. Moreover, only 2 per cent of Afghan 
farmers own tractors.
Poverty and motivation behind 4. 
opium poppy cultivation
Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the 
world. All its socio-economic indicators are near the bottom 
of global rankings. But this does not encapsulate all the 
reasons for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. There 
are considerable disparities in terms of income levels and 
land ownership between Afghan regions. Table 50 shows 
that farmers in southern Afghanistan earn much more and 
are less indebted than other farmers in the country. The 
average land owning size is also high for farmers in the 
93 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2005, Central Statistics 
Oﬃce of Afghanistan.
Average share of opium poppy income in household income*, 2005-2007Table 47: 
* For all households 
Source: UNODC.
Region
Per cent of opium poppy 
income in total house-
hold income (2005)
Per cent of opium poppy 
income in total house-
hold income (2006)
Per cent of opium poppy 
income in total house-
hold income (2007)
Central 1.6 0.7 1%
Eastern 18.4 12.1 21%
North-eastern 27.7 13.8 3%
Northern 16.8 6.1 1%
Southern 35.2 35.4 40%
Western 14 9.9 10%
Income of opium poppy growing and non-growing farmers, 2006Table 48: 
Region Average annual income of opium poppy growing farmers in 2006 ($)
Average annual income of non-opium 
poppy growing farmers in 2006 ($)
Central 2,357 2,674
Eastern 1,817 1,753
North-eastern 1,970 2,290
Northern 2,270 1,862
Southern 6,194 3,382
Western 2,895 2,273
Overall 5,055 2,370
Distribution of income sources for Afghan Fig. 26: 
households (per cent), 2007
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south, compared to other regions. If poverty were the only 
reason for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, it 
would mean that i) Southern Afghanistan farmers became 
severely impoverished after 2002 after large-scale resumption 
of cultivation, and ii) other parts of Afghanistan are much 
richer than southern and western Afghanistan, which does 
not appear to be the case. Especially in central Afghanistan, 
farmers are much poorer than in other regions with a 
comparable level of debt. They do not, however, cultivate 
opium poppy on the same level as farmers in eastern, 
north-eastern and northern Afghanistan. In 2006, UNODC 
published a study about the motivations behind opium 
poppy cultivation.94 In this study, the main reasons/
94 Factors inﬂuencing the variations of opium poppy cultivation in key  
provinces in Afghanistan, 2006, UNODC.
motivations for opium cultivation were summarized as:
Lack of rule of lawi. 
Insecurityii. 
Lack of oﬀ farm employment iii. 
Lack of water and agricultural infrastructureiv. 
Survival – provision of basic needsv. 
External pressure from traﬃckers and tradersvi. 
Exaggerated expectations of bilateral assistance  vii. 
through alternative livelihood activities. 
Lack of coping strategies without opium poppy  viii. 
 income
Afghan farmers’ loans, 2005-2008Table 49: 
Region Average loan (US$) - 2005
Average loan 
(US$) - 2006
Average loan 
(US$) - 2007
Average loan 
(US$) - 2008
Change 2005-2008 
(per cent)
Central 814 806 576 612 -25%
Eastern 861 543 489 593 -31%
North-eastern 474 362 339 333 -30%
Northern 796 708 666 723 -9%
Southern 818 696 787 486 -41%
Western 388 330 318 367 -5%
Motivations for opium poppy cultivation by region, 2006Table 50: 
Motivations/
Regions Central Northern North Eastern Eastern West Southern
Role of Islam
Import motiva-
tion for not 
growing poppy
has limited 
impact on poppy 
cultivation
has limited 
impact on poppy 
cultivation
has limited 
impact on poppy 
cultivation
Has no impact Has no impact
Respect for  
Government
Respect for 
Government has 
a positive impact 
on stopping 
poppy  
cultivation
Respect for 
Government has 
a positive impact 
on stopping 
poppy cultivation
Respect for 
Government has 
a positive impact 
on stopping 
poppy cultivation
Respect for 
Government has 
a positive impact 
on stopping 
poppy cultivation
Lack of respect 
to Government 
is one the reason 
for poppy  
cultivation
Lack of respect 
to Government is 
one the reason for 
poppy cultivation
Rule of law
Better imple-
mentation of 
rule of law lim-
its/stops poppy 
cultivation
Better implemen-
tation of rule of 
law limits/stops 
poppy cultivation
Better implemen-
tation of rule of 
law limits/stops 
poppy cultivation
Better implemen-
tation of rule of 
law limits/stops 
poppy cultivation
Lack of rule of 
law is one of 
the reason for 
poppy  
cultivation
Lack of rule of 
law is one of the 
reason for poppy  
cultivation
Security
Better  
security helps 
to stop poppy 
cultivation
Better  
security helps 
to stop poppy 
cultivation
Better  
security helps 
to stop poppy 
cultivation
Better  
security helps 
to stop poppy 
cultivation
Lack of security 
results in in-
crease in poppy 
cultivation
Lack of security 
results in increase 
in poppy  
cultivation
External pressure 
from drug traﬃck-
ers and anti govern-
ment elements
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Results in in-
crease in poppy 
cultivation
Results in increase 
in poppy cultiva-
tion
Lack of  
provision of basic 
needs
Does not impact 
on farmers deci-
sions on poppy 
cultivation
Has a limited 
impact on farm-
ers decisions on 
poppy cultivation 
Has an impact on 
farmers decisions 
on poppy  
cultivation 
Has an impact on 
farmers decisions 
on poppy  
cultivation 
Has an impact 
on farmers deci-
sions on poppy 
cultivation 
Has an impact on 
farmers decisions 
on poppy  
cultivation 
Lack of coping 
strategies without 
opium poppy 
income
No impact on 
farmers decisions 
on poppy culti-
vation
Farmers are not 
dependent on 
opium poppy 
income
Has an impact on 
farmers decisions 
on poppy  
cultivation 
Has an impact on 
farmers decisions 
on poppy  
cultivation 
Has an impact 
on farmers deci-
sions on poppy 
cultivation 
Has an impact on 
farmers decisions 
on poppy  
cultivation 
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These reasons/motivations vary between regions. Table 51 
presents the main factors influencing opium poppy cultiva-
tion in each region in Afghanistan.
Farmers` income from opium in 5. 
Afghanistan
Farmers (sharecroppers or landowners) and drug traffickers 
benefit most directly from the opium trade in Afghanistan. 
In addition, a considerable number of rural wage labourers 
are engaged in and benefit from harvesting opium. 
Three persons can harvest one jerib (0.20 ha) of opium 
poppy-cultivated land in 21 days. This means that annually, 
the number of individuals needed to harvest the entire 
opium poppy crop was approximately 2.9 million in 2007 
(193,000 ha), 2.4 million in 2008 (157,000 ha)  and 1.8 
million in 2009 (123,000 ha).
In 2008, a large number of itinerant labourers moved to 
southern Afghanistan during the poppy harvest season to 
work as wage labourers (lancing and/or harvesting). 
Although the typical wage is US$ 5/day, due to labour 
shortages, daily wage rates were sometimes increased up to 
US$ 15/day. 
In total, 42 per cent of the farmers in Afghanistan began 
cultivating opium poppy cultivation before the year 2001 
and 58 per cent started after 2001. Particularly in 2004 and 
2005, a significant number of new farmers began cultivat-
ing opium in the country. Only 10 per cent of the total 
number of opium farmers started cultivation after 2005. 
This means that long-established opium farmers increased 
the amount of opium that they cultivated after 2005. 
In southern Afghanistan, 56 per cent of opium farmers 
started poppy cultivation before 2001. 22 per cent of cur-
rent opium farmers began cultivation in 2004 and 2005. 
After 2005, existing opium farmers increased the area 
devoted to poppy cultivation almost threefold. In general, 
opium farmers in northern, central and western Afghani-
stan started cultivating after the year 2001. Particularly in 
western Afghanistan, farmers started to cultivate opium 
poppy after 2003. In northern and central Afghanistan, 
after 2001, some farmers wanted to take the advantage of 
lack of government control and earn easy money by culti-
vating opium poppy. Later on, instructions from the Presi-
dent to provincial and district government officials led to 
improvement in these regions as farmers switched to other 
crops. Since they were not traditionally opium farmers, it 
was easier for them to stop cultivating opium. Eastern 
Afghanistan’s farmers, mainly Nangarharies, left opium 
cultivation in 2005, and having no coping strategy, returned 
to cultivation in 2006. In 2008, cultivation once again 
decreased sharply in Nangarhar province. 
In 2008, farmers earned US$ 732 million from opium, 
mainly in southern and western Afghanistan. With the 
capital gained from opium, farmers reinvest in the formal 
economy. In this way, the local economy indirectly benefits 
from the opium economy, and the two are currently insep-
arable. Another example concerns the sharp decrease in 
opium cultivation in eastern Afghanistan in 2005 and 
2006, which reduced incomes both in the farming sector 
and in the non-poppy business sector (many shopkeepers 
were forced to close down their shops). 
Opium is a labour-intensive crop which generates jobs in 
on-farm casual work (for day labourers involved in weeding 
and harvesting) and in the non-farm rural sector (5.6 jobs 
per hectare, according to World Bank estimates). Clearly, 
opium helps sustain the livelihoods of millions of rural 
Afghans. It is therefore crucial to increase the size of the 
legal economy in order to isolate the opium economy. 
Local traders and trafﬁckers`  6. 
income 
Opium is purchased individually from farmers by traders. 
These traders have close connections with poppy cultivators 
in villages and, given their ties to the local communities, are 
approachable by the farmers. Throughout most of Afghan-
istan, traders work as Kamishankars, that is, the people who 
collect opium (usually small volumes) from farmers to 
supply to the area/district dealers for a fixed commission. 
For each opium poppy growing village, depending on the 
level of cultivation, there can be 2-4 farm-gate traders.95 
Area/district dealers act as liaison or intermediaries between 
provincial drug traders and farm-gate traders. They control 
the farm-gate trading networks in the villages. Depending 
on the level of cultivation in the area or district, there can 
be 1-2 traders collecting the opium from farm-gate traders. 
District traders make cash advances and purchase opium at 
the farm-gate price. District traders then transfer opium to 
provincial/zone traders who dominate the trade in bulk 
purchases at the provincial level. Provincial/zone traders 
transfer the opium to main market traders. 
Each province hosts 1-2 major provincial traders, while 
95 Monitoring of drug ﬂow in Afghanistan, UNODC, 2007.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total number of people 
involved in harvesting 1,200,000 1,965,000 1,560,000 2,475,000 2,895,000 2,355,000 1,845,000
Number of people involved in opium poppy cultivation and harvesting, 2003-2009Table 51: 
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Farmers’ starting year for opium cultivationTable 52: 
Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC. 
main market traders mainly operate in Hilmand (Sangin 
and Musa Qala districts), Kandahar (Kandahar and Andarab 
districts), Nangarhar (Shinwar district), Hirat (Shindad 
district) and Badakshan (Faizabad district). These traders 
maintain strong links with international trading networks 
and organize processing and trafficking to neighbouring 
countries where some have tribal and family ties. 
Although the above classification seems to indicate rigid 
market-defined roles, it should be noted that these are often 
flexible in Afghanistan. 
The number of people engaged in the opium trade has 
increased since Taliban times, due in part to increases in 
prices and production levels. In Hilmand province alone, 
the estimated number of traders (all levels) might vary 
between 600 and 6,000,96 meaning that hundreds of fami-
lies derive financial benefit from the opium trade.
The price for high quality (60–80 per cent purity) heroin in 
Afghanistan is around US$ 2,500/kg. In general, the price 
of heroin increases the closer it gets to its destination coun-
tries, to reach up to $70,000 - $100,000* per kg, which is 
30-40 times higher than the price in Afghanistan. The esti-
96 Opium trading systems in Hilmand and Ghor provinces, Afghanistan drug 
industry, World Bank- UNODC pp 98.
mated value of opiate trafficking for Afghanistan was US$ 
3.4 billion in 2008.97 The total turn over of the global 
heroin market is estimated at US$ 65 billion. The total 
income of Afghan farmers from opium (US$ 0.7 billion) in 
2008 is very small in comparison. 
From 2002 to 2008, Afghan farmers earned US$ 6.3 billion 
and Afghan drug traffickers more than US$ 18 billion. 
Afghan farmers paid 10 per cent of their total income, or 
US$ 600 million, to the Taliban, warlords, Mullahs or 
Government officials as tax. Taliban-led insurgents also got 
other benefits from drug traffickers, like weapons and 
financial contributions, in return for the provision of 
security.
97 Afghanistan opium survey, 2008, UNODC.
Central Eastern
North-
eastern
Northern Southern Western Total
Before 2001 8% 50% 33% 12% 56% 3% 42%
2002 46% 13% 0% 6% 7% 5% 8%
2003 0% 8% 0% 12% 8% 12% 9%
2004 15% 17% 56% 12% 11% 24% 15%
2005 8% 8% 11% 12% 11% 27% 14%
2006 15% 4% 0% 35% 5% 23% 9%
2007 8% 0% 0% 0% 1% 5% 2%
2008 0% 0% 0% 12% 1% 1% 1%
Opium farm-gate income per region (million US$), 2003-2008Table 53: 
Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC.
Regions 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Central 150 12 1 1 3 1 167
Eastern 529 169 25 38 132 4 897
North-eastern 231 103 50 74 24 1 482
Northern 78 76 152 118 28 4 456
Southern 528 191 241 463 701 657 2,782
Western 18 49 95 67 117 62 408
Total 1,534 600 560 760 1,000 732 5,186
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The illicit opium trade chain in AfghanistanFig. 27: 
* Street value of heroin. 
Source: UNODC Afghanistan Office, Monitoring of drug flow in Afghanistan, 2007.
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2. THE OPIATE ECONOMY: 
 A transnational security threat
OPIATE ECONOMY  A. 
AND INSURGENCY
Insurgencies have demonstrated an interest in and capabil-
ity of using drug money for funding, such as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia and the 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) in 
Colombia1. The links between anti-government elements 
in Afghanistan and its drug economy have been well-noted. 
It has become difficult to distinguish clearly between terror-
ist movements, insurgencies and organized crime (linked to 
the drug trade or otherwise), since their tactics and funding 
sources are increasingly similar.2
It can now be said that all actors involved in destabilizing 
Afghanistan are directly or indirectly linked to the drug 
economy.3 Insurgents’ access to the opium economy trans-
lates into increased military capabilities and prolongs con-
flict. Opiates also fuel insecurity across Afghanistan as 
groups fight for control of routes and territory. Finally, the 
drug trade also indirectly contributes to political instability 
in Pakistan,4 Central Asia5 and the Chinese province of 
Xinjiang (bordering Central Asia and Afghanistan).6 These 
1 The FARC reportedly taxes coca cultivation and production, earning an 
estimated $140 million annually; see Michael Renner, The anatomy of resource 
wars, world watch paper 162, WorldWatch Institute, October 2002.
2 Viatcheslav Avioutskii et al., “The Geopolitics of separatism: genesis of 
Chechen ﬁeld commanders”, Central Asia and the Caucasus 2,20:7-14. 
3 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Aﬀairs, Fighting the 
Opium Trade in Afghanistan: Myths, Facts and Sound Policy, http://www.state.
gov/p/inl/rls/other/102214.htm, 11 March 2008
4 Pakistani military sources quoted in: Bokhari Laila, “Waziristan- Impact on 
the Taliban Insurgency and the Stability of Pakistan”, FFI/Rapport, 2006.
5 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) proﬁted heavily from the drug 
trade when it controlled traﬃcking routes in Tajikistan in the late 1990s, 
becoming in the eyes of some an organized crime group with a political wing.
6 Ziad Haider, “Politics, Trade, and Islam along the Karakoram Highway”, 
are all consumption markets in their own right, but also 
transit regions for heroin travelling to western, Chinese and 
Russian markets, in which organized crime groups control 
distribution networks. 
This section examines interactions between the Afghan 
drug trade, the Afghanistan-Pakistan insurgency and 
organized crime. The opiates trade is a major component 
of Afghanistan’s economy, as it has been since the mid-
1990s. Insecurity is correlated with the opiate economy, 
but disentangling cause and effect is difficult. Distinguish-
ing insurgents from drug traffickers is a challenge when 
these categories overlap in many individuals and groups. 
These analytical challenges arise because the opiate econ-
omy is a central rather than marginal phenomenon in 
Afghanistan. It is an important source of finance for net-
works of corrupt government officials and for many insur-
gent groups. 
The term ‘anti-government elements’ (AGE) permits simul-
taneous reference to a wide range of actors that are inhibit-
ing the development of the Afghan state. However, it also 
obscures the varying motivations of AGE and the role shifts 
of individuals and groups. For example, a wealthy southern 
landowner may occupy a local government post, preside 
over sharecroppers who farm opium on his land, and sup-
port the insurgency in order to protect his interests from 
government encroachment. This individual might be con-
sidered an official, an insurgent and a drug trader simulta-
neously. Faced with these category overlaps, it may be more 
productive to examine how different behaviours interact 
(criminality, insurgency and official governance), rather 
than how individuals interact.
Asian Survey, Vol. XLV, No. 4, July/August 2005.
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Anti-Government Elements and 1. 
insecurity in Afghanistan
As a label, ‘AGE’ brings under one umbrella a complex 
amalgam of fluid and shifting alliances. This broad mix 
includes warlords, tribal leaders, religious leaders (mullahs), 
foreign jihadists, mercenaries/semi-private militias, Paki-
stani/Afghan Taliban and criminal organizations. Most 
dedicated insurgents – that is, those who seek to overthrow 
the government and expel foreign troops – associate them-
selves with the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, which are the main 
focus of this section.7
The Taliban
“[A] militant outgrowth of radicalized strands of the Pash-
tun peoples,”8 the Taliban emerged in southern Afghanistan 
and from Pakistani madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in 
Afghan refugee camps in 1994. Two years later, the move-
ment gained control over most of Afghanistan, pushing 
other powers into a corner of the north-east. Following 
their overthrow by the international coalition and the 
Northern Alliance in 2001, many Taliban leaders found 
sanctuary among fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan’s tribal areas. 
From this point, there was heightened operational conver-
gence between an emerging Pakistani Taliban and fleeing 
Afghan Taliban, with the two groups now planning and 
launching attacks against both Pakistan and Afghanistan.9 
Nevertheless, the Taliban movement is not ideologically 
homogeneous and some members are known to be “recon-
cilable” through truces and negotiations. As a first step, it is 
thus important – yet difficult – to distinguish between the 
Afghan Taliban and the more radical “foreign” Taliban. The 
latter are mostly graduates of underground madrassa net-
work and are thought to be much more motivated by 
extremism and sympathy for groups like Al-Qaeda. Research 
by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting revealed that 
in provinces like Hilmand, residents were not necessarily 
troubled by the Afghan Taliban “but from insurgents 
trained in Pakistan who flow in through the porous 
border.”10 
The Afghan Taliban include some non-ideological, more 
“opportunistic” fighters motivated by 1) financial incen-
tives, 2) tribal imperatives, or 3) coalition blunders resulting 
in civilian casualties. Notably, some semi-autonomous “neo-
Taliban” commanders have emerged as a younger genera-
tion. They maintain significant operational independence 
from the Taliban’s top leaders in Pakistan, but receive stra-
7 Some NGOs have identiﬁed a “grass roots” insurgency with no ideological 
links to the Taliban, but like in Iraq made up of disparate groups united with 
“legitimate grievances” in opposition to foreign troops or the central govern-
ment.
8 Rodney W. Jones, “Neutralizing Extremism and Insurgency in Afghanistan 
and Its Borderlands”, Institute of regional studies, Seminar paper, Islamabad, 
May 2008.
9 “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports”, CSIS, April 03, 2008
10 IWPR, “Foreign Taleban Rile Hilmand Residents”, October 30 2007.
tegic guidance and occasional orders/assistance in carrying 
out specific attacks. A number of “neo-Taliban” appear to 
be opium traffickers and criminal gang members.
Unlike the Al-Qaeda network, the Afghan Taliban is a local 
insurgent group whose activities and scope are limited to 
Afghanistan and to a lesser extent the border areas of Paki-
stan. Although it does receive financial support from AQ 
and reported by private donors in the Gulf and other 
regions, much of its funding derives from locals in both 
countries, delivered from mosque collections, sympathetic 
businessmen, radical religious parties (in Pakistan) and 
taxation systems, including those applied to the opiates 
trade.11 In addition, locals may provide shelter and suste-
nance to groups in control of a given area. There is no 
concrete evidence that the Taliban is currently receiving 
state funding, and international cooperation continues to 
put considerable pressure on charities and other non-gov-
ernmental organizations. 
At this stage of its insurgency, the Taliban movement is 
opportunistic and religiously pragmatic. There seems to be 
a consensus that growing poppy is religiously proscribed, 
yet taxing cultivation and trafficking is justified by war 
imperatives. As discussed below, similar flexibility is evident 
in the criminal activities of other groups linked to Al-
Qaeda. A 2001 UNODC mission evaluating the result of 
the Taliban ban on cultivation acknowledged its effective-
ness. However, the Taliban today again have a tolerance of 
opium that for some commanders borders on dependence.
Al-Qaeda
Like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda has evolved under international 
pressure, with more autonomy falling to individual terrorist 
cells which often have appropriated Al-Qaeda’s “brand 
name”. At present, it is highly decentralized, existing as a 
revolutionary motivation12 and a loosely affiliated group of 
individuals based in at least 60 countries. In contrast with 
the more localized Taliban, Al-Qaeda is a transnational ter-
rorist network. It has operational links with like-minded 
organizations throughout the world, for which it acts as a 
focal point or umbrella organization.13 
Al-Qaeda does not appear to have a direct role in the 
Afghan opiates trade. Beyond ideological considerations, 
involvement in drug trafficking would increase the visibility 
of its secretive core group. Set against this, it may have less 
access to donations from sympathizers following the Sep-
tember 11 attacks. Extremist groups linked or ideologically 
aligned with Al-Qaeda have been involved in a wide range 
11 Peter Marsden et al. , “An assessment of the Security of Asian Development 
Bank Projects in Afghanistan”, Asian Development Bank, March 2007. 
12 This doctrine “rejects modernism and emphasizes the concepts of jihad (holy 
struggle) and takﬁr (declaring another Muslim an inﬁdel)”; see for example 
Christopher G. Pernin et al., “Unfolding the Future of the Long War: Moti-
vations, Prospects, and Implications for the U.S. Army”, RAND, 2008.
13 Examples include the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin of Pakistan.
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of illicit activities, including drug trafficking, to finance 
themselves in such disparate areas as North14 and South 
Africa,15 Southern Europe and Central Asia. The US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency has estimated that Al-Qaeda has 
required some $30 million a year to sustain itself during the 
period preceding 9/11, but little information exists on its 
current financial resources.16 Certainly, it seems to have 
regained some of its past financial capacity, with some esti-
mates placing the number of Al-Qaeda and Taliban training 
camps at 157 in the North West Frontier Province.17
In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda does not “control” territory and 
presumably cannot levy taxes on cultivation or transporta-
tion. However, on the Pakistani border, its members are 
well-placed to participate in low-level drugs and/or arms 
smuggling. A joint US DEA/FBI investigation in 2001 
uncovered a transnational heroin network based in Pesha-
war and identified money-launderers with alleged ties to 
Al-Qaeda. Sea-borne trafficking through Pakistan to Europe 
via the Gulf States seems to have been significant for Al-
Qaeda funding – in a two-week period in December-Janu-
ary 2004, the US Navy intercepted four boats carrying tons 
of hashish, heroin and methamphetamines. The first of 
these was manned by suspected Al-Qaeda members and was 
carrying almost two tons of hashish with a street value of 
US$ 8-10 million.18
Insurgent groups linked to  2. 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
Hizb-i Islami
Hizb-i Islami (HI, Party of Islam) has members and influ-
ence in many areas of Afghanistan, and was an important 
group during the conflict of the 1990s. It is split into two 
factions, each led by a former anti-Soviet Mujahedin19 com-
mander. One is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG) and 
the other by Anwar ul-Haq Mujahid (HiK), named after its 
original leader, the late Mawlawi Yonus Khalis. During the 
Soviet conflict, the Taliban supreme leader had fought 
under Khalis and HiK was later absorbed by the Taliban in 
2003.20 Hekmatyar’s faction seems to be closer to Al-Qaeda 
groups than the Taliban, and the list maintained by the UN 
Security Council Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Com-
mittee (1267 Committee) considers Hekmatyar an associ-
ate of Al-Qaeda. Its centre of gravity is in eastern Afghanistan, 
14 “Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)”, Australian Na-
tional Security, http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf
15 Global Witness, For a few dollars more: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond 
trade, April 2003.
16 Victor Comras “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Aﬃliated Groups”, Stra-
tegic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 1 (January 2005).
17 Bill Roggio, “Cross-border strike targets one of the Taliban’s 157 training 
camps in Pakistan’s northwest”, The Long War Journal, August 13, 2008.
18 Navy Makes Persian Gulf Drug Bust , CBS/AP, Dec. 19, 2003.
19 Plural form of the Arabic term for religious or holy warrior.
20 Johnson, T.H., Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 
Orbis (2006).
particularly Kunar, Nuristan and Laghman provinces, 
drawing on support and sanctuary in adjacent areas of 
Pakistan such as Dir, Bajaur and Khyber agencies. Hekmat-
yar also maintains a certain degree of support in his native 
Kunduz and in western Takhar Province.
HI is dedicated to expelling foreign troops but has varied in 
its operational and ideological convergence with the Tali-
ban and Al-Qaeda. This was most obvious in the 1990s, 
when HI directly confronted the Taliban in some areas of 
Afghanistan. Competition continues today, in places like 
Wardak and Logar. HiG is not strong in most areas of 
Afghanistan that cultivate opium, with the important 
exception of Kunar and Laghman. Given its influence over 
these provinces, it seems safe to presume that HiG has 
accommodated itself to cultivation in the areas it controls. 
Most of its drug-related funding consists of informal taxes 
in border areas and to a lesser extent involvement in process-
ing. According to some experts, Hekmatyar was the only 
Mujahedin to exploit opium profits systematically as a basis 
for a party and a conventional army. Most commanders 
were content selling raw opium, but Hekmatyar also 
invested in laboratories, in partnership with Pakistani 
heroin syndicates.21 US troops have raided labs linked to 
HiG in the past22 and, according to UNAMA analysts, HiG 
still maintains a number of laboratories in Nangarhar and 
Badakshan provinces, from which it draws funds for the 
insurgency.23
Haqqani network
The Haqqani network is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a 
noted Mujahedin during the Soviet occupation of Afghani-
stan. The network is active in south-eastern Afghanistan 
(mainly Khost and Paktya provinces) and is based in adja-
cent North Waziristan (Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
of Pakistan).24 The Haqqani network maintains strong his-
torical links with the Taliban25 in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
and has established several training camps in North Waziris-
tan. The Haqqani network provides shelter and protection 
to Al-Qaeda and conducts joint operations with elements 
of the group. Information from UNAMA suggests that Al-
Qaeda favors Haqqani over the Taliban as a ‘sub-contractor’ 
for complex and spectacular attacks.
As well as receiving financial support from Al-Qaeda, mem-
bers of the Haqqani network derive funding from cross-
border trade (such as protection payments from opiate/
hashish traffickers) and have traditional lines of financing 
21 Shahin Eghraghi, “Hekmatyar: The wild card in Afghanistan”, Asia Times 
Online, January 2004. 
22 Robert Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Aﬀairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Govern-
ment Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 
Resources, April 1, 2004.
23 Interview UNAMA, Kabul, April 2009.
24 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009.
25 Haqqani was Minister of Tribal Aﬀairs during the Taliban regime.
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in the Gulf region. The Haqqani network has more limited 
territory than the Taliban and its narcotics tariffs are cor-
respondingly lower. However, its control of an area strad-
dling the important trade route from Miram Shah (North 
Waziristan) through Khost, Paktya and further to Logar 
and on to Kabul, provides it with significant oversight of a 
flow of goods to and from Pakistan.  
Organized crime3. 
Organized crime is a notoriously difficult term to define. 
However, for the purpose of this research, organized crime 
is
a group generally operating under some form of 
concealment with a structure reflective of the 
cultural and social stipulations of the societies that 
generate it; and which has the primary objective 
to obtain access to wealth and power through the 
participation in economic activities prohibited by 
state law.26
It is a form of accumulation based on corruption and the 
use or threat of physical violence.
Criminal groups are the main organizers and beneficiaries 
of the opium trade in Afghanistan. They are critical to the 
transportation of drugs, contributing substantially to cor-
ruption and undermining state capacity. Many of the crim-
inal industries these groups engage in encourage or require 
international connections. In addition to drug trafficking, 
organized criminal syndicates are engaged in arms traffick-
ing, human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants, all 
activities that tend to be transnational. On a local level, the 
recent upsurge in violent crime across Afghanistan, includ-
ing burglary and kidnapping, is viewed by many as an 
indicator of rising organized crime activity. The emergence 
of these groups in Afghanistan has been facilitated by sev-
eral factors, including: a recent and continuing history of 
conflict which has helped breed an environment conducive 
to crime; widespread economic hardship; and nepotism/
corruption. In short, Afghanistan provides multiple oppor-
tunities and few constraints on organized crime growth and 
activity.
Organized criminal groups in Afghanistan are mostly indig-
enous, even if some members have their residences in border 
areas of neighboring countries. Groups appear to be ethni-
cally-based and can generally be classified as small gangs. At 
the top of the pyramid are organizations with recognizable 
structures, leaders and established modus operandi, invari-
ably involving transnational linkages into Afghanistan’s 
neighbours and beyond.
The borders between licit and illicit markets in Afghanistan 
are exceedingly blurry and many of the players involved in 
both the licit and illicit streams are the same. Afghanistan 
26 Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt, The politics of organized crime and the organized 
crime of politics; a study in criminal power, Lexington Books, 2006, p. 13.
Research and Evaluation Unit research suggested that 
[m]any traders, even if they are primarily engaged 
in activities that could be brought into the formal 
economy, have a background in and a capital base 
derived from illicit activities. Even if traders have 
not themselves been involved in the illicit econ-
omy, they require good relationships with those 
who are because this latter group controls the 
supply routes and transport systems.27 
With such a large grey area linking the black and white 
economies, it can be difficult to home in on the most dan-
gerous forms of criminality.28
In the opiate economy, there are two primary types of 
actors connecting the farm-gate to international trafficking 
routes:
Village traders collect directly from farmers (they are a. 
often general shopkeepers, taking opium as credit). 
They also sell opium to district bazaars or directly to 
large traders, including inter-provincially. 
Large traders, who commission collectors, buy di-b. 
rectly from village traders and may also be landown-
ers with sharecroppers/tenants that they pay rent in 
opium. This level of trader has direct links to or owns 
heroin processing facilities. Most large traﬃcking 
networks have responsibilities up to the border, after 
which internationally-oriented groups take over.29 
However, some large traders also have representation 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. For 
example, the Balochistan capital of Quetta report-
edly served as a base for some well-known Afghan 
traﬃckers,30 while members of the large Afghan di-
aspora in Dubai are useful to traders, both for small-
scale traﬃcking and large ﬁnancial movements. 
There are signs that Afghanistan’s opiate markets have 
been consolidating. An assessment by UNODC in 2005 
cites 2003 
as a critical period in the transformation of organ-
ized criminal activity in Afghanistan from essen-
tially a relatively fragmented and open market to 
one where a limited number of operators have 
begun to dominate.31
In 2006, a joint UNODC-World Bank publication con-
cluded that the drug industry in Afghanistan was becoming 
increasingly consolidated. At the top, 
around 25-30 key traffickers, the majority of them 
in southern Afghanistan, control major transac-
27 Sarah Lister and al., “Trading in power: the politics of free markets in Af-
ghanistan”, AREU, March 2004. 
28 As highlighted in the section on the opiate economy and ﬁnancial ﬂows.  
29 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005, p. 91.
30 U.S. v. B. Noorzai, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S1 
05 Cr.19, 04-25, 2005.
31 UNODC Kabul Field Oﬃce, Organized crime in Afghanistan:  
a threat assessment, December 2005.
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tions and transfers, working closely with sponsors 
in top government and political positions.
This concurs with the view of UNAMA analysts that 
approximately 25 networks or “key traffickers” dominate 
the Afghan opiate economy.32 At a lower level, in 2007 
UNODC surveyors estimated the total number of mid- 
and high-level traffickers in Afghanistan to be 800-900, 
reinforcing the conclusion of the 2006 study that there 
were “some 200-250 large traffickers nationwide (…) and 
perhaps some 500-600 mid-level traffickers in the country.” 
AREU’s view that in Afghanistan “many markets are domi-
nated by a few very large players at the top” suggests that 
the structure of opiate trading reflects Afghanistan’s broader 
economic structure.33
Organized crime in Afghanistan is a tremendous security 
threat. In a militarized society, it is unsurprising that organ-
ized crime groups thrive through the availability and 
deployment of weaponry and brutal tactics. UNAMA ana-
lysts have suggested that organized crime has sometimes 
used suicide bombings to eliminate opponents, including 
competitors and uncooperative government officials.34 A 
Finnish delegation uncovered evidence of attacks by local 
drug lords “to hamper the will of ISAF and local police 
forces to target the drug business.”35 Some organized crime 
groups maintain close links with the Taliban and other 
insurgents, particularly where the latter have territorial 
control, such as in tribal border areas. Links vary from out-
right membership of insurgent groups to ties of tribal loy-
alty and alliances of convenience based on transit and 
protection fees.36 For example, in October 2007, a major 
Afghan trafficker, Haji Baz Mohammad (a native of Nan-
garhar province), was sentenced to more than 15 years in 
prison for trafficking millions of dollars worth of heroin 
into the US. Baz Mohammad’s indictment also alleged that 
he was closely aligned with the Taliban, seemingly a case of 
convergence between profit and Taliban ideology.  
Just as debilitating, organized crime in Afghanistan is heav-
ily intertwined with the state and the insurgency, participat-
ing in or buying protection from both sides of the conflict. 
Whether protecting the cultivation of opium or sponsoring 
trafficking of contraband, crime appears to be a primary 
survival strategy for many government officials and insur-
gents. This involves collusion on both sides, but the nega-
tive impact on reputation understandably affects the 
government more. By virtue of being ‘the opposition’, 
insurgents benefit by highlighting criminality in the gov-
ernment, leading to further alienation of the public from 
32 Interview UNAMA, Kabul, September 2008.
33 Anna Paterson, “Going to market: trade and traders in six Afghan sectors:, 
AREU, 2006, p.1.
34 Interview UNAMA, Kabul, July 2008.
35 “Report from a fact-ﬁnding mission to Afghanistan”, Finnish Directorate of 
Immigration, September 2006.
36 See US indictment against Haji Baz Mohammad, www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/
pressreleases/October07/bazmohammadsentencingpr.pdf.
formal political institutions. Where it undermines the effec-
tiveness of the government, organized crime erodes popular 
support and thereby indirectly assists the insurgency. 
Directly, organized crime generates revenue for the insur-
gency, supplies it with weapons and partners with it in 
violent resistance to government encroachment. 
Warlords
During the war against the Soviet Union, well-funded, 
young Mujahedin commanders began to assert their author-
ity to the detriment of traditional local elders and with 
devastating impact on the Afghan social fabric. After the 
Soviet withdrawal, infighting amongst commanders ensued, 
leading to further fragmentation of Afghanistan into numer-
ous fiefdoms under the control of warlords who fought 
each other for power and influence.
The main Mujahedin groups at the time were heavily 
involved in the drug trade, reportedly controlling by them-
selves a total production of over 800 metric tons in 1989.37 
The control of opium fields was a factor in fighting between 
different Mujahedin groups and confrontations over drug 
smuggling routes in Nangarhar and Hirat were reported.38
The consolidation of Taliban power – facilitated in part by 
popular reaction to warlord-led insecurity – curbed the 
influence of many commanders. They either: 
became integrated into the Taliban movement (most-1. 
ly Pashtun commanders but also non-Pashtuns who 
changed their allegiance)39; 
faced conquest and marginalization by the Taliban; or2. 
joined the anti-Taliban alliance (mostly Tajik, Hazara 3. 
and Uzbek commanders but also some Pashtuns in 
the east).40 
Again the opiate economy played a role, as access to drug 
profits was a factor in warlords’ decisions on alliances and 
allegiances.41 
Since the overthrow of the Taliban, many ex-Mujahedin 
commanders, regardless of previous allegiances, have reas-
serted themselves, particularly those who backed the win-
ning side in the international coalition’s invasion. Some 
have been able to regain influence,42 particularly in the 
north but also to a lesser extent in the east. In 2003, the 
37 Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in  
Afghanistan”, Journal of agrarian change, vol.5 n.2, April 2005, p. 198. 
38 Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in  
Afghanistan”, Journal of agrarian change, vol.5 n.2, April 2005, p. 203.
39 Chris Johnson, “Hazarajat Baseline Study - Interim Report (Part I),” U.N. 
Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs, March 2000, p. 5 and 
Appendix D.
40 It should be noted that some Pashtun commanders resisted tbe Taliban 
particularly in the east, see UNCHR, Situation in Afghanistan, 1998,  http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdﬁd/467009322.pdf.
41 Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in  
Afghanistan”, Journal of agrarian change, vol.5 n.2, April 2005, p. 200.
42 See Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords,” A Human 
Rights Watch Brieﬁng Paper, June 2002, available at http://hrw.org/back-
grounder/asia/afghanistan/warlords.pdf.
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International Crisis Group starkly reported that 
[t]he central government does not exercise effec-
tive control over most of the country’s territory, 
which is in the hands of a patchwork of regional 
commanders, the majority of whom are loosely 
affiliated with one or other Mujahedin party. 
A number of warlords also enjoy a degree of influence 
within government structures and with international coali-
tion countries. For example, Human Rights Watch esti-
mated that 60 per cent of the Members of Parliament had 
links to warlordism in 2005. Control over territory or 
resources is maintained (and legitimized to some extent) 
when warlords enter the political process and are appointed 
to key government posts, such as by becoming governors, 
ministers, police chiefs or military officers.43 In the south 
for example, several important governorships, such as in 
Uruzgan and Hilmand, were granted to prominent com-
manders. Entry into national politics has done little to curb 
warlords’ power and many consider that they continue to 
be an obstacle to coherent government control of the coun-
try.44
The typology of warlords ranges from top-level command-
ers (many of whom have joined the political process) to a 
sprinkling of small- and mid-level figures who are more 
involved in and reliant on illicit economies.45 The latter 
have few incentives and few prospects of joining the formal 
political process and thus have a more immediate stake in 
the opiate economy. According to high-level officials in the 
Afghan Security Council, many warlords still have connec-
tions to drug trafficking networks, despite significant pres-
sure from the international community.46 In areas under 
their control, warlords’ profits include a share of both illicit 
and licit activities. For example, local commanders in the 
Barge-e-Matal district, Nuristan province, were reported to 
levy a 10 per cent tax (in kind) on livestock and crops – 
including opium.47 With regard to opium, data from 
UNODC opium poppy surveys suggest that such practices 
have been ongoing since at least 2003.48
As the example of Barge-e-Matal suggests, the opiate trade 
is for warlords as ‘normal’ a target for taxation as any other 
economic activity. In another example, cross-border smug-
43 Conrad Schetter et al., “Beyond Warlordism. The Local Security Architecture 
in Afghanistan”, IPG 2/2007.
44 Roohullah Rahimi,  “Afghanistan: Exploring the Dynamics of Sociopoliti-
cal Strife and the Persistence of the Insurgency”, Pearson peacekeeping centre, 
occasional paper 2, 2008, p.20.
45 Jonathan Goodhand et al., “Bargain for peace? Aid, conditionalities and 
reconstruction in Afghanistan”, Netherlands institute of international relations, 
August 2006, p.40. 
46 Interview, November 2008, Kabul.
47 Bashir Babak et al., “When Cops Become Robbers”, Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting, April 2005. Figures as high as 30 per cent-40 per cent of 
gross farmgate revenue have also been reported – see Jonathan Goodhand, 
“Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan”, Journal of agrar-
ian change, vol.5 n.2, April 2005, p. 203; see also UNODC Afghanistan 
Opium Survey 2004, p.72.
48 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, p.72.
gling of timber and opium in Nangarhar has also been 
alleged to be controlled by warlords,49 at a rate of US$4,000 
to US$6,000 per timber truck.50 To protect their business 
interests, some warlords have also been implicated in attacks 
on ISAF or Afghan police. This was especially visible in the 
north of the country in 2006, according to an assessment 
mission undertaken by a Finnish delegation.51
The opiate value chain  4. 
and insecurity
The following sections examine how various links of the 
opiate value chain are associated with insecurity. A concep-
tual division is maintained between crime and insurgency, 
bearing in mind that individuals can exhibit both forms of 
behavior. Indeed, in the following sections the term ‘war-
lord’ is largely omitted: their behavior is insurgent-like 
when it aims to usurp central government control, but most 
often it is better defined as organized crime when they 
accommodate or corrupt government influence without 
any intention of ‘regime change’. 
Opium cultivation and insecurity
By most measures, insecurity in Afghanistan has increased. 
Insecurity has been rising across Afghanistan since 2005, 
primarily a result of the insurgency’s growing strength and 
improved logistics. Afghan law enforcement and coalition 
forces are the most popular targets, but there have also been 
a substantial number of civilian casualties. In 2008, Afghan-
istan registered a record number of attacks, ranging from 
suicide bombings to coordinated assaults on military bases 
and maximum security prisons. Much of the violence 
occurred in southern Afghanistan, but insecurity has also 
spread outward from the Taliban’s heartland to cover a 
majority of Afghan provinces. 
Insurgency
Areas of opium poppy cultivation and insecurity correlate 
geographically. In 2008, 98 per cent of opium poppy culti-
vation took place in southern and western Afghanistan. 
According to UNDSS, these regions are also the least secure. 
Even in relatively secure provinces, the areas controlled or 
heavily influenced by AGEs generally cultivate opium, such 
as Surobi district in Kabul province.
As it is illegal to cultivate opium, it is hardly surprising that 
cultivation is more likely to occur in places that the govern-
ment cannot influence. This creates a symbiosis between 
insurgent and drug trade activity: drug trading needs to 
prevent or respond to government attempts to enforce the 
law; while insurgency is dedicated to minimizing and 
49 Sarah Lister et al., “Understanding markets in Afghanistan: A case study of 
the market in construction materials”, AREU, June 2004.
50 UNODC Kabul Field Oﬃce, Organized crime in Afghanistan:  
a threat assessment, December 2005.
51 “Report from a fact-ﬁnding mission to Afghanistan”, Finnish Directorate of 
Immigration, September 2006.
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Given that the Taliban have not held sway in the northern 
and central regions, it is assumed that farmers in these areas 
have not paid this tax to Taliban insurgents since 2002 
(with the possible recent exception of Badghis and Faryab 
provinces). In addition, until 2005, the Taliban was not 
very active in Afghanistan and it is assumed that it was not 
able to levy taxes. To calculate the value of Ushr to the 
insurgency, UNODC combined province-level price data 
with opium production volumes since 2005.
Between 2005 and 2008, the total estimated farm-gate value 
of opium produced in southern and western Afghanistan is 
US$ 2 billion. It is therefore tentatively estimated that 
approximately US$ 200 million (10 per cent of US$ 2 bil-
lion) was paid as ushr by farmers. Calculations based on 
UNODC field surveys suggest that Taliban insurgents receive 
30-50 per cent of total Ushr levies. This range is also chosen 
to account for leakage resulting from the tax changing hands, 
as well as the fact that Taliban has not had total control in 
the provinces selected. At trader prices, this yields an esti-
mate that Taliban insurgents collected around US$ 60–100 
million in farm-gate taxation between 2005 and 2008.
In areas where groups other than the Taliban prevail, they 
also benefit from Ushr. For the amorphous spectrum of 
AGEs as a whole, therefore, the total funding from Ushr 
increases. However, it is more difficult to determine how 
much of this money is used for insurgent activity and how 
much is purely criminal income. 
Furthermore, insurgents regularly apply Ushr to all crops, 
not solely opium. Their total tax revenue is therefore greater 
than the numbers calculated for opium cultivation alone. In 
principle, reductions in opium cultivation would be expected 
to undermine insurgent financing only to the extent that 
the total value of farm production in insurgent-controlled 
areas drops. However, sustained reductions in opium culti-
vation would also be expected to feed through into reduc-
tions in opiate processing and trafficking; higher levels of 
the value chain from which insurgents also benefit.
Opiate trafﬁcking and insecurity
The relationship between opium cultivation and insur-
gency is relatively easy to analyse: it is essentially a matter 
of insurgents maximizing the economic advantages derived 
from territorial control, while criminals benefit from insur-
gents’ interference with law enforcement. However, roles 
and relationships blur further at the trafficking level of the 
opiate value chain.
One simple interaction is Zakat, a 2.5 per cent ‘wealth tax’. 
Zakat appears to be applied quite systematically, particu-
larly on low-level traders. As with farmers, it can be pre-
sumed that Zakat is more or less voluntary, depending on 
the trader’s disposition. Similar to cultivation, the ability to 
apply Zakat gives insurgents an incentive to host and pro-
tect trading networks.
A second simple interaction, again based on territorial con-
trol, is a fee for passage. Traffickers moving cargo through 
insurgent-controlled areas pass checkpoints that charge 
them. Functionally, this is no different from bribes extorted 
by police officers in areas of government control. It is not 
clear how systematically insurgents apply such fees. There 
appears to be a mixture of value-based taxation and flat 
rates, but in the southern region in 2008 UNODC received 
multiple reports that opiate consignments were levied at 200 
Afs. ($4) per kilogram. This seems analogous to corruption 
among officers: fees may be greater for high-value/risk ship-
ments, but often there are standard payments for move-
ment. In Taliban areas, such payments usually secure a 
stamp to allow free passage, although this obviously does not 
protect traffickers from extortion by any government offi-
cials, warlord militias or bandits they may encounter. More-
over, the tax schedule of the Taliban is itself augmented by 
individual insurgent units on an ad hoc basis, with unsys-
tematic taxes/extortion such as Baspana, a so-called “assist-
ance” tax levied in the name of war imperatives.
Roles become more complicated when insurgents act as 
protection for drug shipments. Some Taliban groups or 
leaders are involved in joint operations with drug traffick-
ers, transferring opium or heroin to major dealers on the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border and sharing the profit.56 At a 
lesser level, in 2006, UNODC research suggested that in 
the southern region
an alliance has formed between drug traffickers 
and the Taliban where the drug traffickers pro-
vide money, vehicles and subsistence (US$ 
4,000 + a Toyota vehicle + subsistence for a 10 
man group) to transfer around 2 tons of opium. 
The amount asked by the Taliban was almost 
equal to the 2.5-5 per cent of the total value of 
the opium being trafficked. In return the Tali-
ban protect them and do not interfere with 
their activities.
When the Taliban act as private bodyguards in this way, it 
is more accurately considered criminality rather than insur-
gency. 
It appears to be common practice for insurgents to levy 
taxes not in cash but in kind, which raises the question of 
how they realize the value of the opium collected. Barter 
economies are widespread and deeply entrenched in 
Afghanistan, particularly in rural areas and including the 
use of opium as value storage and reference currency. Insur-
gents can therefore exchange taxes collected as opium for 
subsistence needs. For higher-value purchases, large opiate 
traders provide cash.
In the latter transactions, insurgents are active participants 
in the opiate value chain, running from farmer to large 
trader – who then prepares shipments for export. From one 
56 Interview with Afghanistan Intelligence unit, Kabul, 2009.
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perspective, they continue to act as parasites rather than 
value-adders. From a different perspective, they provide the 
nebulous but crucial ‘public good’ of a space without gov-
ernment interference, in which other opiate traders and 
traffickers can function more profitably. 
In another area of the opiate value-adding chain, some 
Taliban networks may be involved  at the level of precursor 
procurement. According to South Korean law enforcement, 
a recent seizure of ten tons of acetic anhydride in South 
Korea appears to be linked to the Taliban network. A sub-
sequent investigation by Pakistani agencies found that over 
50 tons of the substance – linked to the same network - had 
already been shipped to Afghanistan’s southern region dis-
guised as disinfectant (hydrogen peroxide) from April 2007 
to March 2008.57 These recent findings support the asser-
tion that the Taliban network is more involved in drug 
trafficking than previously thought. 
The murkiest arrangements by which insurgents derive 
funding from trafficking is the revenue provided by large 
networks. Previous examples of large traders like Haji Juma 
Khan suggest that such traders give sizeable but ad hoc 
57 CARICC information bulletin 29, August, 2008.
donations to the Taliban. The apparently growing fusion 
between big drug networks and Taliban protection in Tali-
ban-controlled areas indicate that these arrangements are 
likely to prevail throughout the network. In other words, 
whether individually or collectively, nodes of such networks 
are not subject to systematic tax schedules, but do, on 
aggregate, donate significant funds to the Taliban. 
Finally, a different form of synergy between terrorism and 
the drug trade is evident in the dual use of trafficking net-
works for militants as well as opiates. Law enforcement 
sources have contended that in the province of Paktika 
(south-eastern region linked to Wana in Waziristan, Paki-
stan) convoys are being used to smuggle drugs out and 
weapons (and fighters) in.58 Information on drug routes 
may therefore have counter-insurgency implications on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
To summarize, insurgency overlaps mostly with the minor, 
middle and macro levels of opiate trafficking, with the 
major-trader level left mostly to profit-seekers. Macro-level 
involvement is the ‘public good’ of freedom from law 
enforcement. Middle- and minor-level involvement is the 
transfer of significant quantities of opium from farmers to 
traders and processors. This does not appear to involve 
insurgents taking the lead in transferring shipments over 
long distances or substantial cross-border opiate smuggling. 
At the major level, insurgents derive benefit from large but 
generally ad hoc donations from big networks. Lastly, when 
moonlighting as protection for major trafficking ventures, 
they are engaged in criminality rather than insurgency.
Opiate processing and insecurity
As with cultivation, there is geographical correlation 
between areas of insecurity and the location of laboratories. 
Processing facilities comprise the most geographically con-
58 Interview CNPA Nangarhar, October 2008.
Opium production (2002-2009) and farm-gate income (2003*-2009)Table 1: 
* No income data available for 2002.  
Source: Afghanistan opium poppy surveys, UNODC.
Distribution of opium farm-gate income Table 2: 
by region, 2002-2008 
Regions Per cent in total
Central 3%
Eastern 17%
North-eastern 9%
Northern 9%
Southern 54%
Western 8%
Total 100%
Province
Total opium  
production for the period 
(2002-2009) (tons)
Per cent  
in total
Total farm-gate  
income (billion of US$) 
for the period (2003-2009)
Per cent  
in total
Hilmand 19,620 44 per cent 2,262 38 per cent
Nangarhar 4,035 9 per cent 874 15 per cent
Kandahar 4,007 9 per cent 475 8 per cent
Badakshan 2,581 6 per cent 505 9 per cent
Uruzgan 2,520 6 per cent 356 6 per cent
Farah 2,297 5 per cent 263 4 per cent
Other 9,141 21 per cent 1,165 20 per cent
Total 44,200 100 per cent 5,865 100 per cent
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Opium poppy cultivation in Musa Qala  Fig. 1: 
district of Hilmand province (2005-2008)
Source: UNODC Afghanistan opium poppy surveys, 2005-2008.
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fined aspect of the opiate trade and their effects on security 
are narrower. While it is difficult to separate them concep-
tually from trafficking of precursors (in) and heroin (out), 
practically speaking, the facilities themselves create mostly 
localized insecurity. UNODC has no evidence that insur-
gents themselves manage processing facilities. Echoing the 
discussion of trafficking above, processing management 
would be a distraction from insurgency and would best be 
considered crime.
When in power, it appears that the Taliban would in fact 
levy taxes on laboratories “charging between $50 and 70$ a 
kilo depending on whether the final product was morphine 
base or crystal heroin”.59 Recently, an increasing number of 
reports, particularly from ISAF and UNAMA, have indi-
cated that insurgent groups provide protection for process-
ing facilities. This may be an opportunistic deployment of 
manpower by commanders and/or a calculated decision to 
protect a source of tax revenue. It seems that guards are paid 
in kind, that is, a cut of the processing output. Initially, this 
would seem quite inefficient, since each guard must then 
trade the heroin elsewhere. However, lab owners perceive 
some benefit in avoiding cash movements or payments and 
guards are able to take advantage of the widespread use of 
opiates as barter.  
The example of Musa Qala
Nowhere is the entanglement of insurgency and crime more 
evident than in Hilmand. To take the example of Musa 
Qala district, starting with repeated attacks in May 2006, 
the Taliban had nearly complete control for most of 
2007and the district became a hub for insurgent activity 
59 Peters Gretchen, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al 
Qaeda, Thomas Dunne Books, 2009, p. 82.
across southern Afghanistan. The Taliban established reli-
gious courts and presided over a flourishing opium indus-
try, reaping protection money from traffickers and tax 
revenue from the harvest. At the very least, the Taliban were 
tolerant of the opium trade, with a new narcotics bazaar 
constructed and operating openly.60
During the rise in insecurity and subsequent Taliban takeo-
ver of the district, cultivation figures for Musa Qala went 
from 1,664 hectares in 2005 to 6,371 and 8,854 in 2006 
and 2007, respectively. At 12,687 hectares, the 2008 areas 
was double that of 2006.61 Without taking into account 
other taxes, if insurgents were able to levy Ushr systemati-
cally in 2007, they may have earned some US$ 4.3 million.
Following the Taliban takeover, many Afghan traffickers 
previously living in Quetta, Pakistan and western Iran came 
to the district and lived in rented houses. There was com-
petition and collusion in increasing control of local mar-
kets, including closer relationships with heroin laboratories, 
at least five of which were functioning. 
In December 2007, the Afghan National Army alone 
reportedly seized 12 tons of opium in Musa Qala.62 Some 
interdiction operations also encountered Taliban protecting 
labs in August 2007.63 Afghan Special Forces operating in 
Hilmand also reported that findings in opiate storage/
processing compounds suggested a high level of insurgent/
trafficker collusion; seizures contained both opiates and 
60 Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, “The battle for Musa Qala”, April 
2008.
61 UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2008. 
62 Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), Report to the Joint 
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), February 2008. 
63 “Afghan, Coalition Forces Destroy Taliban Heroin Lab”, American Forces Press 
Service, August 27, 2007.
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“sophisticated insurgent materials such as IED (Improvised 
Explosive Device) manuals one would expect to be circu-
lated to specialist cells rather than Tier Two fighters.”64 
Insurgency funding derived  5. 
from trafﬁcking
Between 2003 and 2008, the total export value of Afghan 
opiates is estimated at around US$ 18 billion (there is no 
data for 2002). Between 2002 and 2004, the Taliban had 
comparatively negligible influence across most of Afghani-
stan (with the exception of the southern and south-western 
border areas) but this drastically changed after 2005.  As of 
2005, Taliban insurgents began to assert control over most 
of western (Farah and Nimroz provinces – Iran/Afghanistan 
border) and southern Afghanistan (Hilmand, Kandahar, 
Uruzgan and Zabul provinces). Between 2005 and 2008, 
the total export value of Afghan opium is estimated at US$ 
13.2 billion. Around 80 per cent of the opiates are traf-
ficked via Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, which means that the total export 
value of opiates trafficked through Taliban-controlled 
border areas is approximately US$ 10.5 billion.
Similar to the Ushr tax, there are a number of caveats to 
consider when attempting to quantify Zakat and transit 
taxes tax. First, the percentage of taxation from drug traf-
fickers varies substantially65 and taxes are rarely collected 
uniformly in any given area or region.66 Second, it is often 
sporadic rather than systematic. Finally, it is likely that drug 
traffickers are bribing other elements on the way to the 
Afghan borders (law enforcement and local commanders, 
among others).
Using a range that takes into account the uncertainty of the 
measurement and information collected, it is assumed that 
insurgents derive 2.5-5 per cent of the total export value 
(US$ 10.5 billion) as taxation from drug traders and traf-
fickers. This means that between US$ 250-550 million was 
also expected to be paid in cash -or in kind- (or the equiva-
lent in firearms, vehicles etc.) by drug traffickers to the 
Taliban in the 2005-2008 period. 
In total, including the Ushr from opium farmers (US$ 
60–100 million in farm-gate taxation between 2005 and 
2008), the Taliban is likely to have pocketed around US$ 
350-650 million from the opiate trade between 2005 and 
2008 through direct taxation of farmers and traffickers. Per 
year, this brought Taliban insurgents some US$ 125 million/
year from opium/heroin trafficking in Afghanistan. It is 
important to note that this excludes wages and taxes related 
64 Correspondence with Jane’s Intelligence analyst, October 18 2008.
65 CNPA Kandahar reported that in some areas, the Taliban levy a 20 per cent 
tax on opium (and a 10 per cent tax on wheat); Interview CNPA Kandahar, 
September 2008.   
66 As a general rule, taxes are collected more systematically in southern provinces 
and less systematically in the provinces bordering Iran in the west.
to precursor importation67 and processing facilities.68 
Similar to Ushr, the Taliban are not only taxing drug con-
voys but any vehicle which happens to cross one of the 
checkpoints they have erected along the highways they 
control.69 After 2005, some Taliban groups also became 
directly involved in trafficking of opiates to the Afghani-
stan/Pakistan border together with drug traffickers. In such 
cases, Taliban and drug traffickers apparently shared the 
profit.70 The net profit of the drug traffickers from opium/
heroin trafficking is estimated at US$ 4 billion (besides 
bribery or taxation etc.), which would also significantly 
increase Taliban profits over the above estimation. 
Afghan drug traffickers hand over the drugs to Baluchi drug 
traffickers at Afghanistan’s borders (Hilmand-Kandahar-
Nimroz-Farah provinces) with Pakistan and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. From there, Baluch traffickers take over. 
In Eastern Afghanistan, drugs are trafficked via (Nangarhar-
Kunar) into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA). As explained in the next chapter, FATA is mainly 
controlled by insurgent groups like the Pakistani Taliban 
and other Al-Qaeda linked groups. Negligible amounts of 
opium or heroin have been seized in FATA since 2002. At 
the same time, evidence indicates that Taliban elements are 
involved in drug trafficking, at least by providing security 
to the drug traffickers. The total value of the Afghan opium/
heroin market in Pakistan is estimated at US$4 billion for 
the period 2005-2008. There is, however, insufficient evi-
dence on the amount of profits these are generating in 
Pakistan to draw a conclusion. 
Taliban ﬁnancial requirements6. 
According to some sources, there are around 5,000-10,000 
armed Taliban fighters71 in Afghanistan, and around 4,000 
Taliban were reportedly killed in 2007.72 Other estimates 
put the number of Afghan Taliban at around 30,000, 
including 15,000 Pakistanis.73 Regardless of the exact 
number, any insurgency must be able to replenish and pro-
vide for its fighters. Reports from southern districts indicate 
that the Taliban reportedly pay around US$200-500 per 
month to young locals, so called “tier-2 fighters.”74 This 
67 Some revenue is likely drawn from transit tariﬀs on precursor movements. 
The funding transfers from large networks to insurgents may also include 
wealth derived from precursor traﬃcking proﬁts. However, these are estimat-
ed to be very small in Afghanistan relative to drug production and traﬃcking. 
68 Small, intermittent and independent labs are unlikely to be subject to system-
atic taxation. Large, ﬁxed facilities – the overwhelming majority of which are 
in southern Afghanistan – are generally thought to be controlled by the big 
networks that are here assessed to be operating under special arrangements 
with the Taliban.
69 Seth G. Jones, “The state of the Afghan insurgency”, RAND, December 2007. 
70 Interview with the Afghan Intelligence Unit, Kabul, March 2009.
71 Seth G. Jones,  “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”, RAND counterinsurgency 
study volume 4, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_
MG595.pdf.
72 James Dunnigan “The Taliban Turn Too Tough”, Strategypage, April 4, 2008.
73 Presentation US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, 
2009.
74 H. Mili and J. Townsend “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How it Funds Tali-
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amount is reportedly higher for tier-1 fighters.75 Across the 
border in Pakistan, a Taliban recruit reportedly earns PKR 
15,000 (approximately US$200) per month.76
There has been speculation that Taliban fighters are paid on 
a regular basis. Others thought the payments to be less regu-
lar, and more in line with the immediate needs of a fighter 
(such as marriage costs and leave pay).77 Taliban fighters are 
mostly constituted of small groups (not small armies) 
designed for hit-and-run attacks and led by an Amir (com-
mander) enjoying a large degree of financial and operational 
autonomy. Financial incentives for some fighters may there-
fore consist of payment for escorting a convoy, a portion of 
the booty from the commander, or a share of the Ushr / 
Zakat collected in areas under the group’s control (at the 
commander’s discretion). Depending on the relative poverty 
of an area, some warlords can even employ recruits for as 
little as a meal a day.78 In some areas where they enjoy sup-
port and can use tribal connections, the Taliban do not pay 
salaries and can recruit from a pool of willing volunteers.
On top of personnel costs, insurgents need weapons. Set 
against the potential income from parasitizing the drug 
trade - let alone other funding sources - these costs are 
modest. In Kabul, reliable reports indicate that a suicide 
bomber’s family may receive between 600,000-1,000,000 
Afghanis (US$ 12,000-20,000) for an attack.79 Other 
sources contend that, on average, suicide bombers are paid 
a more modest $3,000-4,000.80  With opiate income alone, 
insurgents can purchase thousands of weapons, fund hun-
dreds of suicide attacks and retain thousands of fighters.  
It is estimated that the Taliban need between $800 million 
and $1 billion per year to finance their operations.81 Based 
on the calculations above, 10-15 per cent of their funding 
could be drawn from the Afghan opiate trade – ignoring 
any revenue from trafficking through Pakistan that may 
find its way into Taliban coffers. This is somewhat less than 
the minimum percentage suggested by some ISAF officials,82 
which ranged from 20-40 per cent of the Afghan Taliban’s 
total income.
ban Operations”,  The Jamestown foundation, May 2007, 
75 NATO refers to farmers who may take up arms with the guerrillas as “tier 2 
Taliban” to distinguish them from committed, full-time “tier 1” ﬁghters.
76 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009.
77 Interview with head of counter-terrorism department, Afghanistan Ministry 
of Interior, November 16 2008.
78 Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in  
Afghanistan”, Journal of agrarian change, vol.5 n.2, April 2005, p. 203. 
79 Interview CNPA, November 2008, Hirat province, Afghanistan.
80 Interview UNAMA, November  2008.
81 Interview with UNDSS analyst, Kabul, 2009. 
82 International Development Committee quoting ISAF sources; see Recon-
structing Afghanistan, House of Commons International Development 
Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2007–08, Volume 1, p. 47.
The opiate economy and the arms 7. 
trade
There are a handful of warlords that play significant roles 
in the Afghan arms trade, and their links to the opiate 
economy warrant attention. Part of their strength lies in 
possessing experienced private militias and having access to 
stockpiled weapons from previous conflicts, in particular 
the remaining weapons depots in northern Afghanistan.
There is a difference in quality between easily-available 
weapons manufactured in Pakistan and the weapons in 
northern stockpiles or trafficked from Central Asia. The 
Tajik-Afghan border regions appear to be important in 
facilitating the importation of higher quality machine guns 
and small arms in particular.83 Significantly, opium is often 
the surrogate currency. This ‘drugs for arms’ trade functions 
in much the same way as it did during the anti-Soviet war, 
in which “opium was one of the only commodities which 
could generate enough income for large scale arms 
purchases.”84
For example, in May 2005 a joint operation between 
Afghan law enforcement and the Tajik Drug Control 
Agency arrested two former Taliban commanders in Kunduz 
Province. They had been operating a “sizeable” arms and 
narcotics trafficking network extending into Tajikistan.85 
Across the border, traffickers include individuals who rose 
to positions of power and wealth in very similar conditions 
as field commanders during Tajikistan’s civil war (1994-
1996).More recent information indicates that these routes 
in Kunduz are still operational, a few miles from the Afghan 
border and the main crossing at Sher Khan Bandar. From 
the north, weapons are currently funneled through central 
routes, from where they are usually transported by truck to 
the south and east to replenish insurgent stocks. According 
to reports, in the first stage one kilogram of heroin is 
exchanged for 15 (new) AK 47s.86 In the northern region, 
one AK-47 reportedly fetches 4 kilograms of opium.87 As 
they are traded/distributed throughout Afghanistan, weap-
ons and opium are inter-convertible currencies, including 
their trade for licit goods. 
Expensive equipment of Soviet/Russian origin (for exam-
ple, night vision gear) is also exchanged. According to 
DIAG (Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups) analysts 
interviewed by UNODC, shipments are currently occur-
ring every second day, with an estimate of around 150–200 
weapons being shipped into Afghanistan via this route per 
83 Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan inherited small-arms factories from the Soviet 
Union and conﬂict in Tajikistan and Afghanistan through the 1990s encour-
aged imports from all over the world.
84 UNODC, The opium economy in Afghanistan: An international problem,  
2003, p.88.
85 “RFE/RL Central Asia Report”, 29 August 2003.
86 Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, “Turning Afghan Heroin Into Kalashnikovs”, Institute 
for War and Peace Reporting, ARR No. 295, 30-Jun-08.
87 Information provided by DIAG analysts, July 2008.
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shipment. This is supported by research by the Institute for 
War and Peace that identified a bazaar on the Panj river (the 
border with Tajikistan), in which “smugglers bring in gem-
stones and weapons to exchange for high-quality Afghan 
heroin.”88 
Highlights of the opiate trade  
and insurgency 
At varying levels, the key actors involved in the drug trade 
have an interest in maintaining an “efficient” level of inse-
curity. 
The Taliban-led insurgency is content to reap divi-1. 
dends from the drug economy to ﬁnance war expen-
ditures. Their ability to provide protection to farmers 
and traﬃckers (preventing interdiction and eradica-
tion eﬀorts) delegitimizes the national government 
and links them with these people’s livelihoods. 
Some warlords use dividends from the drug trade to 2. 
maintain their power bases and also participate in the 
opiate trade when oﬄoading weapon stocks to insur-
gents. Warlords linked to the opium trade may also 
be orchestrating attacks on international forces or 
members of the national army and police if they feel 
their illicit livelihood is threatened.89 On the whole, 
however, these are strictly speaking not members of 
the insurgency.
Organized crime groups exploit insecurity and form 3. 
alliances with insurgents and government oﬃcials 
in order to secure their continued access to regional 
markets. There are no obvious signs of hostility be-
tween the traﬃcking groups and the Taliban. Coex-
istence and even cooperation seem to be the norm. 
In districts of Hilmand where the Taliban achieved 
sustained control, they did not intervene in the drug 
trade and reportedly worked with traﬃckers against 
the authorities. Criminal groups beneﬁt from insur-
gent-led insecurity, which ensures the absence of law 
enforcement in regions like Hilmand and Kandahar. 
Here also, organized crime elements do not necessar-
ily ﬁt the deﬁnition of AGEs/insurgents, largely be-
cause of interpenetration with government structures. 
This triangular relationship is based on a temporary conver-
gence of interests, chief among them being an interest in a 
weakened central government unable to enforce its laws 
and control its borders. The trading of drugs for arms illus-
trates that these links are direct and mutually reinforcing 
but also temporal - an alliance of convenience dependent 
on the continuity of conflict. 
The substantial increase in insurgent visibility and mobili-
zation since 2005 coincides spatially and temporally with 
the concentration of opium production in the south. The 
continued concentrations of poppies and processing in the 
88 Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, op cit.
89 Peter Mardsen et al., “An Assessment of the Security of Asian Development 
Bank Projects in Afghanistan”, Asian Development Bank, March 2007.
south are good illustrations of links between insurgents and 
the drug trade. However, as opium poppy cultivation con-
centrates, insecurity increasingly does not, spreading out-
ward to areas that were previously stable, such as parts of 
north and north-west Afghanistan. 
Buttressed by Taliban reinforcements from Pakistan’s border 
areas, which continue to serve as a launching ground as 
they did during conflict with the then Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR),90 the Taliban-led insurgency 
has garnered strength incrementally and is proving a resil-
ient force against the coalition and central government in 
Kabul. With the shift of violence and reinforcements from 
Iraq to Afghanistan, this situation is likely to continue in 
the short to medium term. Based on previous phases of 
conflict, these trends are likely to enhance the opium econ-
omy at all levels of the value chain. 
With more than 98 per cent of the country’s opium poppies 
being grown in its most insecure Taliban-influenced areas 
and an income stream potentially generating US$ 350-650 
million (average US$ 125 million/year) since 2005, poppy-
dollars may provide the means to foment instability and 
insecurity in both Afghanistan and Pakistan for years to 
come. AGE groups thus have a stake in maintaining and 
expanding the trafficking of narcotics. Furthermore, 
Afghanistan has started cultivating cannabis on a massive 
scale and is now a major exporter of the drug. According to 
the 2007 Afghanistan opium survey, “cannabis cultivation 
is (…) becoming as lucrative as opium poppy.” If  so, it will 
diversify the sources of drug-based finance and further 
complicate the picture of trafficking flows.91
Revenue from drug-related activity must be seen in the 
context of a broad-based taxation system that covers a wide 
range of economic activity.92 Just as importantly, AGEs 
engage in other forms of crime that can at least match drug-
related revenue. For example, one “unplanned” kidnapping 
of South Korean missionaries in 2007 reportedly netted the 
Taliban $20 million.93 Beyond this immediate local fund-
ing source, the Taliban are continuing to receive significant 
funding from private donors all over the world. In the opin-
ion of many experts, this funding contribution dwarfs the 
proceeds of the opium economy or criminal activity in 
general.94 Based on the numbers discussed above, the Tali-
ban must find at least 85 per cent of its funding from non-
opium sources. More likely, the total amount of money 
raised from tax schedules and criminal activity is higher 
than that required for operations, that is, a portion goes to 
90 Roohullah Rahimi,  “Afghanistan: Exploring the Dynamics of Sociopolitical 
Strife and the Persistence of the Insurgency”, Pearson peacekeeping centre, 
occasional paper 2, 2008.
91 UNODC is conducting its ﬁrst dedicated cannabis survey in 2009.
92 For example, UNODC surveyors report that in 2009 the Taliban in the 
southern region are levying 500 Pakistani Rupees from every household con-
nected to the electricity grid.
93 “Taliban say S.Korea paid over $20 mln ransom”, Reuters, September 1, 2007. 
94  Interview UNAMA analyst, Kabul 2009.
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insurgents’ personal enjoyment, highlighting again the 
overlap between criminal and insurgent motivations. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from AGEs’ approach to the opium 
economy – including encouragement and protection – that 
a contraction would have a deleterious impact on the Tali-
ban-led insurgency by disrupting established fundraising 
methods and blunting a strategic wedge between the popu-
lation and the Government. Reductions in cultivation, 
processing and trafficking would erode the financial base of 
the insurgency, although this would mostly affect the fund-
ing that can be derived locally, with minimal impact on the 
insurgency’s strategic threat. Opium is one of many factors 
influencing the war in Afghanistan, which equally depends 
on vested regional interests, cross-border sanctuaries, eco-
nomic disparities, extremist ideologies and long-standing 
unresolved border claims. 
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FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER B. 
TRAFFICKING: TRIBAL LINKS, 
INSECURITY AND CORRUPTION
Afghanistan and its neighbors are overlaid by a tangled web 
of intersecting tribal and ethnic allegiances. As the previous 
section explained, the opium economy is associated with a 
range of security threats. In all of these, ethnic/tribal links 
and frictions are important contextual factors.
In examining the importance of ethnic and tribal associa-
tions to the opiate trade, a risk exists of rarefying group 
dynamics and obscuring individual motivations. The dis-
cussion below tends to treat tribes as homogenous units. 
Therefore, it comes with a caveat that these are generaliza-
tions rather than strictly causative arguments. Naturally, 
individuals will sometimes act against their tribe’s customs, 
such as by defying a ban on opiate processing or by trading 
with members of a rival group.95 In addition, Afghanistan’s 
recent history has done much to weaken tribal identity and 
cohesion. 
Nevertheless, the strength of tribal identity and accompa-
nying customs of interaction in Afghanistan are such that 
useful insights can be made by examining ethnicities and 
tribes. Moreover, some otherwise confusing trends become 
clear once tribal relations are taken into account. For exam-
ple, in southern Afghanistan: 
The security and governance structure of each 
southern town and province largely breaks down 
along tribal lines, with each tribe affiliated with 
a commander who usually occupies some offi-
cial position such as governor, police chief, intel-
ligence chief, or army chief that legitimates his 
retention of a militia. Towns and provinces are 
divided, with varying degrees of clarity, among 
spheres of control by each figure.96
Pashtuns are the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan, with 
approximately 42 per cent of the population (12 million), 
followed by Tajiks (27 per cent), Hazaras (9 per cent), 
Uzbeks (9 per cent), Aimak (4 per cent), Turkmen (3 per 
cent), Baluch (2 per cent) and others (4 per cent).97 Tribal 
identity is vitally important for many Afghans, ahead of 
ideology and for some, nation. Tribal genealogy continues 
to structure social rank, land use and patterns of inheritance 
in many areas.98 In rural areas, tribal identities are the most 
important points of reference. When this is transferred into 
formal government positions, it is unsurprising that offi-
cials are generally appointed according to tribal population 
and balances of power. 
95 For example, Mullah Abdul Salam, a Pirzai (Alizai tribe) defected from the 
Taliban in Musa Qala and is now its governor; see Jane’s Terrorism and Secu-
rity Monitor, “The battle for Musa Qala”, April 2008.
96 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: the problem of Pashtun alienation”, 
ICG Asia Report N°625, August 2003, p.18.
97 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.
98 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo, “Tribalism and Afghan political traditions”, Asia 
& Paciﬁc Studies Nr. 1, January 2003.
According to some analyses, most Afghans perceive political 
parties as vehicles that represent particular ethnic groups, 
clans or tribes. This could provide a rationale for Afghani-
stan’s unusual choice of electoral system, with its emphasis 
on individual candidates rather than parties.99 Following 
the parliamentary elections in September 2005, a report by 
AREU provided the figures below for the breakdown of 
ethnic/religious groups in the newly elected Wolesi Jirga.100
Groups  WJ seats  Per cent
Pashtun  118  47.4 per cent
Tajik and Aimak 53 21.3 per cent
Hazara  30  12.0 per cent
Uzbek 20  8.0 per cent
Non-Hazara Shi’a  11  4.4 per cent
Turkmen  5  2.0 per cent
Arab  5 2.0 per cent
Ismaili  3 1.2 per cent
Pashai 2 0.8 per cent
Baluch  1  0.4 per cent
Nuristani  1 0.4 per cent
The importance of tribal delineations was also demon-
strated in Government sensitivities around the 2004-05 
population “approximation” – otherwise known as a sam-
pling census. 
Pashtuns
Pashtuns have historically been the strongest ethnic group 
in Afghanistan and 11 out of 12 rulers prior to 1979 were 
Pashtun.101 Pashtuns in Afghanistan can be divided into 
two large tribal confederations, the Durrani and the Ghilzai 
(or Ghalji), which between them include approximately 75 
per cent of Pashtuns. The other three tribal groupings are 
the Karlanri (20 per cent of Pashtuns) and the smaller con-
federations of the Sarbani and Ghurghusht. The Karlanri 
tribes comprise the majority of the population in the Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North Western 
Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. 
There are significant pockets of Pashtuns throughout 
Afghanistan. However, Durrani tribes generally dominate 
in the south-west, from Farah to Kandahar. The Ghilzai 
primarily reside in the mountainous south-east, from Kan-
dahar to Kabul – Uruzgan, Zabul, Day Kundi and Paktya 
provinces, and in the Katawaz region of Paktika province. 
The Ghilzai also have communities in the centre and north 
of the country (primarily Badghis and Faryab) as a result of 
resettlement, both forced and encouraged, under Durrani 
rule in the early twentieth century.102 
99 AREU, “The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance”, 2009.
100 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdﬁd/447aa6bd4.pdf.
101 Gregory Gajewski et al., “How War, a Tribal Social Structure, and Donor Ef-
forts Shape Institutional Change in Afghanistan: A Case Study of the Roads 
Sector”, The Louis Berger Group, September 2007.
102 Roohullah Rahimi, “Afghanistan: Exploring the Dynamics of Sociopolitical 
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Kandahar may be viewed as the geographical nexus of both 
the Durrani and Ghilzai confederations, but southern 
Afghanistan remains the Durranis’ traditional heartland, 
centered on the city of Kandahar, which is where the Dur-
rani dynasty was founded. Consequently, while the Durrani 
have a traditional geographic base, the Ghilzai in contrast 
are “scattered all over Afghanistan; thus there is no proper 
Ghilzai land”.103
All the above-listed confederations are further divided into 
tribes and sub-tribes/clans and patriarchal families. Overall 
there are at least 60 Pashtun tribes104 and the diagram below 
charts some of the major divisions.
As previously noted, the Durrani have historically domi-
nated Afghan politics since Ahmad Shah Durrani founded 
a monarchy in 1747. By contrast, the Ghilzai have been 
akin to a ‘military class’, at the forefront of the first and 
second Anglo-Afghan wars and the 1929 revolt.105 Later, 
the Ghilzai provided the largest base for the Mujahedin 
groups during the Soviet invasion and the Taliban move-
ment thereafter. The original Taliban were mostly com-
prised of rural Pashtuns from the Ghilzai confederation, 
with elements from the Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht 
Strife and the Persistence of the Insurgency”, Pearson peacekeeping centre, oc-
casional paper 2, 2008.
103 Bernt Glatzer, “War and Boundaries in Afghanistan: Signiﬁcance and Relativ-
ity of Local and Social Boundaries”, Weld des Islams 41, 3, 2001, pp 379-399.
104 As shown in the chart, the Durrani confederation has two main braches; 
Zirak Durrani and Panjpao Durani. The Ghilzai confederation also has two 
main branches; Toran and Ibrahim. Choosing a precise ‘number of tribes’ is 
practically impossible and it should also be noted that large tribes such as the 
Noorzai may better be disaggregated into sub-tribes, largely based on geogra-
phy, that are the primary solidarity group reference for members.
105 Thomas J. Barﬁeld, “Weapons of the not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun 
Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace”, 
Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series ”Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: 
Transactions and Identities”, Yale University, February 23, 2007.
confederation (not shown on chart). Supreme leader Mullah 
Mohammed Omar Akhund and most of the senior mem-
bers of the original Taliban are from the Hotak tribe of the 
Ghilzai confederation.106 
There are some palpable differences between Pashtun tribes. 
As a generalization, the structure of social relations among 
Pashtuns of eastern Afghanistan tends to be flat, whereas in 
Kandahar hierarchies are more apparent.107 As an example, 
in contrast to the south where a fragmentation into small 
rival groups occurred following the Soviet withdrawal, in 
the east one witnessed the presence of several strongmen 
dominating the scene (often reaching power-sharing agree-
ments). Tribes often rallied around a specific Mujahedin 
leader even if the tribal leader did not. This is likely driven 
by agricultural practices and the structure of landholdings; 
it may also transfer directly into differing forms of organ-
ized criminal groups based on ethnicity.
General rivalries exist between the Ghilzai and Durrani 
confederations.108 Notably, these groups find themselves on 
either side of the current conflict, with the current Durrani 
leadership challenged by the Ghilzai-heavy Taliban. Indeed, 
this stand-off can be traced in part to the favored status of 
Ghilzai groups in the assistance arrangements implemented 
by the Pakistani Government to fight the USSR.109 This 
placed Ghilzai tribes at the forefront of the resistance, ulti-
mately driving the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.
106 Johnson, T.H., Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan”, 
Orbis: A Journal of World Aﬀairs 51, No. 1, 2007.
107 Conrad Schetter et al., “Beyond Warlordism: the Local Security Architecture 
in Afghanistan”, International Politics and Security, Issue 2 , June 2007.
108  Johnson, T.H., op cit.
109 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire”, 
International Security 32:4, 2008.
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Digging beneath this high-level traditional rivalry, strong 
competition is also evident within confederations. In Kan-
dahar, the rivalry among the major Durrani clans is centu-
ries old,110 with the long-running feud between the Alizai 
and Alikozai tribes being just one example. In contrast to 
these internal rivalries, however, Pashtun unity has gener-
ally been strong and quick to achieve in the face of invaders. 
Furthermore, and despite rivalries, most Pahstun tribes 
tend to prefer cooperation with other Pashtuns rather than 
with non-Pashtun groups. In the opiate economy, this cre-
ates notable dynamics. For example, intense competition 
on a local level may become collaborative trading at the 
wholesale level, depending on how profit shares are expected 
to affect balances of power. The less directly participants are 
connected to rivalries, disputes or contested territory, the 
less their respective tribes’ interests will interfere with crim-
inal cooperation.
Opium cultivation and the Durrani 1. 
confederation
The link between opium cultivation and insurgency is com-
monly noted. At the same time, there appears to be a strong 
correlation between opium cultivation and the territorial 
control of the Durrani confederation. As discussed in more 
detail below, Durrani tribes preside over many of Afghani-
stan’s major opium-producing areas, and around 67 per 
cent of Afghanistan’s opium cultivation occurred in mostly 
“Durrani territory”, the province of Hilmand, in 2008.
Hilmand tribes
The four most prominent tribes in Hilmand (and accord-
ing to some experts, in the whole of southern Afghanistan) 
are the Barakzai, Noorzai, Ishaqzai and Alizai (Durrani).
Barakzai
The Barakzai are divided into seven branches and are prima-
rily present in eastern Hilmand, specifically in the districts of 
Lashkar Gah, Naveh-ye-Barakzi and Nahr-e-Saraj. A land-
owning tribe, they have been prominent in Afghan political 
history. The Barakzai also have a strong presence and influ-
ence in Kandahar, especially in the Maruf district.111 The 
tribe is also present in significant numbers in Farah. There 
are strong allegations of drug cultivation and trafficking 
against high-ranking members of the Barakzai tribe.
Alizai
The Alizai tribe belongs to the Durrani confederation112 
and is Hilmand’s largest Pashtun group.113 They control 
110 Thomas J. Barﬁeld, “Weapons of the not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun 
Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace”, 
Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series ”Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: 
Transactions and Identities”, Yale University, February 23, 2007.
111 Naval Postgraduate School, “Kandahar Executive Summary,” Program for 
Culture and Conﬂict Studies.
112 The Alizai are further subdivided into four tribes: the Jalozai, Hasanzai, Pirzai 
and Itharzai; see Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, “the battle for Musa 
Qala”, April 2008.
113 Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, “Tribes” and warlords in southern 
and are numerically dominant in most of northern Hilmand, 
including the Musa Qala, Baghran and Kajaki districts 
(hosting roughly a quarter of Hilmand’s total population), 
in which opium poppy cultivation is very intensive. Some 
important members of the Alizai tribe are known to be 
Taliban sympathizers and arms smugglers, while also heav-
ily involved in the opiate trade.114 
The former governor of Hilmand province, an Alizai tribes-
man named Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, was found 
with over nine tons of opium at his provincial headquaters 
by US officials. He was also accused of encouraging farmers 
to grow poppies (reportedly sparking a 162 per cent rise in 
cultivation in Hilmand) before he was removed from office 
in December 2005. Hilmand’s strong tribal structures and 
its relatively concentrated land ownership transform lead-
ers’ decisions into practical action quite effectively, which 
results in close integration of a group’s territory and mem-
bers into the opiate economy. 
While the Alizai heartland is the Musa Qala district in 
Hilmand, the tribe also dominates elsewhere, such as in 
western Afghanistan. In the last four years, opium poppy 
Afghanistan, 1980-2005, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 7, 
September 2006, p.9. Interview, deputy security council, Kabul November 17 
2008.
114 www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/a_chronology_of_the_1.php.
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cultivation has been increasing alongside the insurgency in 
Farah province. Bala Bulok is the most important poppy 
growing district in Farah province and is dominated by 
Alizai tribe members. This district is also a major Taliban 
stronghold, particularly in and around the village of 
Shaiban.115 The Alizai in this district were transferred to the 
area over a century ago from the Musa Qala district of 
Hilmand and “still maintain close ties with the Musa Qala 
insurgents.”116 There is also a strong Alizai presence in Kan-
dahar’s Maruf districts and the adjoining Pishin district in 
Balochistan, Pakistan. 
Noorzai
The Noorzai are one of the most influential tribes in 
Afghanistan, with more than a million members in both 
Afghanistan (south and west) and Pakistan (Balochistan). 
They own significant swathes of land in the south and are 
concentrated in Hilmand’s Nad Ali district and Kandahar’s 
Spin Boldak district,117 which straddles the main transpor-
tation corridor with Pakistan, and across the border in the 
Quetta district of Balochistan. They also have large com-
munities in Farah and Hirat provinces. Tribal solidarity is 
generally strong among the Noorzai, although the large 
numbers of people under the Noorzai umbrella probably 
requires a search at the sub-tribe level to find strong com-
munity bonds. 
In September 2008, the leader of the Noorzai tribe was given 
a sentence of at least 10 years’ imprisonment by a US court 
for manufacturing and transporting hundreds of kilograms 
of heroin in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and importing to the 
USA. According to US court documents, the trafficker was 
the grandson of Haji Bashir Noorzai, the former chief of the 
Noorzai tribe.118 Based in Quetta, he was convicted of 
involvement in narcotics production and, according to court 
records, in return for his financial and other support, the 
Taliban allowed him to continue his drug trafficking activi-
ties with impunity. In addition, court documents mentioned 
that he and his co-conspirators benefited from advance 
knowledge of the Taliban’s 2000 opium ban, and used that 
information to stockpile opium and sell it at a tremendous 
profit after the ban caused opium prices to spike.119
Court records indicate that Noorzai would sell the opium 
in Chotu (a large opium market in southern Hilmand) and 
Maiwand (a Kandahar district bordering Eastern Hilmand). 
The same sources indicate that Noorzai owned approxi-
mately 500 acres of opium fields extending from Kandahar 
115 Waliullah Rahmani, “Farah Province: The New Focus of the Taliban Insur-
gency”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 23, De-
cember 10, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews 
per cent5Btt_news per cent5D=4599. 
116 Ibid.
117 All Kandahar lab seizures in 2008 were in Spin Boldak testifying to the 
importance of the district in processing and traﬃcking opiates.
118 www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Noorzai_ 
GovtMemoOppOmnibusMotion.pdf.
119 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/2008/nyc092408.html.
City to Kashkenakhod (Maiwand district). Notably Noorzai 
testified that the opium would be sold to Baluch tribe 
members in Kashkenakhod and Kandahar City for further 
trafficking.120
There is reportedly a “close partnership between Noorzai 
leaders and the Taliban leadership”121 and some high-rank-
ing leaders of the Noorzai are simultaneously Taliban com-
manders.122 There also remain serious allegations of drug 
trafficking leveled against other powerful members of the 
Noorzai tribe.
Ishaqzai
The Ishaqzai are part of the Durrani confederation and 
have strong influence in the Sangin district of Hilmand, 
one of the most important opium cultivating districts and 
home to several large heroin processing facilities. The Ishaq-
zai also live and have influence in Hilmand’s Grishk, 
Nawzad, Lashkar Gah and Garamsir districts. Their strong-
est influence is, however, in the border districts of Reg and 
Dishu in southern Hilmand. These districts are located on 
the border with Pakistan and host major opiate smuggling 
routes. Dishu is one of the most important havens for drug 
smugglers and producers in its southern area, particularly in 
the Baramcha area. The Ishaqzai are numerically the second 
most important tribe in Dishu after Baluchis.
During 2006, fierce clashes over control of the opium trade 
pitted them against the Alikozai tribe.123 One analysis sug-
gests that the Ishaqzai provide the backbone of the Taliban’s 
ethnic support in Hilmand province124 and one powerful 
Taliban commander with links to the drug trade is an 
Ishaqzai.125 
Other Durrani tribes with an inﬂuence  
in Hilmand: 
Alikozai (Alokzai)
This is a land-owning tribe with a presence in Sangin dis-
trict. The tribe maintains strong links to Pakistan. Moreo-
ver, the Alikozai are the biggest tribe in Kandahar, although 
the killing of several of their high-ranking leaders has weak-
ened their tribally-based governance structures. The Aliko-
120 www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Noorzai_ 
IntentUseDefendantStments.pdf.
121 Naval Postgraduate School , Kandahar Province: provincial proﬁle, http://
www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Kandahar.html; see also Peters, Gretchen, 
“Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda”, 
Thomas Dunne Books, 2009, p. 198. 
122 Giustozzi, Antonio, “Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop : The Neo-Taliban 
Insurgency in Afghanistan”, Columbia University Press, London, UK, 2008, 
p.47.
123 According to a 2006 BBC report, during the Taliban rule the Ishaqzai were 
favoured; when the Taleban fell the Alikozai re-emerged and “got their 
revenge by charging high “taxes” on drug smuggling.”; see Alastair Leithead, 
“Unravelling the Helmand impasse” BBC News, 14 July 2006.
124 Conversely, the Ishaqzai were among the Taliban’s ﬁercest opponents in Kan-
dahar in the 1990s; see Afghans in Quetta: Settlements, Livelihoods, Support 
Networks and Cross-Border Linkages AREU, January 2006, p.17.
125 Interview ISAF analyst, November 2008.
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zai maintain some control over trafficking from Hilmand 
into the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is a historical feud 
between them and the Ishaqzai.
Achakzai
The Achakzai have an important presence in Kandahar’s 
Spin Boldak district and in Farah province. They have 
strong links to the Quetta, Qilla Saifullah, Qilla Abdullah 
and Pishin districts of Balochistan (Pakistan) and are 
thought to be involved in smuggling networks. The Achak-
zai are considered one of the traditional leadership tribes of 
the Afghan south (along with the Barakzai and Popalzai). 
There is a history of tribal conflict between the Noorzai and 
Achakzai.
Insurgency, tribalism and  2. 
the drug trade
In many cases, Afghanistan’s export-oriented opiate traf-
ficking routes follow centuries-old trading paths. They run 
along well-established geographical and social contours. 
The strength and flexibility of social structures that support 
cross-border trading was evident in their adaptation to 
become Mujahedin supply lines during the Soviet invasion. 
This is apparent now in their use by drug smuggling net-
works. Contemporary inter-state borders are virtual lines of 
demarcation often ignored by peoples that have roamed 
across them for centuries. In some regions of Afghanistan, 
such as the south-western provinces of Nimroz and Farah, 
smuggling is a way of life for tribesmen spanning the bor-
ders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Afghani-
stan. Smuggling is essentially the modern name for their 
tradition of trading. Many of them have triple nationalities, 
which facilitates their smuggling of licit and illicit goods. 
Trading opportunities create incentives for territorial con-
trol. As discussed in the previous section, maintaining 
control of smuggling routes can increase revenue. Tribal 
solidarity becomes both the means of establishing control 
and the beneficiary of its resulting profit.
Tribal solidarity can only be taken so far, however. Along 
some routes, ethnic links have been noted to carry contra-
band great distances from zones of control, such as Baluchi 
tribesmen from southern Afghanistan with ethnic links in 
Balochistan and further into Eastern Iran (Sistan-Balo-
chistan province). In most situations, however, links to 
non-members are required at the edges of zones of control 
in order to dispose of goods and realize profits. This high-
lights the profit motive and reinforces a reliance on tribal 
links. Trust and social sanctions reduce the risks involved in 
intra-tribal trading, but at the same time the profit from 
external transactions encourages outward links. 
Insurgency and tribalism 
Most members of the Taliban are Pashtun, and Pashtuns 
perceive the Taliban more positively than other ethnic 
groups. There is a perception among some Pashtuns that 
the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan deposed a Pashtun 
government and put in its place a multi-ethnic government 
“controlled” by the Taliban’s traditional enemy, the Tajik-
dominated Northern Alliance.126 The insurgency is partly 
the result of “inter-ethnic and tribal dynamics that have 
been antagonized by power distribution at the national 
level, attempted encroachment on tribal autonomy at the 
local level, and exploitation of these grievances by ideologi-
cally motivated actors at the international level.”127 
These perceptions have been fed and exploited by the Tali-
ban, which “has been able to draw on traditional Pashtun 
loyalties to support the insurgency.”128 Again, Pashtun soli-
darity is important, irrespective of the confederation. 
As Antonio Giustozzi correctly points out, the majority of 
the current leaders of the neo-Taliban movement are major-
ity Durrani (and not Ghilzai, as was the case with the 
original movement).129 Some insurgents from the Noorzai 
tribes may also resent being excluded from the govern-
ment130 just as some Ghilzai may object to being placed 
under the control of the rival Durrani. These have opted for 
anti-government activities, but without ‘religious’ motives 
per se.
However, counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency plan-
ners must recognize that the Taliban have been most effec-
tive in the south of the country not just because of tribal 
chauvinism. They have also been able to reach across tribal 
lines to create a rural support base. Part of the explanation 
for this has been the Taliban’s promotion of clerics rather 
than tribal leaders, encouraging cross-tribal religious affin-
ity instead of inter-tribal rivalries.131 In both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, there has also been a deliberate process of 
removing (usually killing) tribal leaders who attempt to 
steer their tribe away from insurgency.
While the Taliban movement exploits tribal differences and 
resentments to generate antagonism towards the govern-
ment, they simultaneously stress their religious rather than 
ethnic motivations. A good example of this was their alli-
ance with Uzbek extremists (of both Afghan and Central 
Asian origin) of The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,132 
126 K R Singh, “Post-War Afghanistan: Reconstructing a Failed State”, Strategic 
Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004., http://www.idsa.in/publications/strategic-
analysis/2004/oct/K per cent20R per cent20Singh.pdf.
127 Roohullah Rahimi, “Afghanistan: Exploring the Dynamics of Sociopolitical 
Strife and the Persistence of the Insurgency” Pearson peacekeeping centre, 
occasional paper 2, 2008.
128 Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)”, 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 3 (2007).
129 Giustozzi, Antonio, “Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop : The Neo-Taliban 
Insurgency in Afghanistan”, Columbia University Press, London, UK., 2008, 
p.47.
130 Sultan Barakat, “Understanding Afghanistan”, DFID, November 2008. 
131 Thomas J. Barﬁeld, “Weapons of the not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun 
Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace”, 
Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series ”Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: 
Transactions and Identities”, Yale University, February 23, 2007.
132 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has the declared aim of revolu-
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despite the historical animosity between Uzbeks and Pash-
tuns in Afghanistan. The IMU leader, Tahir Yuldash, who 
pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar, addressed the thorny 
ethnic issue in a 2004 communiqué that insisted that the 
Taliban state was not a vehicle for Pashtun power. Although 
as they were the group who sacrificed the most, the IMU 
leader stated, it was “right that they should also 
benefit”.133
Some ethnic Tajiks and Turkmens (both of Central Asian 
and Afghan origin) have also been fighting alongside Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan134 and at least one ethnic 
Tajik is a confirmed Taliban commander in Hirat province. 
The fact that thousands of non-Pashtuns have affiliated 
themselves with Mullah Omar indicates that the Taliban 
movement can in some cases override tribal or ethnic affili-
ation.135 One expert of Afghanistan’s tribal network describes 
tionizing the Central Asia region and institute across it a single Islamic state, 
which would more or less correspond to the boundaries of old Turkestan, 
including China’s Xinjiang province.
133 BBC Today, “Al-Qaida commander speaks”, 15 September 2004.
134 Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda killed in North Waziristan attacks”, The Long War 
Journal, October 11, 2007.
135 Alliances of this sort may only last until the point of victory, after which eth-
nic rivalries may become important again in dividing the spoils. Johnson and 
Mason highlight the willingness of Pashtun tribes to unite behind religiously-
inspired leaders at times of external pressure. Their traditional tendency to 
disaggregate once conﬂict is over is being tested by the relative longevity of 
jihadist-led action against the Soviets, through the Mujahedin period and 
a famous insurgent’s dual use of tribal and religious affilia-
tion to recruit among Afghans during the Soviet invasion:
Ethnic and tribal boundaries and identities are not 
fixed since time immemorial, but are often a matter 
of negotiation. Whether social action is based on 
tribal and ethnic criteria depends on opportunities 
and tactics, and these may change quickly. For 
example, in his public speeches the Pashtun party 
leader and warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar initially 
emphasized pan-Islamism and the Muslim solidar-
ity. Boundaries between Muslim states were to 
become obsolete. Later, during his campaigns for 
recruitment in Pashtun areas, he appealed to the 
ethnic and tribal solidarity of the Pashtuns, who 
must defend their identity and honour against the 
rest of the world.136
The Afghan-Pakistani border3. 
Pakistan has a 2,430-km-long border with Afghanistan, 
punctured by three official crossing points (Torkham in 
Nangarhar, Ghulam Khan in Khost and Spin Boldak in 
now against the coalition, Afghan and Pakistani governments - “No Sign until 
the Burst of Fire”, 2008.
136 Bernt Glatzer, “War and Boundaries in Afghanistan: Signiﬁcance and Relativ-
ity of Local and Social Boundaries”, Weld des Islams 41, 3, 2001, pp 379-399.
Ethnic map of Afghanistan/Pakistan borderMap 3: 
Source: UNODC.
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Kandahar). The topography of this border area includes 
numerous north-south mountain ranges, which create nat-
ural smuggling routes across the border. In addition, there 
are hundreds of natural passes, mountain trails and desert 
roads along the entire border, most of which are unmanned 
and unsupervised. Many of these are used for the smuggling 
of illicit goods and weapons using large trucks, pick-ups 
and pack mules. The potential for high-volume smuggling 
increases as the eastern border changes from mountainous 
to open plains near Balochistan province. Control over 
these trade routes provides a significant revenue stream; for 
example, the World Bank estimated that the Taliban gener-
ated more than US$75 million from taxing Afghanistan-
Pakistan trade in 1997.137
With the Al-Qaeda and Taliban presence across the Durand 
Line138 and a history of cross-border smuggling, this border 
is of utmost interest to drug control efforts. Upwards of 150 
tons of heroin and 80 tons of opium are annually smuggled 
across the border and trafficked west to the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, north to the Chinese market or south to the 
warm water ports of Pakistan where it continues towards 
the Gulf States, Europe and the USA.
Estimates of the number of Pashtuns in Pakistan range 
from 25-30 million,139 not counting Afghan refugee popu-
lations (approximately 3 million),140 of which some 80 per 
cent are ethnic Pashtuns.141 Unofficial estimates of the 
number of Pashtuns in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas range up to four million. Estimates of Pasthun popu-
lations in the North West Frontier Province range from 
approximately 7 million142 to 16 million.143 Other areas of 
high Pashtun concentration are Quetta (Balochistan), with 
approximately 450,000, Lahore (Punjab province) with one 
million144 and Karachi (Sindh province) with an estimated 
three million.145 Pashtuns are a majority in Pakistan’s tribal 
areas and dominate regional trade and transport in the 
137 Zareen Naqvi, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations” World Bank, 1999 in 
John Solomon, “The Funding Methods of FATA’s Terrorists and Insurgents”, 
CTC Sentinel, May 2008, Vol 1, Issue 6.
138 The Durand Line is the term for the 2,640 kilometer (1,610 mile) border. 
The Durand Line was demarcated by the British and signed into a treaty in 
1893 with the Afghan ruler Amir Abdur Rehman Khan.
139 Lisa Curtis et al., “revitalizing US eﬀorts in Afghanistan”, The Heritage 
Foundation, October 15 2007,; see also Barnett R. Rubin et al., “Resolving 
the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate”, United States Institute of Peace, Special 
Report 176, October 2006.
140 The current number of Afghan refugees in Afghanistan is approximately three 
million, down from a peak of ﬁve million.
141 Rodney W. Jones, “Neutralizing Extremism and Insurgency in Afghanistan 
and Its Borderlands”, Institute of regional studies, Seminar paper, Islamabad, 
May 2008.
142 Barnett R. Rubin et al., “Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate”, 
United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 176, October 2006.
143 Rodney W. Jones, op. cit.
144 “Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local Development: A Case 
Study of Pashtun Residing in NWFP and FATA, Pakistan”, info.worldbank.
org/etools/docs/library/153053/Pakistan.pdf.
145 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009.
border areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan.146 With the 
exception of Nuristan, all Afghan provinces bordering Paki-
stan are dominated by Pashtuns (Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktya, 
Khost, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Hilmand and Nimroz). 
The influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan’s tribal areas 
following the Soviet invasion cemented trade relations147 
and reignited tribal linkages.148 Weapons and militants are 
shuttled and drugs and precursor chemicals trafficked across 
the border. The Durand line thus became (and continues to 
be) as one researcher put it: “a tactical resource in warfare, 
a line beyond which one’s enemies cannot follow, and the 
crossing of which offers security for oneself and one’s fami-
lies while offering the chance to find supplies for continu-
ing warfare”.149
The transnational nature of Afghanistan’s insurgency is 
highlighted by the fact that the Taliban’s peak bodies are in 
Pakistan, where there are reportedly four underground 
Taliban shuras (councils). The first is in Quetta150 and 
directs operations in southern Afghanistan (Zabul, Kanda-
har, Hilmand and Nimroz). The second is in Miram-shah 
(North-Waziristan), bordering Afghanistan’s Khost prov-
ince; it is a smaller council responsible for Paktika, Paktya, 
Khost and Logar provinces. The third is based in Peshawar 
and directs activity in eastern Afghanistan (Kunar, Nuris-
tan, Nangarhar and Laghman), with attempts to extend to 
the north of the country and a primary role in operations 
targeting Kabul. A fourth council was reportedly estab-
lished outside the tribal areas, in Karachi, and mostly has a 
political and strategic role.151 
Each council is subdivided into four ‘departments’: 
A military commission, formulating plans for  1. 
‘normal’ insurgent attacks, but also kidnappings and  
suicide bombings. 
Financial agency, coordinating donations and orga-2. 
nizing purchases to support the other departments.
Political commission, taking strategic decisions,  3. 
including negotiations with external actors.
Public information (propaganda, websites etc.).4. 152
146 Thomas H. Johnson et al., “Misunderstanding Pakistan’s Federally Admin-
istered Tribal Area?”, International Security, Volume 33, Number 3, Winter 
2008/09.
147 In similar fashion to the development of links between Central Asian ethnic 
groups and their Afghan counterparts.
148 In some regions, cross-border trade relations between Pashtun tribes were 
negligible prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
149 Bernt Glatzer, Op. cit.
150 It was previously based in Kandahar; see Seth G. Jones, “the state of the 
Afghan insurgency”, RAND, December 2007.
151 The presence of high-ranking Taliban oﬃcials in Sindh province was recently 
conﬁrmed with the arrest of a signiﬁcant TTP commander in Karachi, see 
“Developments in the Jihadi Resurgence in Pakistan”, NEFA foundation, 
January 2008.
152 Interview, head of counter-terrorism department, Ministry of Interior, Kabul, 
November 16 2008.
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Regular meetings are reportedly held between all four but 
most political/strategic decisions regarding Afghanistan are 
reportedly made in Quetta153 (followed by Peshawar in 
order of importance). Jane’s Intelligence reported that the 
Taliban takeover of Musa Qala district in January 2007 
occurred pursuant to directives from the Quetta shura. 
The presence and influence of the Afghan Taliban in FATA 
and Balochistan has been the transformation of the Paki-
stani Taliban from a local sub-division of the Afghan Tali-
ban into a fully separate entity organizationally distinct 
from the Afghan Taliban. Independent of the Afghan Tali-
ban, insurgency activity led by the Pakistani Taliban in 
Pakistan has continued, both through suicide bombings as 
well as the evolution of militant organizations. The latter 
has involved the genesis of new groups as well as the devel-
opment of established groups that increasingly perceive 
themselves as part of a global war. The insurgency, or rather 
insurgencies, in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas rep-
resent a spectrum of groups and aims, from the local frus-
trations of Baluchi separatists to global aspirations embodied 
in the Al-Qaeda ideology. 
New groups have emerged in the tribal areas of Pakistan 
such as Lashkar-I-Islam and Ansar-Ul-Islam. These are 
increasingly influenced by the ideology of the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda, as are older, more established Punjabi groups. 
Other groups include the East Turkestan Islamic Movement 
(ETIM), a Chinese-Uighur group with personnel and logis-
tical links to Pakistan/Central Asia, the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (and several offshoots) and smaller, loosely-
affiliated Chechen groups. Members of such foreign groups 
come from almost every ethnic group in Central Asia 
153 Ibid.
(including Western China) and the Caucasus (including a 
minority of Westerners) but are often numerically domi-
nated by Uzbeks. Whether operating under the Pakistani 
Taliban umbrella or supported by Al-Qaeda, cross-pollina-
tion between the various insurgent groups is increasing and 
operational links are solidifying. 
The tribal areas of Pakistan4. 
The FATA borders Afghanistan to the west, the NWFP and 
Punjab to the east and Balochistan to the south. It consists 
of seven agencies and six frontier regions. The seven agen-
cies are Bajaur, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Khyber, 
North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The six frontier 
regions are Kohat, Peshawar, Bannu, Lakki, Dera Ismail 
Khan and Tank. The latter are transition areas between 
FATA and the adjoining settled districts of the NWFP. 
They are jointly administered by the NWFP and FATA; 
according to the 1998 census, they had a combined popula-
tion of 235,000.154 Some tribal pockets are kept under the 
provincial administration as well. 
The tribal areas in Balochistan and the NWFP are known 
as the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). In 
the NWFP, the PATA include the Malakand, Chitral, Dir, 
Swat, Amb and the tribal areas of Kohistan and Manshehra 
districts. NWFP inhabitants are ruled by the Pakistani gov-
ernment from the provincial capital in Peshawar. In Bal-
ochistan, Zhob and Loralai districts, Dalbandin in Chagai 
district, Maari and Bugti in Sibi district comprise the PATA. 
As noted above, the people of the NWFP and the FATA, as 
154 Some more recent estimates render a combined population of about 275,000; 
see Hassan Abbas “Proﬁles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies”, Jamestown 
Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 4 Issue: 20, October 20, 2006. 
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)Table 3: 
Source: Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,  
http://www.infopak.gov.pk/districtPK.aspx.
Agency  Area (km²)
Population 
(1998  
census)
Density 
(people/
km²)
Bajaur   595,227
Khyber 546,730
Kurram 448,310
Mohmand 334,453
North Waziristan 361,246
Orakzai 225,441
South Waziristan 429,841
Six Frontier  
Regions combined 235,083
FATA 27,220 3,176,331 117
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Tribes and insurgent groups in FATA (Pakistan)Table 4: 
Source: UNAMA, UNODC, UNDSS, Jamestown Foundation, CTC Sentinel, The Long War Journal.
well as the adjacent eastern, south-eastern and southern 
regions of Afghanistan, are overwhelmingly Pashtuns, 
mostly from the Karlanri confederation. Like their cross-
border brethren, the Pashtuns of Pakistan’s tribal areas take 
great pride in their history of repelling invaders. 
The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is widely 
ignored by Pashtuns living on either side. Every day, Pash-
tuns freely cross the border at hundreds of points, on foot, 
pack animal and in vehicles. 
The Soviet invasion had immense ramifications for the 
FATA. For example, the impact of that war on the FATA’s 
economy was a shift from “subsistence agriculture and 
nomadic pastoralism to dependence on the unregulated, 
cross-border trade of goods, including contraband such as 
drugs and arms”.155 This trade has continued more or less 
unabated since the early 1980s as the FATA straddles a 
major drug route out of Afghanistan, into the NWFP and 
further to eastern Pakistan. 
The current instability in the FATA precludes law enforce-
ment efforts and maintains the border regions’ status as de 
facto sanctuaries for heroin and hashish traffickers (and 
perhaps minor heroin and opium producers). Pakistan 
achieved poppy-free status in 1999-2000, but the impact of 
insecurity may have led to some opium cultivation in Paki-
stan, albeit on much smaller scale than Afghanistan. Accord-
ing to the US Department of State’s International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, after 2002 cultivation picked up 
in Pakistan in the areas of highest insecurity and bordering 
Afghanistan: Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Waziris-
155 Barnett R. Rubin et al., “Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate”, 
United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 176, October 2006.
tan (FATA) and Gulistan/Qila Abdullah in Balochistan.156
While the area cultivated in 2005 (3,145 hectares) 
was equivalent to only 3 per cent of the area cultivated 
in Afghanistan, there is a risk that cultivation could 
increase substantially – especially as a result of dis-
placement from Afghanistan – unless there are sus-
tained efforts to dissuade farmers from planting poppy 
and to destroy opium crops before they are harvested. 
The task of eradicating opium cultivation in FATA is 
complicated by counter-terrorism considerations; in 
some instances the need to win “hearts and minds” 
has inhibited action to destroy poppy crops.157
The US Department of State’s 2008 International Narcot-
ics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Narcotics Strategy 
Report documents roughly 1,731 ha of opium cultivated 
land in the area (after eradication), an increase of 200 ha 
over 2006. The potential production in the tribal areas is 
reported to be around 4.25 metric tons of opium. 
1. The Khyber Agency is named after the Khyber Pass 
(Torkham border crossing) and provides the most impor-
tant link between Pakistan and Afghanistan. A majority of 
consumables in eastern Afghanistan are imported through 
this agency and it is the coalition’s biggest supply route. 
Once across the border, most goods flow into Jalalabad, the 
main transit center and distribution point for goods from 
Pakistan. The importance of cross-border trade with Paki-
stan is reflected in the fact that Pakistani rupees are the 
major currency used throughout Nangarhar. The Khyber 
156 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 2003, United 
States Department of State. 
157 UNODC, Strategic Programme Framework for Pakistan 2007 – 2010, July 
2006, p.2.
Border agency/ 
province Main tribes
Main AGE groups  
(non-exhaustive)
Cross-border representation 
and linkages in Afghanistan
Khyber Shinwari, Afridi Lashkar I-Islam, Ansar ul Islam, HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Shinwari
Kurram Turi, Mangal, Bangash, Jaji, Moqbil HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Jaji, Mangal,Moqbil
Bajaur Mamunds, Salarzais,  Uthman Khel
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
(TNSM), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI),  Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al Qaeda, Jaish-
e-Islami, Karwan-e-Niamatullah, HIG
Mamunds, Salarzais
North Waziristan Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz
Al-Qaeda, IMU and Uzbek splinter 
groups (e.g. Islamic Jihad Union), 
Haqqani network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Paki-
stan (TTP)
Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz
South Waziristan Ahmadzai Wazirs,  Mehsuds
Al-Qaeda, IMU, Tehrik-e-Taliban Paki-
stan (TTP) Ahmadzai Wazirs
Mohmand Mohmand, Saﬁs Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),  Al-Qaeda Mohmand, Saﬁs
Orakzai Orakzai, Afridi Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Balochistan province Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch 
Afghan Taliban, Balochi separatist groups, 
Jundullah Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch
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agency is famous for its opium bazaars, which also stock 
weapons and smuggled goods. The most well-known of 
these are in Ali Masjeed and Landi Kotal, the latter only 6 
km from Torkham. Of note, Hekmatyar’s HiK has main-
tained a base of operations in Khyber (since the Soviet 
invasion) but it is unclear if the agency is used by this group 
for operations. 
The Khyber agency borders Afghanistan’s Nangarhar prov-
ince in the districts of Kot, Spin Ghar, Achin, Naizian, Dur 
Baba, Mohmand Dara and southern Lal Pur. Khyber has a 
population of approximately 500,000, predominately Afri-
dis with significant Shinwari minority and smaller pockets 
of Orakzais. 
The Afridis (Ghilzai confederation) are divided into eight 
clans158 and are historically the dominant tribe in Khyber 
in terms of numbers and influence, constituting about 80 
per cent of the population.159 The tribe is generally oriented 
towards Sufism, which puts them at odds with more con-
servative and pro-Taliban groups.160 Among Afghans, Afri-
dis are well known as traders/smugglers.
Shinwaris (Sarbani confederation), the second largest tribe 
of Khyber, are also influential, but most of its members (85 
per cent) inhabit Nangarhar province,161 where they are a 
majority in several border districts (Dih Bala, Spin Ghar, 
Nazyan, Achin and Dur Baba) and parts of Kunar. They are 
known as businesspeople, both licit and illicit, a tradition 
facilitated by their strong links with Pakistani Shinwaris in 
places like Landi Kotal. In Nangarhar’s border areas, they 
appear to exercise control over the transport business, with 
a focus on oil tankers, trucks and buses.162 Across the border 
in Pakistan, Shinwaris own significant logistics companies, 
some with offices in Pakistani ports and Dubai.
Tribes such as the Shinwaris (and Khogiani) in Nangarhar are 
more involved than others in some aspects of the drug trade. 
They are the historical bearers of opium cultivation knowl-
edge and have played a part in spreading this to other parts 
of Afghanistan.163 The Shinwari leadership decision in late 
2006 to plant opium was an important driver of the spike in 
provincial cultivation in 2007. It also resulted in strong resist-
ance to eradication in areas controlled by these tribes.164 
158 Malikdin Khel, Kuki Khel, Qambar Khel, Sepay, Aka Khel, Adam Khel, 
Zakah Khel - S. Iftikhar Hussain Shah, “Some major Pukhtoon tribes along 
the Pak-Afghan border”, University of Peshawar and Hanns Seidel Founda-
tion, Germany, 2000, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_ﬁles/no_4/
review/3r.htm.
159 Asian Development Bank, “Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Tribal Peo-
ples Plan”, June 2007.
160 www.mrt-rrt.gov.au/docs/research/PAK/rr/PAK31546.pdf
161 Naval Postgraduate School, www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pakistan/
Tribes/Shinwari.pdf.
162 Ibid.
163 UNODC, An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy Cultivation 
to New Districts in Afghanistan, Strategic study #1: Preliminary Report June 
1998.
164 UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2007.
Higher up the opiate value chain, members of the Shinwari 
tribes in Nangarhar have held sway over heroin production 
and processing,165 with a concentration of laboratories in 
Shinwari-dominated districts like Achin and Nazyan.166 
Most law enforcement sources believe that the bulk of the 
incoming precursor chemicals and a portion of outgoing 
narcotics in Nangarhar are trafficked by pack mules or 
backpacks through illegal border crossing points in Shin-
wari territory.167 
Strong connections between Shinwaris in Nangarhar and 
Afridis in Khyber are the foundation for drug and precursor 
trafficking through this area. Afridi networks are reportedly 
involved in smuggling everything from timber to car parts 
and narcotics across the Durand Line.168 The tribe is neatly 
spread out along the main roads of Khyber.169 One region 
almost fully under their control is the strategic Tirah valley 
(130 km west of the Khyber Pass),170 a famous drug smug-
gling route171 and cannabis cultivation area.172 There are 
two main Pakistan/Afghanistan crossings along the Pesha-
war-Jalalabad route. The most widely used is the Peshawar-
Torkham-Jalalabad road. The second border crossing is 
Peshawar-Ali masjeed Tirah Bazar- Jalalabad. A detour is 
taken off the Peshawar-Torkham road near Ali Masjeed into 
the difficult terrain of the Tirah valley. This route is mostly 
used for smuggling timber and a variety of goods, including 
opium, from Afghanistan.173
In an example of inter-tribal cooperation, there are reports 
of Shinwari involvement in heroin production in Nangar-
har’s Spin Ghar district, the product of which is handed 
over to Pakistani Afridis.174 For some Afridi traffickers, 
networks expand far beyond Khyber of even Pakistan. One 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) operation in 2006 
uncovered a Khyber-based Afridi network shipping hun-
dreds of kilograms of heroin to Canada and Africa.175 An 
165 Interview, July 12 in Kabul.
166 Interview CNPA Nangarhar, October 2008.
167 The ﬂexibility of tribal connections is also suggested by their use for the trade 
in illegal timber – and most forests in Nangarhar are in Shinwari areas.
168 Naval Postgraduate School, http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Paki-
stan/Tribes/Afridi.pdf; see also Jonathan Goodhand, http://www.gtz.de/de/
dokumente/en-opium-economy-2005-afg.pdf.
169 Jonathan Goodhand, http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-opium-economy-
2005-afg.pdf.
170 The Tirah valley lies between the Khyber Pass and the Khanki Valley. It is 
inhabited by the Afridi and Orakzai tribes but controlled by the former. The 
Orakzai have always refused the Tirah valley be linked to the rest of the coun-
try by a road suitable for motor vehicles, In the 1990s, a government attempt 
to build a road passing through Shin Qamar, 50 km west of the North-West 
Frontier Province capital of Peshawar, led to skirmishes between government 
militias and tribesmen.
171 Sarah Lister et al., “Understanding markets in Afghanistan: A case study of 
the market in construction materials”, AREU, 2004. 
172 Muhammad Hamayun et al., “Folk Methodology of Charas (Hashish) 
Production and Its Marketing at Afridi Tirah, Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas(FATA), Pakistan”. 
173 Sarah Lister et al., “Understanding markets in Afghanistan: A case study of 
the market in construction materials”, AREU, 2004. 
174 Interview CNPA Nangarhar, October 2008. 
175 http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md. 
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infamous Afridi tribe member is Haji Ayub Afridi, nick-
named the “Lord of Khyber Pass”. He was previously sen-
tenced by both the USA and Pakistan on charges of 
international drug trafficking. 
Khyber straddles a major precursor route and seizure data 
suggest that most precursor trafficking here occurs along 
the eastern belt of Paktya and Nangarhar, which border the 
Khyber and Kurram Agencies of the FATA. From Karachi 
or Islamabad, precursor routes dedicated to east and north-
eastern Afghanistan converge on Peshawar.176 From there, 
they travel to Nangarhar – Torkham is 55 km from Pesha-
war – or Paktya (bordering the Kurram Agency). For those 
precursors destined for labs in Achin and Nazyan, the 
majority of their journey is through Afridi territory. There 
is also information suggesting that Afridi elements have 
moved some laboratory operations to Badakshan and 
expanded relations in southern Afghanistan.177 
In contrast to the general overlap of crime and insurgency, 
the Shinwaris and Afridis have formed an alliance against 
insurgent elements. The two tribes have also become increas-
ingly antagonistic to groups such as Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), a 
local militia trying to implement its own interpretation of 
religious law but apparently not closely allied to the Paki-
176 It is 1,800 km from Karachi to Peshawar and over 1,400 km of the road have 
been rehabilitated.
177 Interview CNPA Nangarhar, October 2008. 
stani Taliban.178 The LI has reportedly been involved in the 
destruction of Sufi shrines179 and claims to fight the drug 
traffickers,180 two tendencies that may have provoked a 
backlash from tribe members (drug-involved or otherwise). 
It is worth remembering that the aforementioned anti-in-
surgency alliance depends on their tribal unity to have any 
effectiveness. While the Shinwaris seem to act more or less 
homogeneously in Nangarhar, the Lashkar-e-Islam is in fact 
dominated by Afridis and led by an Afridi.181 There are also 
Afridis reportedly fighting in Taliban ranks (such as from 
the Shalobar sub-tribe). In fact, the Afridi sub tribes who 
are confirmed as anti-Taliban are the Mullagori, Zakha and 
Adam Afridis; other sub-tribes may not have followed suit. 
This is a prime example of the limits of tribal affiliation, 
especially in the face of supra-tribal religious extremism. 
2. Kurram Agency borders Afghanistan’s Nangarhar prov-
ince in the north-west and Khost and Paktya provinces in 
the south-west. Comparatively more accessible than other 
agencies, it has a population of about 500,000 and is home 
to two tribes – the Turi (Shia Pasthun from the Karlanri 
confederation) and the Mangal/Bangash (both Sunni and 
Pashtun), the latter also a part of the Karlanri confedera-
tion. Turis account for approximately 40 per cent of Kurram 
inhabitants182 and are mostly concentrated in Parachinar 
(upper Kurram), the area bordering Afghanistan. There are 
significant minorities of Mangals, Moqbils and Jajis also 
residing in upper Kurram bordering Paktya province. The 
latter, the Jajis, are a Khogiani subtribe of the Karlanri con-
federation, with ethnic links into Nangarhar.
The agency has been the scene of fierce sectarian clashes 
between the two sects (Shia Turi and Sunni Bangash), par-
ticularly in the area of Parachinar, resulting in hundreds of 
casualties. The conflict is exacerbated by the role of the 
Sunni Taliban, which has historically been anti-Shia and are 
reportedly backing the Bangash tribe.183 This agency has 
often been considered to be supportive of the Northern 
Alliance, partly because the Turi tribe (Turkic origin) is 
thought to be oriented against the Taliban due to these 
sectarian differences. However, sectarian differences do not 
seem to prevent good relations between the Turi and the 
Sunni Jajis in Paktya.184
A well-known drugs- and weapons-smuggling route runs 
between Kurram and Paktya, which was also heavily used 
during the Soviet invasion. The route travels from Tere 
Mangle (Kurram) to Kotki, a small town in Paktya province, 
178“Khyber’s Shinwaris, Afridis feel ‘humiliated’ by LI” Daily Times, December 
18 2008. 
179 Ibid.
180 “Interview with Mangal Bagh of Lashkar E- Islami” NEFA, May 2008.
181 Lashkar e Islam’s leader is Mangal Bagh Afridi. In 2008, LI had control of an 
abandoned government outpost near the Khyber Pass and has been known to 
set up checkpoints on the main Torkham-Peshawar road.
182 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA – A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009, p.14.
183 The Nation, August 24.
184 Interview, Paktya traders Kabul, November 2008. 
Durbaba crossing (Nangarhar – Afghanistan/FATA – 
Pakistan)
Source: Nangarhar Valley Foundation
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about 15 kilometres away from the border. In Paktya’s border 
districts, the population is mostly from the Jaji (Karlanri) 
and Moqbil tribes (Karlanri). Strong cross-border links exist 
between the Jaji and Turi and the Moqbil and Mangal/
Bangesh. The Moqbil are considered a key cross-border tribe 
because of their influence over the insurgency.185
Kurram also borders three of Nangarhar’s districts (Sherzad, 
Khogiani and Pachir Wa Agam) that are almost entirely 
inhabited by the Khogiani tribe (Pashtun) and which host 
a significant number of heroin processing labs. These Kho-
giani tribesmen have cultivated opium poppy for centu-
ries.186 The Khogyani district of Pachir Wa Agam is also the 
only Nangarhar district where coalition forces continued to 
meet stiff resistance following the 2001 intervention and 
the ousting of the Taliban. It is also the site of Tora Bora, 
the cave complex where Al-Qaeda fighters had entrenched 
themselves.187 
However, the limited data available does not indicate Kho-
giani involvement in extensive cross-border smuggling, nor 
do they appear to have particularly strong links in the 
FATA. On the other side of the border, insurgents – report-
edly able to exert a form of control over cross-border trade 
by maintaining a presence along these routes - are also able 
to make use of these to smuggle militants and weapons. A 
good example is the Sherzad and Hisarak districts, which 
are historically connected to Kabul by the old silk route 
(and doubled as a weapons route during the Soviet inva-
sion). Insurgents make use of this route to smuggle mili-
tants into Nangarhar and further to adjacent provinces 
including Kabul.188
3. Bajaur Agency is the smallest of the seven and is largely 
inaccessible due to its mountainous terrain. The population 
of Bajaur is about 600,000 people. Some of its prominent 
tribes are the Uthman Khel and the Mamund (Tarkani 
tribe),189 although the Salarzai tribe (Tarkani) appear to be 
the majority.190 Both the Mamunds and Salarzai have close 
kin across the border in Kunar province. The Salarzai, 
Mamund and Uthman Khel tribes have all reportedly 
founded anti-Taliban militias.
Bajaur borders the Afghan province of Kunar in four dis-
tricts (southern Sirkanay, Marawara, Shaygal Wa Shitan 
and Northern Dangam). The tribal composition in Kunar’s 
Marawara district is almost entirely Mohmand, while in 
Sirkanay district it is split roughly evenly between five tribes 
185 Major Darin J. Blatt et al., “Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan”, Special 
Warfare, January-February 2009, Volume 22, Issue 1.
186 Sophia F.D. Woodcock, “Socio- Economic and Psychological Assessment of 
Fluctuations and Variations of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Key Provinces in 
Afghanistan: Balkh, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Central Provinces”, UNODC 
Kabul ﬁeld oﬃce, December 2006. 
187 http://www.aims.org.af/afg/dist_proﬁles/unhcr_district_proﬁles/eastern/nan-
garhar/pachir_wa_agam.pdf.
188 Data provided by UNODC Nangarhar, May 2008.
189 Matt Dupee, “Afghan Taliban leaders nabbed in Pakistan”, The long war 
journal, February 12, 2008.
190 http://www.pbase.com/noorkhan/pakistan.
(Safee, Salarzai, Shinwar, Mohmand, Alkozai). The district 
of Shaygal Wa Shitan has a majority of Shinwaris (70 per 
cent), followed by an approximately equal number of 
Mamund and Gujar, with smaller Salarzai and Mashwani 
presences. Almost half the population of Dangam is Sala-
rzai; the remainder is split equally between the Mashwani 
and the Mamund tribes. 
The crossing point through the Nawa Pass is an unpaved 
road connecting the Sirkanay district to the Bajaur Agency. 
It is Kunar’s main trade link with Pakistan. Although 
Kunar’s forests are severely depleted and a ban on logging is 
in place, there continues to be significant timber smuggling 
into Pakistan. Kunar is also increasingly used as an exit 
point for opiates, with an apparent shift away from using 
Shinwari-dominated districts in response to law enforce-
ment efforts in Nangarhar.191 Outgoing opium is mostly 
trafficked through the Nawa Pass using pack mules or con-
cealed in timber shipments, with reliable reports that some 
processing occurs in Bajaur Agency.192
4. Orakzai Agency has a population of approximately 
240,000 and is primarily inhabited by the Orakzai tribe 
(Pashtun from the Karlanri confederation). The other 
important tribe in this area is the Daulatzai.193 Similar to 
Kurram, Shiites and Sunnis live side by side in Orakzai and 
are often in conflict. Regular sectarian clashes have dimin-
ished the effectiveness and influence of the Orakzai tribe 
and extremist organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 
have been based there for a number of years.194 This is the 
only agency that does not border Afghanistan. Despite 
having a comparatively high literacy rate, the agency was 
the first to ban NGOs from operating in the area, declaring 
them anti-Islamic. The possession of televisions has also 
been declared a crime here as result of influence from the 
local Taliban.195 
Darra Adam Khel is a town in Orakzai, located between 
Peshawar and Kohat, very close to the FATA. The city is a 
strategic location as it straddles the Indus highway. It is 
inhabited by Pashtuns of the Afridi clan, the Adam Khel. It 
is a historical gun manufacturing area196 and more recently 
a major drug market. Adam Khel has been the scene of 
numerous clashes between insurgents and Pakistani forces. 
In one operation in October 2008, Pakistani security forces 
reportedly arrested 168 militants,197 including dozens of 
191 Interview with UNODC surveyor, Kabul, July 27 2008.
192 Interview CNPA Nangarhar, October 2008; Interview UNODC oﬃcial in 
Nangarhar, October 2008. 
193 The Dalautzai also reside in Balkh and Kabul province; see http://www.
encyclo.co.uk/deinfe/Daulatzai.
194 “Developments in the Jihadi Resurgence in Pakistan”, NEFA foundation, 
January 2008.
195 Jamestown Foundation, “Proﬁles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies”, Terror-
ism Monitor,Volume: 4 Issue: 20October 20, 2006
196 Francis Fukuyama, “The future of the Soviet role in Afghanistan: a trip 
report”, Rand Corporation, September 1980, www.rc.rand.org/pubs/
notes/2007/N1579.pdf.
197 “Detained Uzbekistani nationals confess to planning suicide attacks at behest 
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Uzbeks who had reportedly crossed into Pakistan via the 
Khyber Pass.198 In July 2008, a jirga (grand meeting) of 17 
tribes in the Orakzai Agency promised full support to the 
government should the Taliban attempts to use their terri-
tory for attacks on government security forces.199
5. North Waziristan Agency is the second-largest agency 
in terms of area. It borders Afghanistan’s Khost province 
and is a major exit point for narcotics to Pakistan (mainly 
hashish but also some opiates). The Ghulam Khan official 
checkpoint is located near Khost city and is linked by road 
to Miram-Shah (agency center), continuing to Pakistan’s 
Tochi valley (NWFP) and further to Rawalpindi (Punjab 
province). Some 300-500 vehicles a day are reported to pass 
through the checkpoint, including an undetermined 
amount of trucks.200 As such, North Waziristan straddles a 
major transportation corridor between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban or Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) in Miram-Shah reportedly “introduced a 
formal schedule for taxes and criminal offenses into the 
area. Truckers (…), are sold six-month or yearlong passes to 
travel safely through the territory”.201 Miram Shah (and 
North Waziristan in general) are major hubs for cross-bor-
der arms trafficking, perhaps more important than Baram-
cha (southern Hilmand) in terms of weapons trafficking. 
The agency also borders Paktika province in the Gayan and 
Bermel districts.
North Waziristan agency is home to approximately 375,000 
people, populated primarily by Utmanzai Wazirs (Karlanri 
confederation) and a minority of Daurs (in the highlands) 
and Gurbuz. The tribes maintain a monopoly on the trans-
port business in the region but some elements are more 
notorious for engaging in kidnapping for ransom. The 
Wazir tribe has strong representation in Paktika’s border 
district of Barmal, while the Gurbuz have strong links with 
the Gurbuz district of Khost in Afghanistan. North Waziris-
tan is also the site of the Taliban shura in the town of 
Miram Shah. It is the Taliban council in charge of opera-
tions in Paktika, Paktya, Khost and Logar provinces.
In 2007, the former security chief for Pakistan’s tribal 
regions, estimated that 
about 2,000 foreign militants - mostly hardened 
Uzbek202, Chechen and Tajik fighters, along with a 
sprinkling of Arab financiers and organizers - shelter 
in North Waziristan, particularly in four villages 
of intelligence of neighbourly country”, BBC monitoring, October 21 2008
198 It should be noted here that according to Pakistan security sources, the 
Uzbeks in question were not citizens of Uzbekistan but rather inhabitants of 
Balkh and Faryab; 
199 Federico Carbonari, “Pakistan: the security situation and its impact on 
Afghanistan”, ARGO, September 2008, http://www.argoriente.it/_modules/
download/download/pakistan/pakistan-ots-security-afgh-eng.pdf
200 UNAMA, Border Crossing Assessment, 2006.
201 http://www.world-check.com/media/d/content_experttalk_reference/Expert-
Talk_Sep08.pdf.
202 “Pakistan detains two Uzbek citizens near Afghan border – agency”, Pajhwok 
Afghan News, 16 February 2006
south of the town of Mir Ali, and in the territory west 
of Datta Khel.203 Others stay in South Waziristan.
The village of Dande Darpa Khel in Miram-Shah is reported 
to be the main base of the Haqqani network. The network 
includes Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens, Turks and Middle 
Easterners within its ranks,204 but its leadership is domi-
nated by the Zadran205 (Karlanri confederation), a Pashtun 
tribe which resides in Paktya’s Zadran, Shwak and Zurmat 
districts as well as Ghazni province.206 The Zadran are a 
majority in Khost’s border district of Spera207 and in the 
Paktika border district of Gayan, where widespread support 
for the insurgency is observed. The network also maintains 
a strong presence in Paktya’s Zadran district, which is 
Haqqani’s home district.208 As previously stated, it appears 
that the Haqqani network is involved in and “deeply 
dependent on smuggling heroin”.209
6. South Waziristan Agency is the largest agency by land 
area, home to around 425,000 people split about evenly 
between the Mehsud and Ahmadzai Wazir tribes, both 
belonging to the Karlanri confederation. The tribes are 
proud of a reputation as warriors and are known for fre-
quent blood feuds. Both tribes also played decisive roles in 
Afghan armed rebellions as far back as the early twentieth 
century. The overall political leadership of South Waziristan 
is dominated by conservative mullahs.
The Mehsud tribe have one of the highest literacy rates in 
the FATA and have produced many senior civil and military 
officers. They are, as one author put it “well-placed in the 
power hierarchy of the state”.210 
Previously the majority tribe in the agency, the Mehsuds are 
now at the forefront of the insurgency and one of their own 
is leading the Pakistan Taliban. The involvement of the 
Mehsud in the insurgency appears to be a recent phenom-
enon, dating back to 2005.211 The Ahmadzai Wazir are 
divided into nine sub-tribes, with the Zali Khel as the most 
important.212 Following the 2001 invasion, Al-Qaeda and 
203 According to some sources, the Datta khel area is a major training ground for 
suicide bombers; see Presentation “Transnational Threats and International 
Coordination: Afghanistan in 2008”, Ambassador Said T. Jawad, George 
Washington University, February 20, 2008.
204 Bill Roggio, “Senior leader of Haqqani network killed in Afghanistan”, The 
long war journal, November 1 2007. 
205 The Zadran are reported to be the largest tribe in southeastern Afghanistan. 
206 Naval Postgraduate School, “Paktya Province overview”, www.nps.edu/
Programs/CCS/PaktyaPaktya.html.
207 Naval Postgraduate School, “Khost Executive Summary,” Program for Culture 
and Conﬂict Studies, www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive per cent20-
Summaries/Khost per cent20Executive per cent20Summary.pdf.
208 Zadran is the home district of the leader of the Haqqani network Sarajudin 
Haqqani, see Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, January 2009.
209 Peters, Gretchen, “Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban 
and al Qaeda”, Thomas Dunne Books, 2009, p. 37.
210 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009.
211 Ibid. 
212 Rizwan Zeb, “The Wana operation: Pakistan confronts islamic militants in 
Waziristan”, Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, March 24 2004. 
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other foreign elements found refuge in South Waziristan, 
where they developed strong links with the Zali Khel.213 
The late Nek Mohammad, a popular militant leader in the 
region, belonged to this sub-tribe and led the insurgency 
during 2003-2004.214 The Zali Khel sub-tribe maintains a 
degree of dominance over Wana, the administrative and 
financial capital of the district. The Ahmadzai Wazir also 
dominates the western parts of South Waziristan, control-
ling the economically lucrative border trade and smuggling 
routes with Afghanistan. 
The Wazir tribe (but not the Mehsud) also spill over into 
Afghanistan, specifically into the Barmal district of Paktika, 
a remote province where the reach of the Afghan govern-
ment is very limited, particularly in the border districts. 
Proximity to South Waziristan has had extensive ramifica-
tions for the security in Paktika. The United Nations 
Department of Safety and Security assesses that most dis-
tricts in the province are at the highest risk levels and the 
security situation further deteriorated in 2008.215 
The town of Wana in South Waziristan is also one of the 
main drug hubs in the FATA.216 Notably, the transregional 
and inter-tribal Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) appears to have 
integrated criminal groups into its ranks217 and there are 
reports that the TTP is partly funded from involvement in 
the drug trade.218 In fact, a similar strategy as that seen in 
Afghanistan is being followed in North Waziristan: the 
creation of alternative government structures complete with 
tax or “donation” schedules for local businesses.219
7. Mohmand Agency takes its name from the Mohmand 
tribe (Durrani confederation) that resides there and num-
bers about 350,000.220 The Mohmand221 are considered to 
have a relatively unified tribal structure in both Pakistan 
and Afghanistan (similar to the Shinwaris). When conflicts 
cannot be resolved, Mohmand elders from across the border 
are asked for help. The Mohmands are one of the three big-
gest tribes222 by population, but in proportion to this they 
213 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009.
214 Nek Mohammed belonged to the important Yargulkhel clan of the Zalikhel 
sub-tribe (a traditional leading sub-tribe of the Waziris).
215 UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), Afghanistan Security 
Report, July 2008.
216 Interview, ABP Nangarhar, October 2008. 
217 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009, p.18.
218 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ttp.htm.
219 Robert C. Martinage, “The global war on terrorism: An assessment”, Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, CSBA, 2008, http://www.csbaon-
line.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20080223.The_Global_War_on_/
R.20080223.The_Global_War_on_.pdf.
220 Jamestown Foundation, “Proﬁles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies”, Terror-
ism Monitor ,Volume: 4 Issue 20, October 20, 2006. 
221 The Mohmands are sub-divided into the Khawezai, Baezai, Halimzai, Tarak-
zai, Aka Khel, Burhan Khel, Dawezai, and Utmanzai; see S. Iftikhar Hussain 
Shah, “some major Pukhtoon tribes along the pak-afghan border”, Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 2000.
222 There are also pockets of Kodakhels Khugakhels, Musakhels, Isakhels spread 
out throughout Mohmand; see Brig Mahmood Shah,” Tribal Areas of 
hold little power. The tribe has a proud history as guerrilla 
fighters and have fought most of their wars under the lead-
ership of their mullahs.
The Mohmand agency is connected to Kunar’s Khas Kunar 
and Marawa districts, which are majority Mohmand dis-
tricts. The tribe also has representation in other border 
districts of Kunar (Sirkanay). The agency borders Nan-
garhar’s districts of Lal Pur and Goshta, where Mohmands 
make up the overwhelming majority of the population. 
These Afghan districts straddle major smuggling routes/
mountain passes into the Mohmand agency and the Moh-
mand are heavily involved in Nangarhar’s transport busi-
ness. One of the biggest smuggling routes runs through 
Goshta, which is close to 100 per cent Mohmand and gives 
them almost full control over trade there. From Mohmand, 
opiates or hashish are smuggled to the Punjab region. These 
same routes are used to shuttle militants from Mohmand 
agency into Nangarhar/Kunar. Al-Qaeda number two 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri is reportedly married to a woman from 
the Mohmand tribe. Both TTP and Al-Qaeda have a pres-
ence in Mohmand and Taliban courts have been established 
in the agency.223
A minority of Safis (Durrani confederation) also inhabit the 
agency,224 including a high-level TTP leader.225 The Safi 
tribe also span both sides of the border and reportedly con-
trol a number of crossings.226 
North Western Frontier Province 5. 
(NWFP)
According to the 1998 census, Pashtuns made up 74 per 
cent of the NWFP’s 17.7 million population. Compared to 
the FATA, Pashtuns living in the NWFP tend to be more 
educated and urbanized, and leftist political parties like the 
Awami National Party (ANP) have had some electoral suc-
cess there. However, insurgents in the NWFP have targeted 
law enforcement personnel and threatened judges in 
attempts to assert their influence over the area. As in the 
FATA, effective drug control is thus increasingly precluded 
by the volatile security situation in the NWFP’s Provincially 
Administered Tribal Areas, which include Chitral, Dir, 
Swat, Amb and the tribal areas in Kohistan and Manshehra 
districts. 
Pakistani Customs acknowledges this on its website: “In 
recent times, the turbulent situation in southern North Western 
Frontier Province (…) due to creeping talibanization from 
Pakistan and Afghanistan: Interconnectivity and Spillover Eﬀects”, Institute of 
regional studies, Seminar paper, Islamabad, May 2008.
223 Ziad Haider, “Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Tribal Belt: A Human Rights and 
Security Imperative”, Discussion paper #09-0, Belfer Center Student Paper 
Series, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2009.
224 Shuja Nawaz, op. cit.
225 “Developments in the Jihadi Resurgence in Pakistan”, NEFA foundation, 
January 2008, http://www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefapakanaly-
sis0308.pdf.
226 Ibid.
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adjoining tribal areas has literally halted Customs functioning 
in those areas.”227 Local border controls by the Frontier 
Corps face similar challenges as most border posts are, in 
the words of the analyst Shuja Nawaz: 
isolated and poorly manned and cannot be defended 
against concentrated attacks by militants… [Fron-
tier Corps] soldiers find it wiser sometimes to look 
the other way when well-armed Taliban bands cross 
the border near them.228 
In other words, even where there are manned border posts, 
the cross-border tide of drugs, militants and weapons pro-
ceeds virtually unabated. 
Balochistan6. 
Balochistan is a mountainous region covering an area of 
347,200 square km. It has a population of 7,215,700 (2002 
estimate). There are 26 districts in Balochistan and the 
capital is the city of Quetta (Quetta district). Much of 
Balochistan is dry and rocky plateau with a rainfall of less 
than 13 cm a year. Agriculture is an important sector of the 
local economy, as is mining and the informal sector (smug-
gling). It is bordered in the east by the Pakistani provinces 
of Sindh, Punjab and a part of North West Frontier Prov-
ince. The province has a coastline of 760 km, a 1,160 km 
border with Afghanistan and 835 km with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.229 Balochistan borders Afghanistan’s 
Nimroz (223 km), Hilmand (163 km), Kandahar and 
Zabul provinces, as well as the southern part of Paktika. It 
also borders Afghanistan’s largest drug hub, the Baramcha 
bazaar in the southern Dishu district. 
The Baluch, Pashtun, and Brahui230 are the three main 
tribal groups in Balochistan. The population is 45 per cent 
Baluch, 38 per cent Pashtun and 17 per cent others.231 
Unlike the eastern FATA, south Balochistan is not Pashtun-
dominated, which has an impact on smuggling networks. 
Pashtun-dominated districts in Balochistan are in the south, 
and are generally border districts, including Zhob, Qilla 
Saifullah, Pishin and Qilla Abdullah.232 
The Brahui population is estimated at 100,000 and is 
mostly concentrated south of the provincial capital of 
Quetta, in Balochistan’s Kalat district. It also has strong 
representation in Afghanistan (mostly southern Kandahar 
in the border district of Shorabak), with over 250,000 indi-
227 http://www.cbr.gov.pk/newcu/Collectorates/Pesh/Peshawar-Collectorate.asp
228 Shuja Nawaz, op. cit.
229 Chronological introduction to Balochistan, prr.hec.gov.pk/Chapters/670-1.pdf.
230 Although a distinct ethnic group, in many regions of Afghanistan and 
Balochistan the Brahui are virtually indistinguishable from the Baloch; see 
Naval Postgraduate School, Kandahar Provincial Proﬁle, http://www.nps.edu/
Programs/CCS/Kandahar.html.
231 Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan, November 2005, 
Report 7. http://www.senate.gov.pk/reports/mushahid/7.pdf.
232 Rodney W. Jones, “Neutralizing Extremism and Insurgency in Afghanistan 
and Its Borderlands”, Institute of regional studies, Seminar paper, Islamabad, 
May 2008, p. 96, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_14831-544-1-30.pdf.
viduals.233 One important Brahui sub-tribe are the Moham-
mad Hasni stretching across the Hilmand valley to Nushki 
(Chagai district) in Balochistan.234 Opinions differ as to 
whether Brahuis are ethnic Baluch or a separate group.235 
According to UNODC sources, those in control of the 
Baramcha drug hub (Hilmand-Dishu district) in 2006 were 
“Brahui Baluch”.236
The main Pashtun tribes living along the border, apart from 
the Baluch tribes in the extreme south, are Mohammad 
khels, Noorzais, Achakzais, Kakars, and a mixture of Mando 
khels, Kharotis, Nasirs, and Suleyman khels.237 Both the 
Noorzai and Achakzai enjoy strong representation in south-
ern Afghanistan. The movement of refugees from Afghani-
stan into Balochistan further reinforces cross-border linkages 
between Pashtuns and many Afghan Pashtuns have Paki-
stani ID cards.
Cross-border trade relations are strong and most Afghan 
importers and traders have their offices and establishments 
in Quetta and other townships close to the Afghan border. 
There are two main cross-border trade routes passing 
through Balochistan. One is via Chaman to Afghanistan 
and the other is via Taftan/Zahedan into the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran. The two routes intersect at Quetta (Balochistan 
capital) located in the centre of the province. Quetta is 
linked by rail and road with Karachi in the south, Chaman 
(Pak-Afghan Border) in the north, Taftan/Zahedan (Islamic 
Republic of Iran) in the west and with the main rail road 
network of the country in the east. The Pakistan Railway 
extends from Quetta to Zahedan (831 km) about 100 km 
inside Iran.238 
There are two roads linking Karachi and Quetta. One is 
direct via Kalat district (672 km), extending up to Chaman 
on the Pakistani-Afghan Border (129 km). The other is via 
(Rohri/Sukkur) on the main trunk route that runs across 
the country from Karachi to Peshawar (859 km). The rail 
link follows the main trunk road. Afghan transit trade is 
carried through Chaman (and Torkham in the north), 
depending upon the destination in Afghanistan, although 
Chaman provides the shortest distance from Karachi to 
anywhere in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan’s southern drug trafficking route has numerous 
exit points from Zabul, Kandahar, Hilmand and Nimroz 
into Balochistan. Drugs are trafficked from this region 
through Balochistan towards Karachi, the Makran coast 
233 Naval Postgraduate School, Kandahar Provincial Overview, http://www.nps.
edu/Programs/CCS/Kandahar.html.
234 Mariam Khan, “Border Tribal Belt: Partnership, Prosperity and Security”, 
December 2008.
235 “Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development”, http://www.balochistan-
info.com/200604/BalochNationalismitsOriginandDevelopment.pdf.
236 UNODC Mission to Nimroz province, 2006. 
237 Brig. Mahmood Shah,” Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan: Intercon-
nectivity and Spillover Eﬀects”, Institute of regional studies, Seminar paper, 
Islamabad, May 2008.
238 Interview, Abdul Majeed, Transport economist Balochistan, December 2008. 
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and western Iran by road. There is one official border cross-
ing point at Spin Boldak (Kandahar), which links with the 
Pakistani town of Chaman. However, dozens of ‘semi-offi-
cial’ and unofficial crossing points are also used. The Spin 
Boldak crossing averages 300 trucks239 and 30,000 people 
crossing per day. The area called Registan (including the 
southern border districts of Dishu and Reg in Hilmand, 
Reg in Kandahar and southern Nimroz) is nearly all desert 
and essentially devoid of law enforcement or international 
presence. It is replete with insurgents and smugglers, both 
of whom use the numerous illegal crossing points to move 
back and forth across the border. 
Baluch tribe
The Baluch are a Sunni Muslim people who live in eastern 
Iran, southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan. They are 
a distinct ethnic group with their own language and strong 
tribal traditions which tend to prevail over religious iden-
tity. The tribal system within the Baluch is quite strong and 
there are few faultlines among the various sub-tribes of the 
Baluch. Compared to most Pashtun tribes, the Baluch 
tribes are hierarchical, including the appointment of chiefs 
(sardars), who tend to possess more power than leaders of 
Pashtun tribes. There are numerous Baluch tribes, each 
with its own clan subdivisions. Two Baluch sub-tribes of 
239 Asian Development Bank, Brief description of border posts and ICD’s, 2006.
particular importance in terms of numbers and cross-border 
influence are the Rakhshanis who have representation in 
Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Sanjrani Baluch 
who are present in Dalbandin up to Robat-I-Jali and into 
Nimroz province.240
Estimates of the number of Baluch in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran range from 1–4 million, nearly all of whom are 
Sunni Muslims (in contrast to other Iranians, who are over-
whelmingly Shia).241 These are concentrated in the province 
of Sistan-Balochistan and Zabol, the latter mostly in border 
areas.242 In Pakistan, the total Baluch population is approx-
imately 6 million, mostly concentrated in Balochistan.243 In 
neighbouring Afghanistan, the Baluch account for 2 per 
cent of the population, or about 0.7 million people.244
There are pockets of Baluch settlements in the Afghan 
provinces of Farah, Hirat, Badghis, Faryab and Jawzjan. 
Most Afghan Baluch, however, live in the border areas of 
240 Mariam Khan, “Border Tribal Belt: Partnership, Prosperity and Security”, 
December 2008.
241 “Balochi Nationalists Intensify Violent Rebellion in Iran”, Jamestown Founda-
tion, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 3, February 9, 2009 .
242 John R. Bradley, “Iran’s ethnic tinderbox”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 
2006-07.
243 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Pakistan,” The World Factbook, 
April 9, 2009.
244  Institute for the study of war, “Pakistan and Afghanistan”, http://www.
understandingwar.org/print/647,  April 15 2009.
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2. The opiate economy: B. Facilitating cross-border trafficking: Tribal links, insecurity and corruption
Nimroz, Hilmand and Kandahar. In Afghanistan’s Nimroz 
province, the Baluch are the majority ethnic group. Accord-
ing to USAID, less than a quarter of Nimroz’s trade with 
Iran is legal and more than 70 per cent of the local popula-
tion participates in smuggling activities.245 Baluchis in 
Nimroz are very closely oriented to Zabol and the Iranian 
province of Sistani-Balochistan and, to a lesser degree, Paki-
stan’s Balochistan province. 
The border district of Chahar Burjah in Nimroz is over-
whelmingly Baluch and many reportedly own property in 
Iran’s adjacent Zabol province. In 2006, UNODC surveyed 
Shirabad,246 a small town in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
near the Sistan-Balochistan provincial capital of Zahedan 
and close to Nimroz province. 40-60 per cent of residents 
earned their living either by smuggling goods between Iran 
and Pakistan or by providing logistical support to local drug 
traffickers.247 In Hilmand, the drug hub of Baramcha was 
reportedly founded by an ethnic Brahui/Baluch, the drug 
kingpin Haji Juma Khan, who was recently convicted by a 
US court. 
Narcotics cross from southern Hilmand (for example, 
Baramcha bazaar), southern Nimroz (Robat-I-Jali bazaar) 
or Kandahar into Balochistan before heading west towards 
the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan for onward 
transport towards Turkey and western markets. Drug 
convoys in Balochistan are mostly (but not exclusively) 
manned by Baluch tribesmen. The convoys are usually 
comprised of 2-3 vehicles, although larger convoys are not 
uncommon). Convoys often possess heavy weaponry, 
including reports of surface-to-air missiles.248 Motorcyclists 
act as scouts for these convoys and satellite phones are used 
for early warnings and to arrange passage. Sand dunes and 
desolate terrain give traffickers a good chance of moving 
undetected and convoys transit from one staging area to 
another at night. When these mostly nocturnal smuggling 
operations are discovered by law enforcement, firefights 
almost always ensue as traffickers are unwilling to give up 
their cargo and have good reason to believe that they can 
outgun the authorities.249 Of note, the Baluch also control 
trade routes in the reverse direction, such as fuel import 
from Iran to the southern Hilmand districts by the route of 
Taftan.
245 USAID, “The Contribution of Regional Markets to Afghan Wheat Supplies”, 
May 2007.
246 It is estimated that out of Shirabad’s 55,000 inhabitants, 20-30 per cent are 
Afghan refugees; see Nahidsiam doust ,“Women in Iran Gain From Com-
munity approach”,http://www.undp.org.sa/Reports/Choices per cent20Sep 
per cent2004.pdf., September 2004.
247 “Drug Supply Reduction: An overview of drug supply and traﬃcking in 
Iran”, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/iran/drug_crime_situation/dsr/Supply_Re-
duction_trends_and_traﬃcking.pdf.
248 UNODC oﬃce Pakistan, Project document 2003.
249 Iran, for example, has suﬀered considerable human and ﬁnancial costs in 
responding to both direct traﬃc from Afghanistan and the substantial opiate 
shipments arriving via Pakistan (losing 3,500 oﬃcers in 20 years). In response 
to increased traﬃcking, the Iranian government has reportedly spent upwards 
of $600 million to strengthen its border with Pakistan, using ditches, 
barbwire fences and numerous armed checkpoints.
As the drugs change hands, smuggling methods diversify. 
Crossing into the Islamic Republic of Iran, many traffickers 
use camel caravans to avoid raising law enforcement suspi-
cion, but also because of the nature of the terrain. Another 
established route transports drugs to the southern Qasim 
port (international container port), smaller fishing ports 
and open areas of the Makran coast, for onward shipment 
to the Gulf states, East Africa and Europe. Karachi port is 
especially important, according to a 2007 UNODC report, 
as most narcotics entering Karachi come from Balo-
chistan.250 A reverse route from Karachi transports precur-
sors towards Kandahar and Hilmand.
To summarize, the Baluch depend heavily on smuggling 
income and run the dominant smuggling networks heading 
south-west from Afghanistan. However, very little opium 
cultivation occurs on Baluch land, primarily because they 
inhabit mostly non-arable land. Therefore, while not tradi-
tionally interested in Pashtun-led insurgency, the Baluch 
depend on relations with Pashtuns to generate most of their 
drug-related profits. For drug trafficking, by volume, the 
interface between Baluch and Pashtun tribes is probably the 
most significant one between any two ethnic groups in the 
world.
Chagai district
Chagai is perhaps the most important of Pakistan’s districts 
in terms of opiate trafficking. It borders the three key prov-
inces of Hilmand, Kandahar and Nimroz, and large quanti-
ties of drugs are transported through the district center and 
main bazaar, Dalbandin. Much of the land in the areas 
from and around Nokkundi to Dalbandin is reportedly 
owned by the Sanjrani, a Baluch tribe with links to Afghan-
istan.251 The area has long been known as a major transit 
point for Afghan opiates traveling from Hilmand and Kan-
dahar to the Makran coast or to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.252 
In June 2006, Pakistan’s ANF reported the destruction of 
nine laboratories in the area of Malgai, about 800 meters 
away from the Pakistan-Afghan border in the Chagai dis-
trict, seizing 2,137 kg of morphine base, 50 kg of ammo-
nium chloride and huge quantities of arms and ammunition. 
Large seizures in Chagai are mostly related to opium poppy 
cultivation in Hilmand and arrive from the Baramcha 
opiate market in Hilmand’s adjoining Dishu district. That 
district is 80 per cent Pashtun and 20 per cent Baluch, the 
latter mostly present in the border areas.253 A 2002 UNHCR 
report estimated that 10 per cent of the population in 
250 Eisa Nang, UNODC mission report to Pakistan, 21 April – 2 May 2007, p.5.
251 http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?179172.
252 Pierre Arnaud Chouvy, Opium Smuggling routes from Afghanistan to Europe 
and Asia, Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1 2003, http://www.geopium.org/
JIR3.htm.
253 UNHCR Sub-Oﬃce Kandahar, “District proﬁle: Helmand”, 2002, 
http://83.138.163.176/afg/dist_proﬁles/unhcr_district_proﬁles/southern/
helmand/dishu.pdf.
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Dishu was involved in smuggling (mostly opiates), while 80 
per cent are labor migrants in Pakistan, the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran and southern Afghanistan.254 
The “Baramcha route” is of utmost importance to traffick-
ing because of its numerous laboratories, its location on the 
border and large opiates stocks. The main drug hub in the 
area (indeed in all of Afghanistan) is located in this village, 
which straddles the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Baramcha 
is frequently accessed from Nimroz along the Hilmand 
river into Dishu district and is linked by trade routes to the 
Dalbandin bazaar in Balochistan. Hilmand’s labs are fed by 
the same route flowing in the reverse direction and the 
Afghan Border Police officers in Nimroz assessed that most 
precursor chemicals enter Hilmand through Baramcha.255 
Chagai also borders Nimroz. In September 2006, a 
UNODC mission to Nimroz province reported no border 
posts on the entire length of the Nimroz/Pakistan border 
(and only one post on the southernmost 100 km on the 
Iranian border), leaving approximately 300 km of porous 
border for smuggling. ANP officers interviewed during this 
mission stated that the 223 km border with Pakistan is an 
“ideal smuggling route.” The province remains virtually 
isolated from the country’s security apparatus and the 5th 
ABP brigade is reported to be the only government pres-
ence, as neither ISAF nor the ANA maintain a base in 
Nimroz. Like much of Afghanistan, Nimroz has been expe-
riencing rising insecurity since 2005, particularly around 
Zaranj city and the neighbouring district of Khash Rod.256 
ANP officers interviewed in 2006 were reporting persistent 
and growing Taliban activity with extensive links to drug 
trafficking networks,257 a nexus which has intensified in the 
last two years. 
Another of Chagai’s neighboring provinces, Kandahar, is 
dominated by Pashtuns, with minorities of Baluch nomads 
in the south-west Reg district.258 Chagai’s border with the 
Reg district contains a number of well-established smuggling 
routes, controlled by Baluch tribesmen with strong links to 
their kin in Balochistan, Nimroz and Sistan-Balochistan 
(Iran). Chagai also borders the southern part of Kandahar’s 
Shorabak district, populated almost exclusively by the Bares 
(Barech, Bareq), a Pasthun tribe of the smaller Sarbani 
confederation,259 reported to be significantly involved in 
narcotics trafficking (and other forms of smuggling).
Qilla Abdullah district
Qilla Abdullah borders Kandahar’s districts of Spin Boldak, 
Arghestan, as well as parts of Maruf and Shurabak. The 
254 Ibid. 
255 Phone interview with Nimroz border oﬃcial, September 14 2008.
256 Matt DuPee, “Coalition and Insurgents vie for control of southwestern 
Afghanistan Part 1- Nimroz Province”, the Long War Journal, May 25 2008.
257 UNODC mission to Nimroz, 2006. 
258 As well as Hazara, Hindu and Uzbek minorities.
259 http://www.khyber.org/pashtotribes/b/barak.shtml.
population of Qilla Abdullah district was estimated to be 
over 400,000 in 2005, predominantly of the Achakzai 
Pashtun tribe,260 which has a strong presence in Chaman 
and across the border in Kandahar, particularly in the Spin 
Boldak area.261 The Pakistani Achakzais reportedly control 
large sections of the transportation sector in Balochistan262 
and maintain strong links with their brethren in Kandahar. 
The Achakzai and Noorzai tribes also maintain close cross-
border economic ties, again around the strategic Spin 
Boldak/Chaman area. 
In an illustration of how widespread and accepted the 
smuggling activities are, the government of Balochistan’s 
own webpage describes the area of Chaman as “the major 
centre for smuggling activities. It is a paradise for smugglers 
from both sides of the border”.263 In fact, the entire district 
of Qilla Abdullah is one giant smuggling route for hashish 
and opiates. Other research corroborates this – for example, 
in 2006, researchers for the Asian Development Bank 
observed similar phenomena in the adjacent border cross-
ing area of Spin Boldak: “Trucks and cargo as well as people 
and non-motorized vehicle move across the border through 
authorized and unauthorized route going in all directions 
avoiding capture by customs control which is a small tem-
porary shed in front of the border gate or even by customs 
police control a few hundred yards down the road.”264 
A large seizure in December 2008 involved a train of don-
keys carrying more than 550 kg of hashish in the Gulistan 
area.265 The same method was recorded in a similar seizure 
in the same area in July 2008 where 730 kg of hashish had 
been loaded onto pack mules.266 Another large seizure - 
1,200 kg of opium - occurred in the same district in 
November 2008. From this district, narcotics can travel 
west towards the Islamic Republic of Iran but also travel 
directly to Karachi. As an example, in October 2008 the 
Pakistani Coast Guard recovered 220 kg of hashish from a 
vehicle outbound from Qilla Abdullah on its way to Kara-
chi using the main RDC (N-25) highway.267
260 The Achakzai tribe are further divided into into two large sub-groupings, 
the Gujanzais and the Badinzais. They have two major clans living in Qila 
Abdullah, the Mallezai and Ashemi. The Mallezais (and some Asherzais) are 
native to Baluchistan, while most of the Asherzais migrated from neighboring 
Kandahar and other southern provinces of Afghanistan, ﬁrst in the 1950s and 
later in the 1980s. They have since settled permanently in Chaman and other 
parts of the Qilla Abdullah and adjacent Pishin districts.
261 Naval Postgraduate School, Kandahar Provincial Overview, www.nps.edu/
Programs/CCS/Kandahar.html.
262 “Afghans in Quetta: Settlements, Livelihoods, Support Networks and Cross-
Border Linkages” AREU, January 2006, p.17.
263 http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/New Folder/Social Killa Abdulla.htm.
264 Asian Development Bank, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of 
Public Works/Asian Development Bank cross border trade and transport 
facilitation”, Draft Final Report, June 2006, p.43.
265 Associated Press of Pakistan news agency, 02 December 2008.
266  Associated Press of Pakistan news agency, 30 July 2008.
267 Associated Press of Pakistan news agency, 14 October 2008.
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Qilla Saifullah district
This district is centrally located between Quetta and Zhob 
to the north and east, Loralai district to the south and to 
the west by Pishin district and Afghanistan (Kandahar 
province, Maruf district). The district limits start some 88 
km from Quetta on the Quetta- Zhob-Dera Ismail Khan 
road.268 The district sits on a road junction, the Quetta-
Zhob-Dera Ismail Khan (N-50) and the Qilla Saifullah-
Loralai-Dera Ghazi Khan (N-70). It has a total population 
of 200,000 and most of its inhabitants are Pashtuns from 
the Kakar tribe.
Zhob district
Zhob is bounded by Afghanistan and South Waziristan 
(FATA) to the north, to the east by the tribal area adjoining 
Dera-Ismail-Khan district of the NWFP and Musakhel 
district, and to the south and south-west by Loralai and 
Qilla Saifullah districts. This district borders the Afghan 
provinces of Paktika and Zabul (45 km border). Zhob 
district is inhabited mostly by Kakars (Ghurghusht 
confederation),269 Suleymankhels (Ghilzai), Nasirs (Ghilzai), 
Kharotis (Ghilzai). Across the border in Zabul, Ghilzais also 
constitute a majority (over 90 per cent) in the Shamulzayi 
border district and the adjacent Atghar district. The major 
ethnic groups living in adjacent Zabul province are Tohki 
(Ghilzai), Hotak (Ghilzai), Suleymankhels, Kakars, Popalzai 
(Durrani), Nasirs and Shamulzai (Ghilzai).270 
Zhob connects to Afghanistan through a number of cross-
border trails, including at Badini (a village straddling the 
border and connecting with Zinzeer in Pakistan). From 
Zhob, insurgents enter Zabul’s Shalmuzai district, which 
acts as a major militant inflow route into Afghanistan. The 
province has been the site of numerous AGE attacks.271 
268 cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/pk_idv_qillasaifullah.pdf.
269 As well as with Mandokhels, and Sheranis, Haripals, Babars, Lawoons, 
Khosty and Sayeds ; see Chronological introduction to Balochistan, prr.hec.
gov.pk/Chapters/670-1.pdf.
270 In addition to pockets of Ludin and Kuchi nomads; see Zabul Provincial 
proﬁle. UNAMA, 2006. 
271 “Taliban ﬁghters talk tactics while safe in Pakistan?”, Daily Times Monitor, 
November 10, 2006 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006 
Reliable sources assess that in Zabul’s border district (Shal-
muzai) the local insurgency (composed almost totally of the 
Shalmulzai and Hotak tribes) enjoys significant control 
outside the district centre.272 On the border with Paktika, 
UNAMA reports that Taliban insurgents “are believed to be 
running checkpoints opposite Terwa district (Paktika), 
where they host/train foreign fighters, including 
Kashmiris.”273 This same route is identified as a narcotics 
smuggling route.
Although the district has historically been an important 
inter-provincial and international route of illicit 
trafficking,274 law enforcement officers interviewed by 
UNODC did not believe Zhob to be a significant cross-
border smuggling point due to the poor road infrastructure 
on both sides of the border. It was suggested that Zabul’s 
crossing points may not be used by traffickers because of 
the reported difficult mountainous terrain (although less so 
than border provinces in eastern Afghanistan), which grad-
ually becomes less challenging as the border slopes further 
south toward Kandahar. Even so, UNAMA reports indicate 
that 100-150 cars and trucks illegally cross the Zabul-Paki-
stan border on a busy day,275 suggesting that, as in the east, 
trade networks are undaunted by difficult terrain. This is 
logical, since much of Zabul’s economy is linked with Paki-
stan, specifically the Pakistani markets of Muslimbagh (dis-
trict Qilla Saifullah) and Pishin district,276 to which many 
crossing points lead. Nevertheless Zhob district does not 
seem to be a major trafficking area when compared with 
Balochistan’s other districts. 
Pishin district
This district borders parts of Kandahar’s Shorabak and 
Maruf districts. The population is estimated at around 
400,000 and approximately 150,000 Afghan refugees also 
reside in Pishin.277 The major tribes in the district are 
Kakars, Achakzais and Sayeed and Alizai.278 It is the site of 
the Jungle Pir Alizai camp (reportedly closed down in 
2007), home to some 35,000 Afghan refugees in 2007. The 
camp was established following the Soviet invasion in 1979 
and, like Gardi Jangle, it has been described by Pakistani 
officials as a hub for militants and drug traffickers.279 Pishin 
straddles the main transport corridor linking Spin Boldak 
to Quetta to Karachi (National Highway Quetta-Khuzdar-
Karachi) and as such is a major transit district for a signifi-
cant portion of Karachi-bound narcotics.
per cent5C11 per cent5C10 per cent5Cstory_10-11-2006_pg7_11.
272 Interview CNPA Kabul, November 2008.
273 UNAMA Border Crossing Assessment, 2006.
274 S. M. H. Zaidi et al., Programme development of drug abuse control in 
Baluchistan, Pakistan”. 
275 UNAMA Border Crossing Assessment, 2006.
276 Personal communication with traders based in Zabul, Kabul, July 2008. 
277 http://drought.iucnp.org/fertile.htm.
278 District Proﬁle: Northern Balochistan – Pishin, Dawn, http://www.dawn.
com.pk/weekly/herald/herald90.htm.
279 “Afghanistan: After Mullah Dadullah”, South Asia Conﬂict Report: May 
2007, June 11 2007, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.
Terrain on Kandahar’s southern border  
with Pakistan
Source: UNODC provincial office in Kandahar.
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Refugee camps7. 
Millions of Afghans moved to Pakistan after the Soviet 
invasion, with more joining them during the civil war 
(1994-1996) and the war with the Taliban (2001). Although 
refugees have started to move back to Afghanistan, accord-
ing to UNHCR, there were around three million Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan in 2005. According to UNHCR’s 2005 
census, there are 783,545 Afghan refugees in Balochistan, 
and the majority of them are Pashtuns. Most Pashtuns live 
in Quetta or adjoining areas, although there are dispersed 
pockets close to the border with Afghanistan. According to 
UNHCR, Afghan Pashtuns make up 27 per cent of the 
population in Quetta and 20 per cent of the total popula-
tion in the Chagai district (approximately 25,000).280
Conditions in refugee camps are very difficult. Economic 
and social deprivation among young refugees creates fertile 
ground for recruiting insurgents and encouraging extremist 
doctrines.281 The Pakistani government has contended that 
four camps in particular had become sanctuaries for cross-
border insurgents, these are: the Kacha Gari and Jalozai 
camps in NWFP (reportedly closed in 2008) and the Pir 
Alizai and Gardi Jangle in Balochistan.282 Data collected by 
UNAMA and UNDSS suggest that some suicide bombers 
are Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan. According to some 
sources, elements based in the Gardi Jangle camp and the 
adjacent Baramcha bazaar (Hilmand province) provided 
training for suicide bombers.283 In 2002, Gardi Jangle also 
reportedly hosted some fleeing high-ranking Taliban offi-
cials.284 Of importance to this research, a minority of the 
camps are also said to be used by drug traffickers to store 
narcotics and consolidate shipments.285 The two camps 
most often connected to drug traffickers are Pir Alizai 
(Pishin district) and Gardi Jangle (Chagai district), both in 
Balochistan. 286 
Afghanistan’s most prominent drug hub in Baramcha con-
nects with Gardi Jangle in the Dalbandin area of Chagai 
district.287 
Gardi Jangle is located on the main road between Dalban-
280 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.
pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=464dca012.
281 It is worth remembering that the Taliban movement partly grew out of 
Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.
282 Although slated to close in 2008, at the time of this writing the status of Pir 
Alizai and Gardi Jangle remains unclear. 
283 Said T. Jawad, Presentation “Transnational Threats and International Coordi-
nation: Afghanistan in 2008”, George Washington University, February 20, 
2008, http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/ART/AfghanPresentation.pdf.
284 Ilene R. Prusher and Philip Smucker “Al Qaeda quietly slipping into Iran, 
Pakistan”, the Christian Science Monitor, January 14, 2002. 
285 “Afghan refugees concerned over imminent closure of two camps in Balo-
chistan”, IRIN, May 6 2007.
286 Shahzadi Beg, “The Ideological Battle”, p. 171, Institute of regional studies, 
Seminar paper, Islamabad, May 2008.
287 There are reportedly some 43,000 residents still inhabiting the camp. Source: 
Thomas H. Johnson, On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence 
in Afghanistan, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 2 (2007) 
p. 93-129.
din and the Afghanistan border. It is viewed by many 
experts as a consolidation and transshipment point for nar-
cotics and may also be a processing area. The Gardi Jangle 
camp was reportedly closed in 2007 by the Pakistani gov-
ernment, which cited trafficking as the reason for its clo-
sure.288 Although it is located in a remote area and difficult 
to access, it has been the site of some large seizures, includ-
ing 700 kilograms of morphine in 2002 and 574 kilograms 
of hashish in February 2005. One of the most significant 
seizures took place in 2004 and involved 1,600 kilograms 
of heroin found buried in the Baramcha area (Pakistani 
side) in Amuri village.289 From Gardi Jangle narcotics are 
transported to various Pakistani seaports and further to 
Gulf countries or into Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province. 
ABP officers interviewed by UNODC have also asserted 
that Gardi Jangle was the main precursor transit point sup-
plying southern labs.290 The deputy of the Afghan Security 
Council also assessed that many Afghan had used the camp 
as a base.291 Indeed, there appears to be consensus among 
Afghan and Pakistani sources that Gardi Jangle is a narcot-
ics hub and useful to the insurgency. As previously men-
tioned, another probable drug hub is the old refugee camp 
of Pir Alizai (Pishin district), located 62 km west of Quetta 
on the Quetta-Chaman road, populated by a tribe of the 
same name (a sub-tribe of the Achakzai). Jane’s Intelligence 
reports also that many itinerant harvesters come to Hilmand 
during harvest time (May-June) from Gardi Jangle.292 
Highlights of tribal links with opiate trade
The interspersion of ethnic and tribal groups across Afghan-
istan’s borders provides a conducive social environment for 
drug trafficking. This section has highlighted these interac-
tions on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but similar con-
ditions occur on all of Afghanistan’s borders, with similar 
effects on each smuggling route. 
The opium economy presents clear examples of inter-ethnic 
cooperation, such as Pashtun and Baluch traffickers in the 
south. By contrast, in the east, cross-border trafficking is a 
Pashtun affair, sometimes centred on a single tribe, such as 
in Nangarhar, where several border districts are uniquely 
inhabited by one tribe. While some tribes have taken deci-
sions against involvement in the opiate trade, most com-
munities in border areas rely to a greater or lesser extent on 
smuggling and irregular migration. The profit motive 
should not be downplayed, but the strength of the tribe as 
a political unit makes it an important element of analysis of 
trafficking flows, particularly in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan. Indeed, tribalism and the profit motive are 
not mutually exclusive – tribal connections are a vehicle to 
288 BAAG Afghanistan Monthly Review, July 2005, http://www.baag.org.uk/
downloads/monthly per cent20review per cent2005/61 per cent20June per 
cent20 per cent2005.pdf.
289 RILO Monthly Bulletin for Asia and the Paciﬁc, January 2004.
290 UN Mission to Afghanistan Mazar-Sharif and Hairatan, (25-27 March 2008).
291 Interview, deputy security council, November 17 2008.
292 The changing structure of the Afghan opium trade, Jane’s intelligence 2006
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reduce risk and increase profit, which in turn bolsters the 
strength of tribal connections.
Cross-border ethnic links in the north and west of Afghan-
istan – for example among Tajiks – facilitate crime in a way 
familiar from organized crime groups around the world. 
Shared ethnicity creates opportunities for collaboration and 
some social enforcement mechanisms that enhance trust. 
However, in tribal parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan – pri-
marily rural Pashtun areas - these mechanisms are stronger 
to the point of becoming qualitatively different. The prom-
inence of tribal relations in communal politics means that 
involvement in crime is just one decision in a long list that 
is mediated and enforced by custom. This tends to tie indi-
vidual tribal members more closely to criminality – even 
when not personally involved – and encourages them to 
defend their brethren assiduously, with correspondingly 
greater benefits to traffickers than the more commercial 
relationships among trafficking groups that rely on ethnic-
ity in the north and west.
The importance of smuggling to many border communi-
ties’ economies suggests that a nuanced approach to coun-
ter-narcotics is required. It is more difficult for tribal leaders 
to defend a reliance on drug income and it is less threaten-
ing to focus on counter-narcotics rather than irregular trad-
ing more broadly, particularly by engaging through tribal 
structures. Recognizing the significance of tribal politics 
can thereby enable effective responses at the most relevant 
social center of gravity in many of Afghanistan’s prime 
opiate exit points and precursor import routes. 
Corruption8. 
Afghanistan currently ranks in the second lowest percentile 
on the World Bank’s corruption index.293 A significant 
component of this index is based on the activities of cor-
ruption prone government agencies. Survey after survey 
reveals the Afghan perception of law enforcement and 
courts as among the most corrupt institutions in the coun-
try.294 A 2006 poll by the Asia Foundation found that 77 
per cent of Afghans believed corruption was a problem at 
the national level.295 
In Afghanistan, there is corruption among low level law 
enforcement officers, but also members of the judiciary and 
senior government officials. As one author put it “There are 
government officials at the district, provincial, and national 
levels involved in drug-trafficking, who are more interested 
293 http://info.worldbank.org/governance.
294 UNDP, Afghan Human Development Report, 2007.
295 Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People”, 
2008.
Refugee camps and heroin seizure locations in Balochistan, 2002-2008Map 7: 
Source: UNODC individual drug seizure database.
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in making money than in serving their populations”. 296 In 
other words, there are serious accusations that officials are 
receiving kickbacks from organized crime groups in return 
for protection and some may have a direct involvement in 
the drug trade.
At the outset, it is important to make a rough functional 
distinction between low-level/common corruption and high-
level so-called “grand corruption” in Afghanistan. The major-
ity of corruption in Afghanistan is low-level, such as “gift 
payments” to public officials (such as law enforcement and 
court officers) and to other service providers, including in 
the private sector. Related to the opium economy, it involves 
inter alia bribes on the roads and/or border crossings. The 
use of the adjective “low-level” does not mean harmless, This 
corruption of course has a negative impact/ In the above 
examples it drives up the costs of transportation and deprives 
the Afghan government of much needed funds. 
High-level or “grand” corruption refers to corrupt acts per-
formed by politicians and other top state officials (includ-
ing those in administrative positions). In the Afghan 
context, segments of the state apparatus have effectively 
been “captured” by a specific client group, organized crime. 
In this sense it is “not only a failure of state institutions but 
also a means for enrichment and empowerment of political 
elites.”297 
Low-level corruption
Most interactions with government services in Afghanistan 
generally involve some form of bribery.298 A survey con-
ducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan in 2006 revealed 
that nearly half of Afghan households had paid an average 
of US$ 100 in bribes that year.299
A 2006 poll by the Asia Foundation revealed that 36 per 
cent of Afghans said they had had to bribe a police officer 
at some point.300 There have also been allegations of possi-
ble collusion with the drug trade. In 2006, the CNPA 
arrested a former police officer for selling two kilograms of 
heroin to a law enforcement informant. The accused had 
previously directed a special narcotics unit within the Min-
istry of Interior. There have also been cases of drugs con-
cealed and moved in official police vehicles. Similar 
allegations have been made about other agencies such as the 
Afghan National Army (ANA).301
Logistics companies and locals confirmed the existence of 
illegal payment systems across Afghanistan. Interviews with 
296 Seth G. Jones, “the state of the Afghan insurgency”, RAND, December 2007.
297 UNODC et al., “ﬁghting corruption in Afghanistan: a roadmap for strategy 
and action”, February 2007. 
298 UNDP, “Afghan human development report”, 2007.
299 Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), a Survey report, March 2007, Kabul; in 
UNDP, “Afghan human development report”, 2007. 
300 Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People, 
October 2006
301 Naval Postgraduate School, “Summary of Afghan National Army” Program 
for Culture and Conﬂict Studies, http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs
truck drivers in Jalalabad revealed that unofficial customs 
and other taxes were routine at Torkham (Nangarhar-Paki-
stan border) and a number of other crossing points.302 In 
2006, researchers for the ADB made the following observa-
tions: “According to trader sources, there are some 15 check 
points between Torkham and Jalalabad charging anywhere 
between $10-100 per container. Similar assertions have 
been made about other border link roads. During field mis-
sion by road the team observed numerous check points at 
various points along the road especially at entry and exit of 
all cities and towns with personnel collecting ‘fees’ from all 
moving vehicles especially trucks, buses and taxis.”303 In 
some eastern border provinces, district authorities levy an 
illegal tax on each truck crossing into Afghanistan.304
In the case of trade, both licit and illicit, this involves pay-
ment to law enforcement/ANA officers. Rates increase 
when the goods are moved across legal entry points where 
custom officials are the main beneficiaries. Afghan Border 
Police (ABP) and ANA officers frequently accept bribes but 
also demand illegal payments from licit traders and travel-
lers. As the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 
interviews with truckers revealed: “You can fill a truck with 
bricks or for that matter anything else and bribe your way 
from Peshawar to Jalalabad without any documentation.”305 
It should be noted that, in many cases, border control offic-
ers often accept bribes without knowing what commodity 
is being smuggled into the country.
The bribes are not confined to border areas. Indeed, they 
extend to all of Afghanistan’s roads where various law 
enforcement agencies (and warlords) engage in what has 
been termed the “stop-and-bribe.” For example, in July 
2008, a BBC report investigating this practice found that 
the typical two-hour journey from Torkham crossing point 
to Jalalabad (Nangarhar province) was completed in four 
hours due to the number of checkpoints/bribes along the 
way.306 
This practice also exists on a regional level and bribes can 
cost long-distance drivers up to $10,000 a year: “Hauling 
freight across the country, say from Iran to Pakistan’s Khyber 
Pass, a truck could be stopped 400 times.”307 In response to 
informal payments to customs/ABP, many small traders 
prefer to use illegal border crossing points and seek the help 
of specialized smuggling networks to move their commodi-
ties. Of course, other traders simply wish to avoid paying 
302 Interview, Nangarhar, October 2008.
303 Asian Development Bank, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of 
Public Works/Asian Development Bank cross border trade and transport 
facilitation”, Draft Final Report, June 2006, p.41.
304 Interview, Nangarhar, October 2008.
305 Sarah Lister et al., “Understanding markets in Afghanistan: A case study of 
the market in construction materials”, AREU, June 2004. 
306 Bilal Sarwary, “Bribery rules on Afghan roads” July 29 2008, http://www.news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7519189.stm.
307 Arthur Kent, “Covering up Karzai & Co.”, Policy options, Institute for 
research on public policy, July 2007, http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jul07/
kent.pdf.
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legal taxes and circumvent export bans (such as in Paki-
stan). According to customs officers in Kabul, at least US$ 
400 million (which is 3.5 per cent of Afghanistan’s 2008 
GDP) in tax revenue was thus lost in 2008.308 
The impact on Afghanistan’s economy is obvious and the 
main complaint among the business community remains 
the corruption of personnel at border crossings309 and on 
the many checkpoints (official or unofficial) which impede 
commerce and “do nothing to stop the drug business.” In 
April 2007, this continuing practice led to a strike by 
Afghan truckers. 
The opium impact on licit trade is also detrimental to the 
perception of Afghan traders in international commerce. 
The ministry of Commerce and Industry acknowledges this 
in its 2007 strategy paper: “It must be noted also that the 
level of confidence concerning Afghan traders and trans-
port operators is very low due to historic perception that 
many shippers in Afghanistan are involved in smuggling or 
trafficking in illegal drugs.” 
Motivations: Official and unofficial salaries 
Much of this corruption is the outcome of great economic 
hardship. Although there have been significant material 
improvements, the country has not recovered from the 
severe economic crises brought about by 30 years of con-
flict. Afghanistan’s per capita income (US$ 415) put it near 
the bottom of the world’s states in 2008. 
The resulting low salaries of Afghan law enforcement offi-
cials may contribute to fostering an environment in which 
corruption readily occurs. The average salary of civil serv-
ants in Afghanistan is often insufficient to meet basic needs 
and some corruption is clearly a means to supplement the 
low incomes. An Afghan National Army (ANA) recruit 
typically earns only US$ 70 a month310 while judges in the 
provinces reportedly receive around $35-50 per month.311 
All but the most senior law enforcement personnel are 
poorly paid and may thus be susceptible to bribes from 
drug traffickers and others. 
It should be noted, however, that research has not found a 
significant relationship between these two variables (cor-
ruption and low salaries). Additionally, increasing salaries 
may not necessarily provide the most adequate solution. In 
an attempt to stamp out corruption, the Taliban regime 
reportedly raised judges’ salaries ten times. This initiative 
only led to higher bribes and gave judges “the double ben-
efit of raising the salary”.312
308 Interview with Afghan customs oﬃcials, Kabul, March 2009.
309 ADB, “Afghanistan’s trade with CARECC neighbors: evidence from surveys 
of broder crossing points in Hairatan and Sher Khan Bandar”, 2008.
310 Laura Schuurmans, “Peace and Stability, Good Governance and Development 
in Afghanistan”, Institute of regional studies, Seminar paper, Islamabad, May 
2008, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_14831-544-1-30.pdf.
311 “Afghanistan justice sector overview”, UNAMA, April 2007.
312  Johann Wagner, Interview with Ministry of Justice oﬃcial, Kabul, UNODC, 
17.02.2005. 
The issue of salaries notwithstanding, the incentives for 
corrupt behaviour are huge, especially when taking into 
account the amount of drug money circulating outside 
financial structures. One related indicator is the widespread 
knowledge that postings to lucrative border crossings are 
organized by payments to superiors. In Nimroz province, 
prospective border guards apparently have to pay upwards 
of US$ 30,000 to be appointed to work at the border where 
an officer may make US$ 50,000 a month in illegal pay-
ments.313 In Badakshan province, the bribe for getting hired 
as chief of police in border districts was reported to be 
upwards of US$ 20,000.314 This is further corroborated by 
a report from Jane’s Intelligence Review which found that 
in 2006, a mid-level position in the highway police was 
purchased for US$ 25,000.315 Research by UNODC in 
Central Asia mirrors these findings. For example, a 2006 
UNODC study of the Central Asia-China and Central 
Asia-Afghanistan borders found that border guards had to 
pay large bribes to superiors in order to be posted at major 
crossing points.316 
Smuggling and “grand corruption”
There are strong incentives to use illegal border crossings 
and avoid the main roads for low-level licit and illicit trad-
ers. Larger, well-connected trafficking networks, however, 
can count on contacts - and/or afford the bribes needed - to 
move opiates/precursors within and out of Afghanistan. 
These contacts are high-level officials who ensure safe pas-
sage for drug convoys. Once inside the country, the same 
procedures apply, as demonstrated by a 2007 UNODC 
study on opiates flows inside Afghanistan which concluded 
that “approximately 70 per cent of drug trafficking takes 
place along the main roads, sustained by the strong support 
and involvement of the governmental authorities”.317 One 
UNODC surveyor summed it up succinctly “Big dealers 
use big roads, small dealers use small roads”.318 
Corrupt government or law enforcement officials thus 
facilitate the opium chain by enabling smooth trafficking 
operations and neutralizing law enforcement. While there 
are intermittent reports of high-level traffickers being 
arrested on drug-related charges, these are rarely prosecuted 
or dismissed.319 Successful prosecutions of any significant 
traffickers are often overturned by a simple bribe or protec-
tion from above. 
The establishment of the Criminal Justice Task Force 
(CJTF) in May 2005 was partially a response to this 
313 Telephone interviews, Nimroz ABP, July and October 2008..
314 Telephone interview, Nangarhar ABP, October 2008.
315 “The changing structure of the Afghan opium trade”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 
2006.
316 UNODC, “Precursor Control on Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan”, 
2006.
317 UNODC, Monitoring of drug ﬂows in Afghanistan, October 2007.
318 Interview September 2008.
319 Although there have been a number of high-level extraditions to the US.
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problem. According to the CJTF, since April 2007, “The 
number of cases involving middle or high-value targets has 
increased by over 300 per cent in the last year to reach 10 
per cent of the total number of cases. Those prosecuted 
have included a provincial deputy head of the CNPA, 
senior civil servants, former anti-Russian commanders and 
officers in the ANA, ANP, NDS and the Border Police”.320
Prosecuting high-level targets may also be a deadly endeav-
our. Those law enforcement or judiciary officials not con-
nected are reportedly often threatened and sometimes killed 
for interfering with the trade.321 
Corruption and opium poppy cultivation...
Corruption impacts all levels of the opium economy, 
including the production stage. For example, in 2006, the 
Ministry of Interior dismissed a district governor and dis-
trict chief of police after they failed to assist in the pre-
planting campaigns against poppy cultivation. The 
provincial governor alleged that the two were corrupt and 
involved in narcotics trafficking and cultivation. There are 
also consistent reports that eradication police officers nego-
tiate agreements with villagers not to eradicate the poppy 
fields or eradicate the failed crops in exchange for a bribe. 
UNODC weekly eradication reports show that on average, 
only 46 per cent of the existing poppy fields were eradicated 
in each village visited by Afghan governor eradication teams 
in 2008. 
…and security
In the above example, corruption invariably affects the 
poorer segments of Afghan society disproportionally. Those 
who cannot bribe their way out of eradication are the 
poorer farmers who lose their only cash crop while well-
connected or richer landowners go unscathed. In the words 
of a high-ranking CNPA official, “the government is more 
likely to seize or eradicate the poppy while the insurgents 
only tax”.322 This statement was echoed in various forms in 
several interviews in 2008. This has a positive impact on the 
general population’s perception of insurgents, who are seen 
as protectors of the population’s basic livelihood against the 
central government and the international coalition. An 
official from the Ministry of Interior indicated a burgeon-
ing alliance between local farmers and insurgent elements 
to jointly resist Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) Activities”323; 
a phenomenon observed in Badghis and other provinces. 
The previous example illustrates how the precarious secu-
rity conditions undermine eradication (but also interdic-
tion) efforts. Given the security situation, it has become 
virtually impossible to conduct eradication operations in 
320 Information provided by CJTF oﬃcial in the brieﬁng “The criminal Justice 
Task Force – A year of advances”, 2009. 
321 Interview with customs enforcement oﬃcial, Kabul, September 2008; Ethira-
jan Anbarasan, “The leading anti-drugs judge in Afghanistan has been killed”, 
BBC, 05-09-2008.
322 Interview, Nangarhar, October 2008.
323 Interview, Kabul, 2008.
districts under the Taliban, which penalizes farmers in pro-
government districts. These districts are mostly located in 
the south of the country where it is increasingly obvious 
that high corruption is geographically correlated with areas 
of drug production, trafficking and insecurity. Police cor-
ruption was, according to one study, more pronounced in 
the south and west of the country than in the centre and 
north. In interviews conducted in the spring and summer 
of 2005, more than 90 per cent of respondents in the south 
and west preferred the local militias (Arbakee) to state 
police, who are often seen as corrupt and ineffective.324 As 
discussed above, the average Afghans deal with day-to-day 
corruption on a daily basis and in some areas in the south 
there is growing support for the Taliban, which is viewed as 
a preferable alternative to corruption and rampant crime.
Particularly at the lower levels of government, corruption is 
the carrot and violence the stick offered by traffickers to 
induce compliance from officials. When officials facilitate 
or directly engage in trafficking, it is unavoidably a drain on 
public resources, just as trafficking is a distraction from 
insurgency for the Taliban. 
However, for insurgents this poses no greater risk than an 
occasional diversion of time and men. For the government, 
in contrast, opiate-related corruption is a strategic threat. It 
undermines effectiveness and reduces public trust in the 
middle of a war with insurgents who are most fondly 
remembered for straightforward law and order. This brings 
us full circle: opiate trafficking is an overwhelmingly crimi-
nal affair, sometimes recruiting insurgents but of greatest 
threat to Afghanistan in crippling government functions 
and eroding popular support.
Corruption also has a more direct impact on insecurity, as 
many weapons shipments travel “undetected” across illegal 
border crossing points with the help of a small bribe. 
Related to this, officers of the ANA have been caught smug-
gling weapons to insurgents in Logar Province.325 That 
2006 case is on the borderline between wilful official igno-
rance of transnational threat activity and active participa-
tion.
Corruption along drug trafficking routes
Corruption is of course not limited to Afghanistan. Tran-
snational trafficking networks have so far been able to take 
advantage of lax border controls and corruption worldwide 
to transport tens of thousands of metric tons of precursors 
into Afghanistan and ship hundreds of tons of opiates 
across into Europe and through the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Central Asia. 
Corruption is a critical link in the trafficking chain, espe-
324 Gregory Gajewski et al., “How War, a Tribal Social Structure, and Donor Ef-
forts Shape Institutional Change in Afghanistan: A Case Study of the Roads 
Sector”, The Louis Berger Group, September 2007. 
325 Samuel Chan, “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army”, 
S. Rajarathnam School of International Studies, Singapore, June 1 2007. 
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cially as the number of borders to cross increases. It is the 
major facilitating factor all along the drug trafficking routes 
out of Afghanistan and into the European and Asian mar-
kets. Afghanistan ranks as the 176th country out of 180 
according to the 2008 Transparency International corrup-
tion perception index (CPI)326. Neighbouring countries 
face similar problems, as shown in table 63. The CPI is 
particularly low in Afghanistan and its border countries 
(except China) compared to the world average (average CPI 
= 4 for 180 countries in 2008). 
Afghan opiates are trafficked to Europe via the so called 
Balkan route (Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and beyond) and the 
Central Asia route (Afghanistan–Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan/
Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan/Kazakhstan-the Russian Federa-
tion). 
Tajikistan is the most important country in terms of traf-
ficking of Afghan heroin to Russia and beyond. Heroin is 
being trafficked from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan (mainly) or 
Uzbekistan or direct to Russia (by air). Kazakhstan is a hub 
country for Afghan heroin to be trafficked to Russia. The 
CPI for both Kazakhstan and Tajikistanis is very low. In 
Kyrgyzstan the CPI was 1.8 in 2008, and in Kazakhstan, 
2.2. That Central Asian states are still in transition from the 
Soviet period has created a favorable environment for thriv-
ing organized crime and corruption. At the destination 
point, Russia is an important country for the trafficking of 
Afghan heroin as consumer (mainly) and transit country. 
The CPI was also very low for Russia in 2008 (2.1). 
On the Balkan route, the CPI for Turkey is 4.6 and for 
Greece 4.7, which is slightly more than the world average 
in 2008. Bulgaria (CPI = 3.6) and Albania (CPI = 3.4) had 
lower CPIs than the world average in 2008. 
Corruption is not a problem limited to Afghanistan. It 
extends across the region and beyond, including to destina-
tion countries. Corruption poses major challenges to drug 
326 The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people and country analysts; see United Nations “Afghanistan: Pub-
lic Administration Country Proﬁle, January 2006; see also www.transparency.
org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table.
control efforts, but also facilitates all types of transnational 
trafficking apart from opiates; from human beings and 
weapons to smuggled goods and resources such as fuel and 
precious gems. 
Corruption has clearly affected the morale and motivation 
of Afghans. While this study is in no position to assess the 
reliability of all allegations of corruption, one fact remains 
clear: there is palpable general distrust of government and 
its institutions (particularly law enforcement) among the 
Afghan public. 
Insurgents are eager to use this disenchantment through 
information operations and propaganda, but corruption 
has done more damage to the government’s image (and by 
extension the coalition and the international community) 
than any Taliban propaganda campaign. In a sense, the 
Taliban/insurgents derive both financial and political capi-
tal from the opium economy. 
The “corruption problem” in Afghanistan may potentially 
take more time to tackle than the drug culture as the former 
predates the latter. It will necessitate sustained effort and 
the refocusing of significant energy on the part of interna-
tional donors. 
 
CPI* index value for Afghanistan  Table 5: 
and its neighbours
* CPI ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
Country 2008
Afghanistan 1.7
Iran 2.4
Pakistan 2.5
Tajikistan 2.1
Turkmenistan 1.9
Uzbekistan 1.9
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Between 2002 and 2008, Afghan farmers earned a total of 
about US$ 6.4 billion from opium poppy cultivation, and 
Afghan traffickers approximately US$ 18 billion from local 
opiate processing and trading. During the same seven-year 
period, the transnational trade in Afghan opiates produced 
a total turn over of US$ 400 to 500 billion. Arrests figures 
suggest that there may be around 1 million traffickers 
involved in bringing opiates to some 16 million opiate users 
across the world every year. The source of the trade is in 
Afghanistan, but its bulk takes place outside that country.
The difficulties to eliminate opium production in Afghani-
stan and the global dimensions and transnational structure 
of the opiate trade it fuels, clearly suggest that the solution 
to this transnational threat cannot be found in Afghanistan 
alone. With a view to tackle the problem in its broad 
dimensions, the international community and UNODC 
have launched a number of regional and international ini-
tiatives, such as the Paris Pact and UNODC’s Rainbow 
strategy. These efforts must be actively supported and 
expanded to continue strengthening a strategic response 
that is based on (a) a growing understanding of the patterns 
and dynamics of the transnational Afghan opiate trade, and 
(b) on a targeted, sequenced and cost-effective mix of inter-
ventions. 
To continue advancing our understanding of the transna-
tional Afghan opiate trade, some of the priorities for further 
research include:
more and better data on opiate demand, purity and s 
prices to improve the mapping of opiate ﬂows in the 
world; priority South-East Asia, East Asia, Africa, Cen-
tral Asia, Middle East and South-East Europe (regions/
subregions); India, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and Iraq (countries); 
the involvement of insurgent and organized crimes s 
groups in heroin/opium traﬃcking in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan;
money ﬂows related to the transnational Afghan opiate s 
trade;
the role of organized crime groups in running the trade s 
along the Balkan and Northern routes;
the growing trade of Afghan opiates in South-East and s 
East Asia’s retail markets. 
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